Category Archives: FINRA

Most Popular Insights for the Fourth Quarter

Each calendar quarter, I post approximately 12 articles on my blog, fredreish.com. This quarterly digest provides links to the most popular posts during the past three months so that you can catch up on what you missed or re-read them.

  • A Rollover Recommendation is a Securities Recommendation

    The Department of Labor (DOL) considers a rollover recommendation to be a recommendation to liquidate the investments in a participant’s 401(k) account or to transfer (and change) securities. This article discusses how the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority are in alignment with the DOL and why those agencies expect broker-dealers and investment advisers to have information about the investments held in a participant’s account.

  • Discretionary Management of IRAs: Conflicts and Prohibited Transactions

    Where an investment adviser charges different fees for managing fixed income in a portfolio than for managing equities and has discretion to determine the allocation between the two in an IRA, the investment adviser has control over its fees, which appears to violate a prohibited transaction provision in the Internal Revenue Code. The inadvertent violation can be corrected, going forward, by using a blended rate where both allocations are charged the same fee. In other words, there would just be an account fee and not a fee that varied by allocations that are within the control of the investment adviser. This article focuses on allocations among asset classes where the adviser charges different fees.

Share

A Rollover Recommendation Is a Securities Recommendation

Key Takeaways

    • The Department of Labor considers a rollover recommendation to be a recommendation to liquidate the investments in a participant’s 401(k) account or to transfer (and change) securities.
    • In addition, as explained in earlier articles, the DOL considers a plan-to-IRA rollover to be a change of account type, e.g., from a 401(k) account to an IRA account.
    • The SEC and FINRA are in alignment with the DOL’s position that a recommendation to roll over is, in effect, a securities recommendation, e.g., to liquidate the investments in the 401(k) account and rollover cash (since 401(k) plans almost never transfer the plan’s investments to an IRA and in some cases, it would not be legally permissible, e.g., collective investment trusts, CITs).
    • This may explain why the DOL, SEC and FINRA all expect broker-dealers and investment advisers to have information about the investments held in a participant’s account, that is, how can a “sell” recommendation be made without knowing the investments that the recommendation covers.

In the preamble to PTE 2020-02, the DOL explained its view that:

 A recommendation to roll assets out of a Title I Plan is necessarily a recommendation to liquidate or transfer the plan’s property interest in the affected assets and the participant’s associated property interest in plan investments.35 Typically the assets, fees, asset management structure, investment options, and investment service options all change with the decision to roll money out of a Title I Plan. Moreover, a distribution recommendation commonly involves either advice to change specific investments in the Title I Plan or to change fees and services directly affecting the return on those investments.

Continue reading A Rollover Recommendation Is a Securities Recommendation

Share

Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #23

Regulation Best Interest: SEC 2020 Examination Priorities—Examinations for Compliance With Reg BI and the Investment Adviser Interpretation

The SEC has issued its final Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI), Form CRS Rule, RIA Interpretation and Solely Incidental Interpretation. I am discussing the SEC’s guidance in a series of articles entitled “Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors.”

My last post on Best Interest for Advisors #22 discussed the FINRA 2020 Examination Priorities (https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/2020-risk-monitoring-and-examination-priorities-letter.pdf) provisions on examinations for compliance with Reg BI and Form CRS. This article discusses the SEC’s 2020 Examination Priorities (https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/national-examination-program-priorities-2020.pdf) provisions on compliance with Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers (“RIA Interpretation”) and Form CRS (as well as compliance by broker-dealers with Reg BI).

Continue reading Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #23

Share

Alert: FINRA’s 529 Plan Share Class Initiative to Self-Report

FINRA is taking the position that broker-dealers need to evaluate the long-term costs of different share classes in 529 plans. In effect, FINRA is imposing a “best interest” standard on 529 recommendations. For a description of FINRA’s expectations and its new self-disclosure program, here is an article by several of our Drinker Biddle attorneys, including me: FINRA’s 529 Plan Share Class Initiative to Self-Report

Share

Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #2

I am writing two series of articles that together are called “The Bests.” One is about Best Practices for plan sponsors, while the other is about the Best Interest Standard of Care for advisors. Each series is numbered separately to make it easier to identify the subject that is most relevant to you.

This is the second of the series about the Best Interest Standard of Care.

In my last post, I discuss the remarkable similarities among the SEC’s proposed Regulation Best Interest, the SEC’s proposed Interpretation for investment advisors, the DOL’s Best Interest standard of care (which is a combination of ERISA’s prudent man rule and duty of loyalty), and the New York State Best Interest standard for sales of annuities and insurance products. All of those rules require that advisors act with care, skill, prudence and diligence, and that they place the interests of the investor ahead of their own.

In the first post, I conclude that the Best Interest standard requires the following:

  • A careful and skillful professional process measured by the objective standard of a knowledgeable and experienced advisor; and
  • A duty of loyalty to the investor.

This post discusses the type of process that would satisfy the Best Interest standard for all of those rules. However, since the process is not well defined (other than in guidance under ERISA), some of the suggestions in the post may, in fact, be Best Practices. Let me define that term. “Best Practices” means that the advisor is doing more than is required by the law. While Best Interest may be required, Best Practices is not; it is voluntary. As a result, Best Practices are for advisors who desire to excel, while Best Interest is for advisors who want to be compliant.

In my view, a combination of Best Interests and Best Practices suggests that advisors should use the following process:

  • Gather the information that is relevant to providing Best Interest advice. (“Relevant” means the information that is necessary to develop a recommendation that is appropriate for the investor. A synonym in this circumstance would be “material” information. If information about the needs and circumstances of the investor could affect the recommendation, then it is material and relevant).
  • Consider the types of investments (and insurance products) and strategies that are appropriate for the investor based on the analysis of the investor’s profile (that is, based on analysis of the relevant information). In effect, this step is the formulation of a strategy for the investor based on the products and services available to the advisor. While there may be some flexibility if the advisor only has access to limited types of products, that flexibility is limited, in the sense that any recommendation will still be measured by the Best Interest standard of care.
  • Select the particular investments, insurance products and services that will be recommended to the investor, that is, that will populate and implement the investment strategy. As the SEC said in its proposed guidance, while cost and compensation are not the only factors to be considered, their significance is enhanced under the SEC proposals. In other words, they are major considerations. Another obvious important consideration is the quality of the product. That includes the “management” of the product, for example, the investment advisor for a mutual fund, the investment manager for an investment service, and the insurance company issuing an annuity contract or life insurance policy.

I suspect that, if an advisor gets into trouble because of his or her recommendations, it will be the result of an inappropriate (and perhaps unsuitable) strategy, excessive costs and compensation, or inferior quality of the “manager” of the product.

That begs the question of, how does an advisor demonstrate a Best Interest process? Other than for the DOL and ERISA plans, there is not a requirement to maintain documentation of the process. However, it probably goes without saying that a well-documented process is good risk management (and, for that matter, that a well-documented process is likely to be a prudent process).

In the next year or two, the SEC may enhance its guidance to further define the processes that are needed to satisfy its Best Interest standard. More certainly, though, the SEC, FINRA, DOL and New York State regulators will, in due course—perhaps over the next three years or so—begin their enforcement activities. Unfortunately, it’s possible that we may see “regulation by enforcement,” meaning that the holes in the guidance are filled in by the enforcers, rather than the regulators.

To automatically receive these articles in your in box, you can sign up on my blog at http://fredreish.wpengine.com/insight/. Just enter your name and email address under the “sign up for our e-newsletter” option, and click on the button to subscribe.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

 

Share

Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #100

Investment Advisers and the SEC’s Interpretation of Their Duties: Part II

This is my 100th article about interesting observations—or “angles”—concerning the Department of Labor’s Fiduciary Rule and the SEC’s “best interest” proposals.

Part I of this post discussed the application of the SEC’s best interest standard to recommendations to participants to take distributions and rollover to IRAs. It also discussed the apparent requirement for a thoughtful and professional process to develop the recommendation. However, it reserved for this post, Part II, the factors to be considered in that process.

The RIA Interpretation lists a number of factors to consider in the best interest process. However, most of them apply to investment recommendations, rather than advice about distributions. But a few are helpful. For example, the costs of investments and services and consideration of the investor profile are relevant factors.

Under Reg BI, though, the SEC is a little more helpful. For example, Reg BI says that an advisor should engage in a careful, skillful, diligent and prudent process. Reg BI also refers to FINRA Regulatory Notice 13-45 in several places. That Regulatory Notice requires that the information about the important factors (see below) be gathered and considered in light of the investor profile. While the Regulatory Notice says that the rollover recommendation must be suitable in light of these factors, the RIA Interpretation and Reg BI add that the recommendation must be in the “best interest” of the participant and that the interests of advisors and their firms cannot supersede those of the participant.

Although vacated by the 5th Circuit, the DOL’s Best interest Contract Exemption (BICE) described a prudent process, using language similar to the SEC’s proposed Reg BI . . . care, skill, prudence and diligence. In addition, the DOL’s BICE also said that information needed to be gathered about the relevant factors and those factors should be evaluated in light of the needs and circumstances of the participant. In other words, the SEC’s proposals and the DOL’s vacated rule are remarkably similar on rollover recommendations.

In sum, I think that it’s fair to say that, in order for the SEC’s best interest standard to be satisfied, an advisor (of a broker-dealer or an RIA) must engage in a process where the advisor gathers, and carefully and professionally considers, the relevant information. That process would need to satisfy the best interest and loyalty standards.

But, what are the relevant factors? The leading guidance on that question is found in FINRA Regulatory Notice 13-45 and the DOL’s vacated BICE (including a FAQ issued by the DOL). Boiled down to the essence, those materials say that advisors must consider, at the least, the investments, services and expenses in the plan; the investments, services and expenses for the proposed rollover IRA; and information about the participant (for example, financial objectives, needs, and risk tolerance). It would also be permissible to consider other factors, such as participant preferences, outside assets, other family investments, and so on.

While BICE has been vacated, it likely reflects the DOL’s current thinking about a prudent process and, as a result, could be applied by the DOL to situations where fiduciary advisors make recommendations of distributions and rollovers. (See DOL Advisory Opinion 2005-23A.) Also, since the DOL has the most experience with plan distributions, FINRA and the SEC may defer to the DOL’s thinking in this area. And, while the FINRA Regulatory Notice only covers recommendations by broker-dealers and their advisors, I doubt that the standard for RIAs would be lower than the standard for broker-dealers.

As a result, investment advisers should develop processes for gathering and considering information about the investments (and fees, costs and services) available to the participant in the plan, and compare them to similar information for a proposed IRA, in light of the investment profile of the participant.

And, keep in mind, as I mentioned in Part I of this article, the SEC’s Interpretation RIA reflects current SEC thinking. This is not something to be put off for the future.

NOTE: This article discusses rollover recommendations to participants in participant directed plans. The issues for “pooled” plans are different. In particular, the analysis for defined benefit plans can be more complex.

NOTE: While the DOL’s vacated Fiduciary Rule would have applied to private sector, ERISA-governed retirement plans, the SEC’s guidance applies to participants in all plans, including government plans.

To automatically receive these articles in your in box, you can sign up on my blog at http://fredreish.wpengine.com/insight/. Just enter your name and email address under the “sign up for our e-newsletter” option, and click on the button to subscribe.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

Share

Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #94

SEC Proposed Reg BI and Recommendations of Rollovers (Part 3)

This is my 94th article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor’s (DOL) fiduciary rule and exemptions and the SEC’s “best interest” proposals.

Part 1 of this series discussed the provisions in the SEC’s proposed Regulation Best Interest that would impose a best interest standard of care for rollover recommendations by broker-dealers and their registered representatives. (More specifically, the standard applies if the rollover recommendation involves securities transactions—which would ordinarily be the case for participant-directed plans.) Part 2 described some of the considerations for developing a best interest recommendation process.

This article—Part 3—describes the proposed requirement to “mitigate” the conflict of interest inherent in a rollover recommendation.

Since a broker-dealer and its representative would not, in most cases, receive any compensation if a participant does not roll over, there is, to use the SEC’s language, a material conflict of interest involving financial incentives. In that regard, Reg BI says that a broker-dealer must disclose and mitigate or, alternatively, eliminate the financial incentive conflict of interest. (This article refers to broker-dealers, but that includes the registered representative, or advisor.)

Of course, it’s impossible to eliminate the conflict, since—if the money stays in the plan—the broker-dealer will not earn anything. But if the money is rolled over, the broker-dealer will receive compensation from the rollover IRA. As a result, the only practical choice would be to disclose and mitigate. While the SEC does not give an example of mitigation of the conflict in the context of a rollover recommendation, the SEC does cite FINRA Regulatory Notice 13-45 on several occasions. RN 13-45, in turn, requires that a broker-dealer and its representatives make a reasonable inquiry about the participant’s plan account. After all, how can a recommendation be made in a manner that is careful, skillful, diligent and prudent (the Reg BI requirements) if the broker-dealer does not have any information about the investments that it is recommending be sold? (Since participant-directed plans such as 401(k) plans typically only distribute cash, a rollover recommendation inherently incudes a recommendation to sell the investments in the participant’s account.)

RN 13-45 requires an analysis of, among other things, the investments, services and expenses in the plan. For those of you who have studied the DOL’s Best Interest Contract Exemption, you will recognize those as the three primary factors listed by the DOL for consideration in making a fiduciary rollover recommendation. In other words, proposed Reg BI (including the references to RN 13-45) and the Best Interest Contract Exemption are remarkably similar.

Where does that leave us?

Bottom line, the best “mitigation” appears to be a process that ensures that the recommendation is in the best interest of, and loyal to, the participant.

That means that broker-dealers are in essentially the same position as they were under BICE. They need to gather and evaluate appropriate information about the investments, services and expenses (among other things) in the plan; the investments, services and expenses (among other things) in the proposed IRA arrangement; and the needs, circumstances, risk tolerance, and preferences of the participant.

Broker-dealers need to develop a process for doing that, together with policies and procedures, training and supervision. That process should produce a reasonable and informed recommendation in the best interest of the investor.

Similar requirements are imposed on RIAs. That will be the subject of a future post.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

 

 

Share

Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #93

SEC Proposed Reg BI and Recommendations of Rollovers (Part 2)

This is my 93rd article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor’s (DOL) fiduciary rule and exemptions and the SEC’s “best interest” proposals.

In my last post, I described the similarities between the SEC proposed Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI) and the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule (and especially the Best Interest Contract Exemption [BICE]) regarding recommendations to participants to take distributions and roll over into IRAs. The similarities include a best interest standard of care and the treatment of conflicts of interest. This article discusses the requirement of the best interest standard of care in Reg BI and compares it to the standard of care in BICE (and the requirements of FINRA Regulatory Notice 13-45). My next article—Part 3—will cover the conflict of interest issues.

In its discussion of recommendations about distributions and rollovers in proposed Reg BI, the SEC says that, where the recommendation involves a securities transaction, the best interest standard of care will apply to broker-dealers. The SEC goes on to describe the best interest standard of care as requiring care, skill, prudence and diligence and making a recommendation that is in the best interest of, loyal to, the participant.

With regard to the question of whether a recommendation to take a distribution and roll over is a securities transaction, the SEC refers to FINRA Regulatory Notice 13-45. The SEC guidance and that Regulatory Notice, in combination, point out that, in the typical recommendation to a 401(k) participant, there are two securities transactions. The first transaction is the liquidation of the investments in a participant’s account, since a distribution cannot ordinarily be made without first selling the investments in the account. (In other words, a recommendation to take a distribution usually inherently includes a recommendation to sell the investments in the participant’s account.) The second transaction is in the rollover IRA, where a new investment recommendation will be made. As a result, distribution and rollover recommendations to 401(k) and 403(b) participants will ordinarily involve two securities transactions and both will be subject to the proposed best interest standard of care.

However, the SEC does not discuss the process and analysis required to make a best interest recommendation of a distribution. As discussed above, though, the SEC makes a number of references to Regulatory Notice 13-45. That notice goes into some detail that the information needed to evaluate whether a rollover recommendation would be suitable. It seems safe to assume that, at the least, the same information would be required for a best interest recommendation.

In its Regulatory Notice, FINRA points to a number of factors to be considered, including the investments, services, and fees and expenses in the plan. A broker-dealer will need to gather information in order to evaluate those factors . . . and then compare them to the services, expenses, and investments in the proposed rollover IRA. That analysis must be done in light of the financial needs, circumstances and preferences of the participant.

While it is easy to say that plan information is needed, it is hard to find that information.

How do I know that? It is because those are the same factors that the DOL said were primary considerations for making a best interest recommendation under BICE.

The DOL, SEC and FINRA have converged to agree on the important factors that need to be considered to make a rollover recommendation. However, it’s proven to be difficult to gather information about plan investments, expenses and services. Fortunately, though, the DOL did offer guidance for situations where it was not possible to find the information. I assume that the SEC and FINRA will share the alternative approach provided by the DOL, which was described in a set of FAQs. Broadly stated, the DOL permits use of “alternative data” where a participant cannot find, or does not want to use, the primary plan data.

Also, I should point out that there continues to be an education alternative, which is that a broker-dealer can provide distribution and rollover education, rather than making recommendations. However, it’s important that the education be unbiased and relatively complete. Otherwise, it could be viewed as a disguised recommendation.

In my next post, I will discuss the conflict of interest issues where distribution and rollover recommendations are made.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

Share

Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #92

SEC Proposed Reg BI and Recommendations of Rollovers (Part 1)

This is my 92nd article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor’s (DOL) fiduciary rule and exemptions and the SEC’s “best interest” proposals.

On April 18, 2018, the SEC released three proposals for comment—Regulation Best Interest (“Reg BI”) for broker-dealers, an Interpretation about the Standard of Conduct for RIAs (“RIA Interpretation”), and a CRS—Customer/Client Relationship Summary for both broker-dealers and RIAs. That was the beginning of a lengthy process, and the outcome is uncertain. However, if these rules are finalized, the impact on the securities industry and investors will be significant.

My first reaction is that Reg BI, which imposes a best interest standard of care on broker-dealers, is strikingly similar to the DOL’s Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE). There are major differences—for example, the SEC proposal does not create a private right of action for investors, and some of the disclosure requirements are eliminated. However, once you get beyond the differences, the similarities are striking.

Let’s discuss the SEC’s Best Interest standard for broker-dealers in the context of recommendations of plan distributions and rollovers.

First, the SEC acknowledges that a rollover recommendation involves an inherent conflict of interest. In footnote 204 the SEC states: “For example, firms and their registered representatives that recommend an investor roll over plan assets to an IRA may earn commissions or other fees as a result, while a recommendation that a retail investor leave his plan assets with his old employer or roll the assets to a plan sponsored by a new employer likely results in little or no compensation for a firm or a registered representative.”

On pages 82 and 83 of the Reg BI package, the SEC explains that “Securities transactions may also include recommendations to rollover or transfer assets from one type of account to another, such as recommendations to roll over or transfer assets in an ERISA account to an IRA.”

The significance of rollovers being classified as “securities transactions” is that the proposed best interest standard of care applies to recommendations of securities transactions. That is, a recommendation to a participant to take a distribution from his or her 401(k) plan and roll over to an IRA is, in effect, a recommendation that the participant sell the mutual funds in his or her account and rollover the cash proceeds.

In fact, the rollover process involves two securities transactions. In footnote 155, the SEC explains: “A recommendation concerning the type of retirement account in which a customer should hold his retirement investments typically involves a recommended securities transaction, and thus is subject to FINRA suitability obligations. For example, a firm may recommend that an investor sell his plan assets and roll over their cash proceeds into an IRA. Recommendations to sell securities in the plan or to purchase securities for a newly-opened IRA are subject to FINRA’s suitability obligations. See FINRA Regulatory Notice 13-45.”

In addition to the existing suitability obligation, Reg BI would impose a best interest standard of care, including a duty of loyalty, such that the recommendation to sell the investments in the plan (for example, a 401(k) plan) would be subject to both suitability and best interest. The suitability and best interest standards would also apply to recommendations about the re-investment of distributed money in an IRA.

That raises a question about how a best interest recommendation of a distribution and rollover should be made. What steps should be followed? That will be the subject of my next article.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

Share

Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #90

Parallels Between the SEC Regulation Best Interest and the DOL Best Interest Contract Exemption (Part 1)

This is my 90th article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor’s (DOL) fiduciary rule and exemptions. These articles also cover the DOL’s FAQs interpreting the regulation and exemptions and related developments in the securities laws.

The SEC’s proposed Regulation Best Interest (“Reg BI”) is remarkable in its similarities to the DOL’s vacated Best Interest Contract Exemption (“BICE”). This article describes some of those similarities. Keep in mind as you read this that Reg BI applies to securities recommendations, while BICE would have covered any investment or insurance recommendation by a fiduciary advisor.

Reg BI, if finalized, will require that broker-dealers and their representatives act in the “best interest” of “retail customers,” which includes IRA owners and participants. The DOL’s BICE also would have required that fiduciary advisors (including broker-dealers and their representatives) act in the “best interest” of participants and IRA owners. A major difference is that the SEC proposal covers all retail customers, while the DOL’s BICE would have covered “qualified accounts”—which includes only plans, participants and IRA owners. (I should note that Reg BI says that it covers recommendations to “legal representatives” of retail customers. That reference could include the trustees and plan committees for retirement plans. However, it’s not clear.)

Also, Reg BI is similar to BICE in that it covers recommendations to participants to take distributions from retirement plans and roll over to IRAs. Reg BI only applies where securities recommendations are made. But it appears to be the position of both the SEC and FINRA that a recommendation to take a distribution from a 401(k) plan implicitly includes a recommendation to liquidate the investments in the participant’s account, which would be a securities transaction. (I will get into more detail about recommendations to participants to take distributions and roll over to IRAs in a future article.)

In addition, both Reg BI and BICE include a duty of loyalty for recommended securities transactions. While the wording in the two pieces of guidance is slightly different, the outcome is the same . . . broker-dealers and their representatives cannot prioritize their own interests ahead of the interests of investors.

While some people refer to the new standard of care as being “suitability plus” or “enhanced suitability,” I see it differently. Based on my reading of the guidance and on comments by SEC commissioners, the suitability standard is incorporated into the new Best Interest Standard of Care, rather than the other way around. As a result, it might be better referred to as “transactional best interest.”

Unfortunately, the SEC proposal does not fully define the Best Interest Standard of Care. However, it does say that broker-dealers and their representatives have to act with “diligence, care, skill, and prudence,” which was also in the DOL’s Best Interest Standard of Care. (As an aside, the requirement to act diligently, carefully, skillfully, and prudently suggests the need for a process—similar to ERISA’s prudent man rule.) The proposed Reg BI goes on to say that its duty of care is based on the principles in the DOL’s Best Interest Standard of Care. To me, that means that a starting point for understanding the Reg BI requirements is to look at the DOL’s Best Interest Standard of Care which says that:

Investment advice is in the ‘‘Best Interest’’ of the Retirement Investor when the Adviser and Financial Institution providing the advice act with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims, based on the investment objectives, risk tolerance, financial circumstances, and needs of the Retirement Investor, without regard to the financial or other interests of the Adviser, Financial Institution or any Affiliate, Related Entity, or other party.

If you read that closely, it easily divides into three categories: a prudent person rule; a know-your-customer requirement; and a duty of loyalty. The preamble to the proposed Reg BI discusses those three principles as being key elements of its standards.

However, while the proposal would require best interest for recommendations of securities transactions, it would not mandate a duty to monitor. That is significantly different from the role of an investment adviser (RIA), where best interest monitoring is generally expected.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

Share