Category Archives: registered investment advisers

Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #91: Rollover Recommendations to Participants in Government Plans

Key Takeaways

The DOL’s expanded definition of fiduciary advice is described in the preamble to PTE 2020-02. The PTE then provides relief for conflicted non-discretionary recommendations (for example, rollover recommendations), if its conditions are satisfied.

However, the DOL’s guidance in the PTE does not apply to rollover recommendations to participants in government plans.

Rollover recommendations by broker-dealers and investment advisers to participants in government retirement plans are regulated by the SEC. Stated slightly differently, the SEC regulates rollover recommendations by broker-dealers and investment advisers to both private sector and government plan participants.

This article discusses the SEC regulation of rollover recommendations.

Background

The DOL’s prohibited transaction exemption (PTE) 2020-02 (Improving Investment Advice for Workers & Retirees), allows investment advisers, broker-dealers, banks, and insurance companies (“financial institu­tions”), and their representatives (“investment professionals”), to receive conflicted compensation resulting from non-discretionary fiduciary investment advice to ERISA retirement plans, participants (including rollover recommendations), and IRA owners (all of whom are referred to as “retirement investors”). In addition, in the preamble to the PTE the DOL announced an expanded definition of fiduciary advice, meaning that many more financial institutions and investment professionals are fiduciaries for their recommendations to retirement investors and, therefore, will need the protection provided by the exemption.

Under these standards, a rollover recommendation will ordinarily be nondiscretionary fiduciary advice and result in a financial conflict of interest that is a prohibited transaction under both ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code. But, since the recommendation is nondiscretionary, PTE 2020-02 will provide relief, but only if all of its conditions are met.

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Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #67: Compliance with PTE 2020-02: Factors to Evaluate for a Rollover Recommendation (Part 3)

The DOL “Fiduciary Rule,” FAQ 15: Factors to Evaluate for a Rollover Recommendation (Part 3)

This series focuses on the DOL’s new fiduciary “rule”, which was effective on February 16. This, and the next several, articles look at the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) issued by the DOL to explain the fiduciary definition and the exemption for conflicts of interest.

Key Takeaways

  • The DOL FAQs generally explain PTE 2020-02 and the expanded definition of fiduciary advice.
  • FAQ 15 explains the DOL’s opinion on the factors to be considered in the process of determining whether a rollover recommendation is in the best interest of a plan participant. In order to obtain relief from the prohibited transaction that results from a rollover recommendation where the financial institution and the investment professional are fiduciaries for the recommendation, the Impartial Conduct Standards must be satisfied during the period from February 16, 2021 until December 20, 2021 under the DOL’s non-enforcement policy (with concurrence by the IRS), and then on December 21, all of the conditions of PTE 2020-02 must be satisfied.
  • However, the requirement that a rollover recommendation satisfy the best interest standard of care is not delayed until December 21, since the Impartial Conduct Standards require that a financial institution and an investment professional satisfy the best interest standard of care. FAQ 15 explains the DOL’s view on what is required to do that.

Background

The DOL’s prohibited transaction exemption (PTE) 2020-02 (Improving Investment Advice for Workers & Retirees) allows investment advisers, broker-dealers, banks, and insurance companies (“financial institutions”), and their representatives (“investment professionals”), to receive conflicted compensation resulting from non-discretionary fiduciary investment advice to retirement plans, participants and IRA owners (“retirement investors”). In addition, in the preamble to the PTE the DOL announced an expanded definition of fiduciary advice, meaning that many more financial institutions and investment professionals will be fiduciaries for their recommendations to retirement investors and, therefore, will need the protection provided by the exemption.

In April, the DOL issued FAQs that explain the fiduciary interpretation and the conditions of the exemption.

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Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #35

Comparing the DOL Proposal to the Broker-Dealer and RIA Standards of Conduct

Broker-dealers and investment advisers are now governed by a best interest standard of care. Those standards are based largely on the same fiduciary principles that are incorporated into the ERISA prudent man standard. The DOL recently extended the ERISA standard to an expanded definition of fiduciary status in a new interpretation found in the preamble to its proposed Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) for advice to plans, participants and IRAs. Among the conditions in the PTE is a requirement that advisors adhere to a best interest standard of care which, like its broker-dealer and RIA counterparts, is a combination of a duty of care and a duty of loyalty. This continues the convergence of the fiduciary standards for investment advisers and fiduciary advisors and the fiduciary-like standard for broker-dealers.

My colleagues, Joan Neri and Bruce Ashton, and I have recently written an article describing the similarities (and some differences) among those three pieces of guidance. The article includes a chart, which should make it easier to compare the different relevant provisions from the guidance.

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Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #29

Best Interest Standard and Recommendations of Rollovers and Withdrawals

On June 15, SEC Chairman Clayton issued a statement partially entitled:  “Need for Increased Care when Recommending 401(k)/IRA Rollovers and Withdrawals . . .”. As that title suggests, the Chairman’s statement covers areas where the SEC will focus on recommendations when Reg BI applies on June 30. One of those areas of “increased care” is the recommendation of rollovers (and other withdrawals) from retirement plans.

The best interest standard for investment advisers became applicable last year. As a result, the Chairman’s statement already applies to rollover recommendations by investment advisers.

One part of the statement is entitled:  “Areas Where Increased Care May be Necessary When Making Recommendations to Main Street Investors“. In that part, the statement says:

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Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #26

Regulation Best Interest: Recommendations of Account Types (Part 2)

The SEC has issued its final Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI), Form CRS Rule, RIA Interpretation and Solely Incidental Interpretation. I am discussing the SEC’s guidance in a series of articles entitled “Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors.”


In my last post (Best Interest for Advisors #25), I discussed the SEC guidance for broker-dealers and investment advisers on recommendations of account types. The article explained that investment advisers are subject to the best interest standard for recommending account types (since July of last year) and broker-dealers will be subject to the new best interest rules for recommending account types (beginning June 30 of this year).

The focus of the article, though, was to define what an account type was. As the article explained, “account type” is to be interpreted very broadly and includes many programs and accounts that may not obviously be considered types of accounts. As a result, the first compliance step for broker-dealers and investment advisers is to identify all of the account types they offer. Then those firms can develop the processes for their advisors to consider the types of accounts (and compare different types of accounts) offered by the firm . . . in light of the investor’s needs. (The rules apply to retail customers of broker-dealers and all clients of investment advisers.)

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Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #25

Regulation Best Interest, RIA Interpretation and Consideration of “Account Types” (Part 1)

The SEC has issued its final Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI), Form CRS Rule, RIA Interpretation and Solely Incidental Interpretation. I am discussing the SEC’s guidance in a series of articles entitled “Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors.”


Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI) and the Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers (RIA Interpretation) require that broker-dealers  and investment advisers evaluate the account types their firms offer—in light of the investor’s investment profile—to make a best interest recommendation. In other words, both types of firms, and their advisors, must first consider the account type that is appropriate for the investor. That raises the obvious question of “What is an account type?”

Before answering that question, let’s look at what the SEC said about the need to consider account types as a part of a best interest process.

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Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #23

Regulation Best Interest: SEC 2020 Examination Priorities—Examinations for Compliance With Reg BI and the Investment Adviser Interpretation

The SEC has issued its final Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI), Form CRS Rule, RIA Interpretation and Solely Incidental Interpretation. I am discussing the SEC’s guidance in a series of articles entitled “Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors.”

My last post on Best Interest for Advisors #22 discussed the FINRA 2020 Examination Priorities (https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/2020-risk-monitoring-and-examination-priorities-letter.pdf) provisions on examinations for compliance with Reg BI and Form CRS. This article discusses the SEC’s 2020 Examination Priorities (https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/national-examination-program-priorities-2020.pdf) provisions on compliance with Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers (“RIA Interpretation”) and Form CRS (as well as compliance by broker-dealers with Reg BI).

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Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #21

Regulation Best Interest: Rollover Recommendations and Mitigation of Advisor Incentives (Rollovers Part 7)

The SEC has issued its final Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI), Form CRS Rule, RIA Interpretation and Solely Incidental Interpretation. I am discussing the SEC’s guidance in a series of articles entitled “Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors.”

This is the 7th of my series of articles about rollover recommendations and rollover education under the SEC’s Regulation Best Interest and its Interpretation for Investment Advisers. (For the first six, see Best Interest for Advisors #’s 15161718, 19 and 20.)


This article deals with the Reg BI requirement that broker-dealers mitigate the incentives that might induce their advisors to make rollover recommendations that are not in the best interest of participants. Specifically, that requirement (which applies on June 30, 2020) is:

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