Participant Disclosures about Brokerage Accounts


404a-5, broker-dealers, DOL, fiduciary, plan sponsors

The DOL’s 404a-5 regulation places a fiduciary obligation on plan sponsors—in their roles as ERISA plan administrators—to make certain disclosures to participants. In the rush to comply with the 408(b)(2) disclosures, some broker-dealers may have overlooked the participant disclosure guidance about brokerage accounts in Field Assistance Bulletin (FAB) 2012-02.

While the legal obligation is imposed on plan sponsors, the obligation will, as a practical matter, be on broker-dealers, since plan sponsors do not have the information or capability of making these disclosures. As a result, they will turn to their broker-dealers to satisfy the compliance requirements.  Continue reading Participant Disclosures about Brokerage Accounts →

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408(b)(2) Violations and Service Provider Correction Program


408(b)(2), broker-dealers, recordkeeper, registered investment advisers, service providers

The failure of a covered service provider (for example, a broker-dealer, RIA or recordkeeper) to provide adequate 408(b)(2) disclosures results in a prohibited transaction . . . for both service providers and plan sponsors. While the regulation has an exemption for plan sponsors (if they follow certain steps), there is no similar exemption for covered service providers.  Continue reading 408(b)(2) Violations and Service Provider Correction Program →

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Disclosures for Individual Brokerage Accounts


404a-5, 408(b)(2), broker-dealers, DOL

In DOL Field Assistance Bulletin (FAB) 2012-02R, the Department of Labor explained the disclosures for individual brokerage accounts in participant-directed plans. I am concerned that many broker-dealers have not focused on these new “requirements.” That is true for several reasons, including:

  • So much money and energy have been devoted to complying with the plan disclosure requirements, that is, the 408(b)(2) disclosures.
  • The 404a-5, or participant, disclosure requirements are imposed on plan sponsors, in their fiduciary capacity. Stating this slightly differently, the participant disclosures for brokerage accounts are not imposed on broker-dealers, but instead are placed on the shoulders of the plan sponsors. Since it is not a legal responsibility for broker-dealers, it has not received the same attention as the 408(b)(2) disclosures. However, as a practical matter, plan sponsors will turn to the broker-dealers and insist that they satisfy those disclosure requirements. That seems like a reasonable position, since the information is in the control of the broker-dealers.

The FAB provides detailed information about the requirements. To name a few, there is a requirement for a written description of the brokerage account; there must also be an explanation of any fees and expenses that are likely to be incurred in the brokerage account; and, participants must be provided with statements, at least quarterly, describing the fees and charges, both as dollar amounts and in a narrative form.

My sense is that few broker-dealers are prepared to offer assistance at that level of detail. However, I expect that will change now that the work on the 408(b)(2) disclosures is behind us.

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Asset Allocation Models


404a-5, 408(b)(2), DOL

Based on the DOL guidance in FAB 2012-02, many advisers have concluded that asset allocation models (AAMs) can be offered to plans without the need to treat them as designated investment alternatives (DIAs) and, therefore, without the need to report the performance history, expense ratios, etc., of the AAMs.

Unfortunately, that is an oversimplification and may inadvertently lead to problems under both the 408(b)(2) and 404a-5 regulations.  Continue reading Asset Allocation Models →

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408(b)(2) and Plan Sponsors


408(b)(2), fiduciary, plan sponsors

My law firm recently published a bulletin about the responsibilities of plan sponsors, as the “responsible plan fiduciaries,” for reviewing the 408(b)(2) disclosures of covered service providers. A copy of the bulletin can be found at:

http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/resources/publications/2012/
ERISAServiceProviderDisclosuresWhatPlanSponsorsNeedtoDoNow?Section=Publications

While many plan sponsors and almost all advisers understand that fiduciaries must evaluate the compensation of service providers to ensure that it is reasonable, there are other requirements which are less well understood.

For example, there is a requirement that plan sponsors review the disclosures as soon as reasonable to determine whether they have received disclosures from all of the covered service providers and whether the disclosures are complete (that is, whether they include all of the required information). And, it appears that at least part of the review needs to be done by the end of August.

If a plan did not receive disclosures from all of the covered service providers or received inadequate disclosures, plan fiduciaries must request the missing information—in writing. The failure to do so will cause those fiduciaries to be engaged in a prohibited transaction. Furthermore, if a covered service provider does not respond, there are specific steps that fiduciaries must take. Those steps are outlined in our bulletin.

Fiduciaries are required to evaluate the service and status disclosures, in addition to the compensation disclosures. That involves a number of issues, but for the moment, let me mention two. First, one of the status disclosures is whether a service provider is acting as an ERISA fiduciary. However, if a service provider does not expect to be providing services as a fiduciary, it has the option of saying nothing. So, if the 408(b)(2) disclosures do not include a statement of fiduciary status, that means that the service provider does not believe that it is providing fiduciary services. Secondly, the disclosures must be reviewed to determine whether they identify any conflicts of interest. For example, if a service provider would receive higher compensation under one alternative than another, that is a conflict of interest which the fiduciaries must evaluate.

From a risk management perspective, fiduciaries are advised to document those considerations, and their conclusions, in committee minutes.

Take a look at the bulletin. It covers much more than this short article.

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Hedge Funds and Prohibited Transactions


408(b)(2), broker-dealers

In working with broker-dealers and RIAs, I have come to realize that there is some misunderstanding about the application of ERISA’s provisions to investments in hedge funds.

If ERISA plan fiduciaries are given “individualized” advice based on the “particular needs” of the plan (such as asset allocation or non-correlated investments), then the recommendation of an investment in a hedge fund is like any other recommended investment. That is, it can be a fiduciary act by the broker-dealer or the RIA firm. Continue reading Hedge Funds and Prohibited Transactions →

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408(b)(2) Disclosures for Related Parties


408(b)(2), broker-dealers, fiduciary, registered investment advisers, service providers

One of our concerns about disclosures by broker-dealers (and affiliated RIAs) is that they may not fully appreciate the concept of related parties under the 408(b)(2) regulation.

When a broker-dealer is a covered service provider and contracts with others to provide some of the services, the broker-dealer and those other parties are “related” for purposes of the regulation and its disclosure requirements. In those cases, the compensation of the related party (as opposed to the broker-dealer) must be disclosed if it is (1) transactional or (2) charged against the plan’s investments. In some cases, there may be other required disclosures.

Continue reading 408(b)(2) Disclosures for Related Parties →

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Adequacy of Disclosures


408(b)(2), broker-dealers, DOL, fiduciary, prohibited transaction, registered investment advisers

As we get closer to the July 1, 2012 deadline for 408(b)(2) disclosures, more issues emerge concerning the adequacy of disclosures. Of particular concern is the requirement that the disclosures include both monetary and non-monetary compensation. For example, where a mutual fund family or insurance company subsidizes broker-dealer or RIA conferences for plan sponsors or advisers, there is at least an issue of whether those subsidies should be disclosed to the plan sponsor clients of those RIAs or broker-dealers. Another example is where a mutual fund complex or insurance company pays for advisers to attend conferences.

Continue reading Adequacy of Disclosures →

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