Based on the DOL guidance in FAB 2012-02, many advisers have concluded that asset allocation models (AAMs) can be offered to plans without the need to treat them as designated investment alternatives (DIAs) and, therefore, without the need to report the performance history, expense ratios, etc., of the AAMs.
Unfortunately, that is an oversimplification and may inadvertently lead to problems under both the 408(b)(2) and 404a-5 regulations. Continue reading Asset Allocation Models
My law firm recently published a bulletin about the responsibilities of plan sponsors, as the “responsible plan fiduciaries,” for reviewing the 408(b)(2) disclosures of covered service providers. A copy of the bulletin can be found at:
http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/resources/publications/2012/
ERISAServiceProviderDisclosuresWhatPlanSponsorsNeedtoDoNow?Section=Publications
While many plan sponsors and almost all advisers understand that fiduciaries must evaluate the compensation of service providers to ensure that it is reasonable, there are other requirements which are less well understood.
For example, there is a requirement that plan sponsors review the disclosures as soon as reasonable to determine whether they have received disclosures from all of the covered service providers and whether the disclosures are complete (that is, whether they include all of the required information). And, it appears that at least part of the review needs to be done by the end of August.
If a plan did not receive disclosures from all of the covered service providers or received inadequate disclosures, plan fiduciaries must request the missing information—in writing. The failure to do so will cause those fiduciaries to be engaged in a prohibited transaction. Furthermore, if a covered service provider does not respond, there are specific steps that fiduciaries must take. Those steps are outlined in our bulletin.
Fiduciaries are required to evaluate the service and status disclosures, in addition to the compensation disclosures. That involves a number of issues, but for the moment, let me mention two. First, one of the status disclosures is whether a service provider is acting as an ERISA fiduciary. However, if a service provider does not expect to be providing services as a fiduciary, it has the option of saying nothing. So, if the 408(b)(2) disclosures do not include a statement of fiduciary status, that means that the service provider does not believe that it is providing fiduciary services. Secondly, the disclosures must be reviewed to determine whether they identify any conflicts of interest. For example, if a service provider would receive higher compensation under one alternative than another, that is a conflict of interest which the fiduciaries must evaluate.
From a risk management perspective, fiduciaries are advised to document those considerations, and their conclusions, in committee minutes.
Take a look at the bulletin. It covers much more than this short article.
In May 2012, the Department of Labor issued a Field Assistance Bulletin that clarified some of the requirements for participant disclosures under the 404a-5 regulation. However, that Field Assistance Bulletin, or FAB, did more than explain. In some cases, it confused and in others, it shocked.
In working with broker-dealers and RIAs, I have come to realize that there is some misunderstanding about the application of ERISA’s provisions to investments in hedge funds.
If ERISA plan fiduciaries are given “individualized” advice based on the “particular needs” of the plan (such as asset allocation or non-correlated investments), then the recommendation of an investment in a hedge fund is like any other recommended investment. That is, it can be a fiduciary act by the broker-dealer or the RIA firm. Continue reading Hedge Funds and Prohibited Transactions
The 408(b)(2) regulation requires a number of disclosures, including two status disclosures. Those are: Whether the service provider is acting as an ERISA fiduciary; and whether the service provider is acting as an RIA.
Continue reading 408(b)(2) Disclosures and Referrals to Investment Managers
One of our concerns about disclosures by broker-dealers (and affiliated RIAs) is that they may not fully appreciate the concept of related parties under the 408(b)(2) regulation.
When a broker-dealer is a covered service provider and contracts with others to provide some of the services, the broker-dealer and those other parties are “related” for purposes of the regulation and its disclosure requirements. In those cases, the compensation of the related party (as opposed to the broker-dealer) must be disclosed if it is (1) transactional or (2) charged against the plan’s investments. In some cases, there may be other required disclosures.
As we get closer to the July 1, 2012 deadline for 408(b)(2) disclosures, more issues emerge concerning the adequacy of disclosures. Of particular concern is the requirement that the disclosures include both monetary and non-monetary compensation. For example, where a mutual fund family or insurance company subsidizes broker-dealer or RIA conferences for plan sponsors or advisers, there is at least an issue of whether those subsidies should be disclosed to the plan sponsor clients of those RIAs or broker-dealers. Another example is where a mutual fund complex or insurance company pays for advisers to attend conferences.
As you know, I have done a series of short articles about overlooked and misunderstood issues for 408(b)(2) compliance. This article continues that series.
In my last article, I discussed our concerns about the lack of awareness of discretionary investment managers concerning 408(b)(2) disclosures. This article addresses another one of our concerns . . . 408(b)(2) disclosures by advisers who refer investment managers and receive solicitor’s fees.
Covered service providers must make their 408(b)(2) disclosures by July 1, 2012—just weeks away. The failure to make those disclosures will cause their agreements with ERISA plans to become prohibited transactions, resulting in re-payments of compensation to the plans, taxes, interest and penalties.
Continue reading ERISA Disclosures for Discretionary Investment Managers
