Category Archives: fiduciary

Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #56

The Department of Labor has reversed its position on the issues discussed in the article below. Angles article #58 explains the changes.

Recommendations of Contributions as Fiduciary Advice

This is my 56th article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule and exemptions. These articles also cover the DOL’s FAQs interpreting the regulation and exemptions and related developments in the securities laws.

The Department of Labor’s Request for Information on the fiduciary rules and exemptions focuses on a number of issues that became apparent as financial institutions and advisers work to comply with the new requirements. One of these, which is addressed in the RFI, but which has not been generally discussed, is that a recommendation of a contribution, or of increased contributions, to plans and IRAs is a fiduciary act. As a result, if the recommended contribution causes higher compensation to be paid to the adviser (or the adviser’s financial institution), the recommendation would result in a prohibited transaction.

The problems are obvious. Even though there is a potential conflict of interest where an adviser could make a little more money because of the increased contributions, the benefits to participants of increasing their retirement savings in plans and IRAs are meaningful. In that regard, it seems that public policy would favor increased contributions to IRAs and plans, even though there may be some minor benefit to the person making the recommendation.

With that in mind, the Department of Labor’s RFI asked:

Contributions to Plans or IRAs

Should recommendations to make or increase contributions to a plan or IRA be expressly excluded from the definition of investment advice? Should there be an amendment to the Rule or streamlined exemption devoted to communications regarding contributions? If so, what conditions should apply to such an amendment or exemption?

The first question is whether a recommendation to make those contributions should be viewed as a fiduciary act. My view is that it should not. The benefits of increased contributions are so obvious, and the potential conflict is so small, that the easiest, and most direct, solution would be for the DOL to conclude that a recommendation to make or increase contributions is not fiduciary advice.

However, if the DOL doesn’t do that, it should follow through with a favorable response to the second question. In its essence, the DOL’s second question is whether there should be a streamlined exemption for contribution recommendations. A truly streamlined exemption might work. However, usually exemptions have conditions. If those requirements are more than di minimus, the rules would likely create a trap for the unwary. In saying that, I mean that many advisers might not be aware of those additional requirements when recommending that a retirement investor save more in his or her IRA or plan.

Hopefully, the DOL will conclude that recommendations to a participant or IRA owner to increase their retirement contributions is not a fiduciary act. If they conclude otherwise, a recommendation to make or increase contributions would result in a prohibited transaction . . . and an exemption will be necessary. Unless it is an exemption without conditions (which is rare, but possible), there will undoubtedly be inadvertent violations.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

 

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #55

The DOL’s RFI and the Recommendation of Annuities

This is my 55th article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule and exemptions. These articles also cover the DOL’s FAQs interpreting the regulation and exemptions and related developments in the securities laws.

The Department of Labor’s Request for Information (RFI) on the fiduciary rule and exemptions does a good job of focusing on the key issues for advisers and their financial institutions (e.g., broker-dealers and RIA firms). That is, the questions in the RFI cover most of the issues that prove to be compliance problems for our clients, in the sense that the requirements were difficult to satisfy or expensive to implement.

In addition, the RFI also highlights an issue for independent insurance agents, which is that, in the exemptions scheduled to apply on January 1, 2018, the sale of fixed indexed annuities to qualified accounts (e.g., plans and IRAs) is transferred from Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-24 to the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE). That creates a difficult situation, because independent insurance agents will not be able to sell fixed indexed annuities under BICE, because BICE requires that a financial institution supervise the sale. I believe the DOL thought that insurance companies would serve as the supervisory entities (and, in a manner of speaking, as co-fiduciaries) for independent insurance agents who were appointed as agents for the insurance companies. However, insurance companies were not willing to do that. As a result, independent insurance agents will effectively be precluded from selling fixed indexed annuities. (Note that a number of insurance intermediaries have applied to the DOL for “financial institution” status under BICE. However, the DOL has not issued final guidance for the applicants.)

Fortunately for those agents, the 84-24 exemption was amended for the transition period to put fixed indexed annuities, along with variable annuities and fixed rate annuities, under the exemptive relief of 84-24. However, the final 84-24 exemption continues to say that fixed indexed annuities are not included in 84-24, but instead must be sold under BICE.

Because of those issues, the Department of Labor asked, in Question 17 of the RFI:

If the Department provided an exemption for insurance intermediaries to serve as Financial Institutions under the BIC Exemption, would this facilitate advice regarding all types of annuities? Would it facilitate advice to expand the scope of PTE 84–24 to cover all types of annuities after the end of the transition period on January 1, 2018? What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of these two exemption approaches (i.e., expanding the definition of Financial Institution or expanding the types of annuities covered under PTE 84–24)? To what extent would the ongoing availability of PTE 84–24 for specified annuity products, such as fixed indexed annuities, give these products a competitive advantage vis-a`-vis other products covered only by the BIC Exemption, such as mutual fund shares?

In effect, the DOL is asking questions about two alternatives. The first is whether “insurance intermediaries,” such as IMOs, should be allowed to serve as “financial institutions,” which would allow independent insurance agents to use the Best Interest Contract Exemption. Based on our representation of a number of IMOs and BGAs, many of those types of organizations would be willing to serve in the financial institution role, if that was available. If properly done, that solution would work.

The second question is whether to continue to include fixed indexed annuities, along with fixed rate and variable annuities, under the 84-24 exemption. In that case, independent insurance agents would not need a financial institution to supervise their activities. At the present time, the 84-24 rules are more restrictive on compensation and require greater disclosure of compensation than BICE. So, while that alternative is less burdensome in terms of the need for a financial institution, it is more demanding in terms of compensation disclosures.

It is likely that one or both of those solutions will be permitted when the rules are revised by the current leadership at the DOL. While the financial institution alternative is more burdensome and involves greater regulation, it could be favored by the DOL because of the financial institutions’ supervision of the independent insurance agents. On the other hand, if the DOL favors less regulation and burden, the 84-24 exemption will be expanded to include all forms of annuities. Only time will tell.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #54

The DOL’s RFI and Possible Changes to BICE

This is my 54th article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule and exemptions. These articles also cover the DOL’s FAQs interpreting the regulation and exemptions and related developments in the securities laws.

The Department of Labor issued a Request for Information (RFI) about the fiduciary regulation and the prohibited transition exemptions. The questions in the RFI indicate the issues of greatest interest to the DOL and, in some cases, are suggestive of possible outcomes. This article looks at two issues concerning BICE–the Best Interest Contract Exemption.

The first question is about a possible extension of the transition rules, now scheduled to expire on December 31 of this year. The DOL asks:

“Would a delay in the January 1, 2018, applicability date of the provisions in the BIC Exemption, Principal Transactions Exemption and amendments to PTE 84-24 reduce burdens on financial services providers and benefit retirement investors by allowing for more efficient implementation responsive to recent market developments? Would such a delay carry any risk? Would a delay otherwise be advantageous to advisers or investors? What costs and benefits would be associated with such a delay?”

While it is always risky to make predictions, I think that the transition period will be extended, perhaps through the end of 2018.

As background, “transition” BICE requires only that the “financial institution”—e.g., the broker dealer or RIA firm—and the adviser “adhere to” the Impartial Conduct Standards (ICS). The ICS has three conditions: the best interest standard of care, no more than reasonable compensation, and no materially misleading statements. It is a conduct-based standard, and there aren’t requirements for written agreements or disclosure statements.

I believe that the DOL will find that those protections are adequate for the intervening period, as financial institutions transition to the new fiduciary regime, and that delaying compliance with additional requirements for contracts, disclosures, etc., will not negatively impact qualified investors in a material way.

Another set of BICE questions deals with the written contract and warranty requirements in the version of the exemption scheduled to apply on January 1 of 2018 (but likely to be delayed). The two requests for information are:

“5. What is the likely impact on Advisers’ and firms’ compliance incentives if the Department eliminated or substantially altered the contract requirement for IRAs? What should be changed? Does compliance with the Impartial Conduct Standards need to be otherwise incentivized in the absence of the contract requirement and, if so, how?

6. What is the likely impact on Advisers’ and firms’ compliance incentives if the Department eliminated or substantially altered the warranty requirements? What should be changed? Does compliance with the Impartial Conduct Standards need to be otherwise incentivized in the absence of the warranty requirement and, if so, how?”

The outcome on these issues is less clear. The DOL needs to balance the burdens of compliance with protection of retirement investors. For example, the cost, complexity and possible litigation implicit in those requirements could cause financial institutions to limit the range of investments and/or to increase their charges to investors. On the other hand, how will IRA retirement investors obtain relief if there was a breach of the best interest standard of care? While plans and participants can file claims under ERISA, retirement investors in IRAs don’t have a similar statutory right.

Those are complicated issues and there will certainly be comments by both pro-industry groups and pro-investor organizations. While I can’t predict the outcome, I believe that the DOL will try to balance those considerations, with the objective of providing retirement investors with access to a wide range of investments without increasing their costs, but at the same time providing an opportunity for enforcement of the best interest standard of care.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

 

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #53

The Fiduciary Rule and Discretionary Investment Management

This is my 53rd article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule and exemptions. These articles also cover the DOL’s FAQs interpreting the regulation and exemptions and related developments in the securities laws.

In recent conversations I have learned that many broker-dealers and RIAs do not understand how the prohibited transaction rules and exemptions (and, particularly, the Best Interest Contract Exemption) apply differently to discretionary accounts and non-discretionary accounts. This article discusses some of those differences.

One similarity, though, is that ERISA’s prudent man rule and duty of loyalty apply for both discretionary and non-discretionary advice to retirement plans and participants.

However, ERISA does not generally govern investment advice to IRAs. As a result, absent the need for a prohibited transaction exemption, advisers to IRAs will not be governed by fiduciary/best interest standard of care. For example, where an adviser (and his or her supervisory entity) provides discretionary or non-discretionary investment advice to an IRA on a “pure” level fee basis, the adviser and the entity are subject to the fiduciary standards under the securities laws, but are not covered by the new fiduciary rule. That is because, where an adviser is providing advice for a reasonable level fee, it is not a prohibited transaction. As a result, an exemption is not needed. (By the way, a “pure” level fee is compensation that does not vary based on the advisory decisions or recommendations and that is not paid by third parties, e.g., 12b-1 fees, insurance commissions, etc. Also, the fee must be level across all related and affiliated parties.)

However, where there is a financial conflict of interest for non-discretionary or discretionary investment advice to an IRA, a prohibited transaction results. That includes, for example, where the adviser or supervisory entity (or any affiliated or related party) receives compensation in addition to the level fee. Examples of those additional, and conflicted, payments are: 12b-1 fees; insurance commissions and trails; proprietary products; asset-based revenue sharing; and payments from custodians.

Where conflicted payments are received, and a prohibited transaction occurs, the adviser and the supervisory entity will need an exemption. If the adviser provides non-discretionary investment advice, the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE) is available, if its conditions are satisfied. BICE requires only that the adviser and the supervisory entity comply with the Impartial Conduct Standards during the transition period (the transition period is from June 9 to December 31, 2017, but will likely be extended). The Impartial Conduct Standards are that the adviser and entity adhere to the best interest standard of care, receive no more than reasonable compensation for their services, and make no materially misleading statements. The entity–-the broker-dealer or RIA firm-–also needs to have procedures and practices to ensure that the conflicts do not result in advice that is not in the best interest of the retirement investor.

However, BICE cannot be used for prohibited transactions that result from discretionary investment management. In fact, there are only a few exemptions for discretionary investment management, and none as broad as BICE. For example, there is an exemption for the use of proprietary mutual funds.

As a result, many—and perhaps most—financial conflicts (that is, prohibited transactions) that result from discretionary investment management decisions are absolutely prohibited, because there are not exemptions for the conflicted payments.

The moral of this story is that RIA firms and broker-dealers need to distinguish between discretionary investment management and non-discretionary investment advice. For the time being, at least, most conflicts of interest for nondiscretionary advisers are permissible, if the Impartial Conduct Standards are satisfied. However, for discretionary investment management, there are few exemptions and most financial conflicts will be prohibited without any available exemptions. To the extent that the prohibited transaction rules are being inadvertently violated for managed IRAs, now is the time to correct the errors.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #52

The Fiduciary Rule and Exemptions: How Long Will Our Transition Be?

This is my 52nd article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule and exemptions. These articles also cover the DOL’s FAQs interpreting the regulation and exemptions and related developments in the securities laws.

The fiduciary regulation that dramatically expanded the definition of fiduciary investment advice went into effect on June 9. As a result, virtually all advisers to plans, participants and IRAs are now fiduciaries, or will be as soon as they make the next investment recommendation to one of those qualified accounts. At the same time—June 9, the “transition” transaction exemptions were effective.

If viewed out of context, the fiduciary regulation, as currently written, will continue in effect for years to come. However, the transition exemptions will only apply until December 31, when the full exemptions will apply, with their many and demanding requirements. But, that’s out of context.

When viewed in context, the situation looks much different. For example, the Department of Labor will be publishing the Request for Information asking, among other things, about the potential impact of the fiduciary rule and changes that may be needed. Not to be outdone, the SEC has asked a series of questions about a possible fiduciary standard for all investment advice within its purview. The SEC and DOL have indicated that they will be working together to develop their respective fiduciary definitions (and, in the case of the SEC, a fiduciary standard of care) or, perhaps, they will develop an identical definition of fiduciary advice.

In addition, the DOL has asked for input concerning the structure and requirements of the prohibited transaction exemptions, including the two exemptions that impact most advisers . . . the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE) and Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-24. Those exemptions are exceptions from the prohibited transaction rules, but come with strings attached. On the other hand, the SEC does not have a statutory basis for adopting similar prohibited transactions or, for that matter, exemptions from prohibited transactions. Because of those differences, it is likely that, even if the two regulatory bodies adopt a common definition of fiduciary advice (and a common standard of care), their treatment of conflicts of interest will vary.

As mentioned earlier, the transition period for the DOL’s exemptions is only until December 31. And, if I haven’t made clear, there isn’t any transition period for the fiduciary regulation; it is in full force and effect.

What does this mean in terms of timing? My view is that it will be virtually impossible for the DOL and SEC to collaborate on the development of a common, or at least compatible, definition of fiduciary advice and standard of care before December 31. Because of the Administrative Procedures Act, the final regulation would need to be published in early November, which means a proposed regulation would probably need to be published in early to mid-September. To hit those deadlines, the two regulatory bodies would need to develop a proposed regulation within that time frame. That seems almost impossible —partially because of the need for coordination and partially because the SEC hasn’t previously proposed guidance on these issues. In other words, even though the DOL has a basis for revising its regulation and exemptions, the SEC doesn’t.

As a result, my view is that the DOL will extend the transition period, perhaps for as much as a year. That would allow time for the two agencies to work together in a thoughtful manner and at a reasonable pace.

That is both good news and bad news to the regulated community, that is, for financial services companies. It is good news because it allows more time to fully adapt to the new rules and because the compliance requirements for the transition exemptions are not that difficult or burdensome. It is bad news—at least for those firms that strenuously object to the fiduciary rule, because, by a year from now, financial services companies will be in compliance with the fiduciary standard and fiduciary advice will have become the standard course of business. The training will have been done, products will have been developed, solutions will have been implemented, and so on. In other words, the fiduciary standard will have become the norm. As a result, it may be more difficult to change the fiduciary definition and standard of care. On the other hand, there will still be significant changes to the exemptions and, particularly, to the Best Interest Contract Exemption.

One way or another, I expect that we will hear, in August or September, that the transition period is being extended.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #51

Recommendations to Transfer IRAs

This is my 51st article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule and exemptions. These articles also cover the DOL’s FAQs interpreting the regulation and exemptions and related developments in the securities laws.

The new fiduciary regulation includes, among its definitions of fiduciary advice, a recommendation to an IRA owner to transfer the IRA from another firm. As a result, the recommendation, if accepted by the IRA owner, will automatically result in a prohibited transaction. That is because, if the recommendation is accepted and the IRA is transferred, the adviser will obviously make more money than if it were not. That is a financial conflict of interest that is a prohibited transaction under the Internal Revenue Code.

Fortunately, there is an exemption, or exception, called the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE). However, BICE comes with conditions . . . the adviser and his or her supervisory entity (typically a broker-dealer or RIA firm) must comply with the Impartial Conduct Standards. There are three Impartial Conduct Standards:

  • The adviser (and the supervisory entity) must adhere to the best interest standard of care (which includes the duties of prudence and loyalty).
  • Neither the adviser nor the supervisory entity can receive more than reasonable compensation.
  • The adviser and the supervisory entity must not make any materially misleading statements.

This article looks at the requirement to engage in a best interest process.

The first step of a best interest, or prudent process, is to determine the information that is “relevant” to making a decision that is “informed.” In other words, what would a person who is knowledgeable about such matters, and who is unbiased and loyal to the IRA owner, want to review in order to develop a recommendation? Unfortunately, there aren’t any specific guidelines in the fiduciary regulation or BICE. However, it seems reasonable to conclude that, at the least, the following would be required in most cases:

  • The investments, services and expenses in the current IRA.
  • The investments, services and expenses available in the IRA that the adviser will recommend.
  • The needs, objectives, risk tolerance and financial circumstances of the IRA owner.

In the typical case, that may be enough. However, in some cases, there may be special circumstances that would require considerations of additional factors.

Once those considerations have been identified, the next step is to gather the information; that documentation should be retained in retrievable fashion in the event of SEC or FINRA examinations, IRS audits, or private claims.

The next step is to analyze the information. For example, if the investments and the expenses are similar for both the current IRA and a new IRA, the key is to consider the services in light of the needs and circumstances of the IRA owner. With that in mind, in this new fiduciary world, advisers and their supervisory entities should focus on the services that they will provide to retirement money, such as Individual Retirement Accounts. Generally speaking, the investment of retirement money (at least, based on guidance from the Department of Labor) involves considerations of generally accepted investment theories—such as modern portfolio theory, and of prevailing investment industry standards. Ordinarily, that would include strategies such as asset allocation, diversification among and within asset classes, portfolio construction, and so on. Those are “services” that are consistent with the best interest standard of care and that could justify a prudent, or best interest, recommendation to transfer an IRA.

The considerations listed in this article are not exclusive. There are many other factors that could reasonably be considered in developing a recommendation to transfer an IRA. The key, though, is that the appropriate documentation be gathered, a thoughtful analysis be made, and the recommendation be prudent and loyal.

The best interest fiduciary process is a new way of looking at everyday transactions and making recommendations about those transactions. It’s important for advisers to realize that it’s not just a compliance issue; instead, it’s a process . . . a thoughtful, documented, best interest process.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #50

The Fourth Impartial Conduct Standard

This is my 50th article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule and exemptions. These articles also cover the DOL’s FAQs interpreting the regulation and exemptions and related developments in the securities laws.

When the Department of Labor announced that the fiduciary rule and the transition exemptions would apply on June 9, it also issued a non-enforcement policy and a set of Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) and Answers. The FAQs are titled “Conflict of Interest FAQs (Transition Period).”

For the most part, the FAQs are benign and helpful. However, FAQ 6 raises some significant issues for broker-dealers and RIA firms. In relevant part, FAQ 6 states:

During the transition period, the Department expects financial institutions to adopt such policies and procedures as they reasonably conclude are necessary to ensure that advisers comply with the impartial conduct standards. During that period, however, the Department does not require firms and advisers to give their customers a warranty regarding their adoption of specific best interest policies and procedures, nor does it insist that they adhere to all of the specific provisions of Section IV of the BIC Exemption as a condition of compliance. Instead, financial institutions retain flexibility to choose precisely how to safeguard compliance with the impartial conduct standards, whether by tamping down conflicts of interest associated with adviser compensation, increased monitoring and surveillance of investment recommendations, or other approaches or combinations of approaches. For example, some firms have indicated that they intend to rely upon or build on existing regulatory compliance structures to monitor their advisers’ sales practices and recommendations, document the bases for those recommendations, and ensure that the impartial conduct standards are met (e.g., by subjecting transactions involving conflicts of interest to heightened scrutiny and surveillance).

As a general rule, the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE) requires only that broker-dealer and RIAs comply with the Impartial Conduct Standards. The Impartial Conduct Standards are:

  • The best interest standard of care.
  • No more than reasonable compensation.
  • No materially misleading statements.

However, the quoted language from FAQ 6 has the effect of adding a fourth requirement. It is that RIAs and broker-dealers, as financial institutions, adopt the policies and procedures “as they reasonably conclude are necessary to ensure that advisers comply with the Impartial Conduct Standards.”

That language should not be ignored. That is because, among other reasons, the non-enforcement policy requires that financial institutions, such as broker-dealers and RIAs, make a “diligent and good-faith” effort to comply with BICE. Since this additional requirement is imposed as a condition of BICE, it seems difficult to imagine that the non-enforcement policy would be available to a broker-dealer or RIA who did not adopt appropriate policies, procedures, practices and supervision.

Then, the question is, what is “appropriate”? The quoted language provides several alternatives. Those are:

  • Review and determine that existing policies, procedures and supervision is adequate for ensuring that the impartial conduct standards are met.
  • Review and revise existing policies, procedures and supervision, as needed.
  • Adjust adviser compensation to reduce and/or to otherwise manage the effects of conflicts of interest that arise from varying levels of compensation.
  • Heightened scrutiny, surveillance and supervision of transactions involving conflicts of interest.
  • Monitoring advisers’ sales practices and recommendations, including documenting the basis for recommendations.
  • A combination of the above and/or possibly other reasonable practices.

As I read this requirement, a good approach is for a financial institution to review its existing policies, procedures, compensation practices and supervision, and document why they will “ensure that advisers comply with the Impartial Conduct Standards.” No particular approach is required for doing that, but appropriate steps should be taken. (By the way, I specifically mention documentation of the decision because financial institutions may be required to demonstrate that they complied with this requirement. Also, under ERISA, the DOL has specifically stated that documentation is an integral part of a prudent process, and it appears likely that those requirements will apply to fiduciary services under BICE, as well.)

During the transition period, it is possible, perhaps even likely, that the DOL will accept any reasonable efforts to comply with this requirement. In other words, the DOL will probably apply a “reasonable efforts” standard, rather than a “strict compliance” standard. However, the attorneys who represent investors—most likely in arbitrations—will probably push for a higher standard. With that in mind, the broker-dealers and RIAs need to think about the policies, procedures, compensation practices and supervision that will appropriately manage the risk in that more demanding scenario.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #49

The Requirement to Disclose Fiduciary Status

This is my 49th article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule and exemptions. These articles also cover the DOL’s FAQs interpreting the regulation and exemptions and related developments in the securities laws.

When the new fiduciary rule applies on June 9, it will convert most non-fiduciary advisers into fiduciaries.

While there is not a disclosure requirement for new fiduciary advisers to IRAs, there is for these newly minted fiduciary advisers to plans. But it’s not part of the new regulation. Instead the requirement is found in the 408(b)(2) regulation which was effective in 2012.

As background, that regulation required that service providers to ERISA-governed retirement plans, including advisers, make written disclosures to plan fiduciaries of their services, compensation and “status.” The status requirement was that service providers disclose if they were fiduciaries under ERISA and/or the securities laws (e.g., RIAs). The regulation describes the status disclosure as follows:

If applicable, a statement that the covered service provider, an affiliate, or a subcontractor will provide, or reasonably expects to provide, services pursuant to the contract or arrangement directly to the covered plan…as a fiduciary…; and, if applicable, a statement that the covered service provider, an affiliate, or a subcontractor will provide, or reasonably expects to provide, services pursuant to the contract or arrangement directly to the covered plan as an investment adviser registered under either the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 or any State law.

(The reference to “subcontractor” includes representatives of broker dealers who are independent contractors.)

For the most part, broker-dealers, and insurance agents and brokers, have taken the position that they were not fiduciaries and therefore did not make the fiduciary disclosure. And, if they were not in fact fiduciaries, those disclosures worked from July 1, 2012 until June 9, 2017, when the new definition will make them fiduciaries.

Technically, that last sentence is not absolutely correct. Let me explain. First, the new regulation requires that, to be considered a fiduciary, the adviser (and the supervisory entity) must make an investment recommendation. And, until the first investment recommendation is made, the adviser and entity are not fiduciaries. However, the definition of investment recommendation is so broad that it may be best to treat June 9 as the day they became fiduciaries. For example, a recommendation is a “suggestion” that the plan fiduciaries select, hold or remove investments; that the fiduciaries use a fiduciary adviser to give advice on investments or to help participants with investments; that the fiduciaries include certain specified policies in the IPS; and so on.

In other words, under the new rules it’s hard for an adviser to work with a plan without being a fiduciary.

So, accepting that virtually all advisers to plans become fiduciaries on June 9, what does that mean for disclosure of fiduciary status?

The 408(b)(2) regulation generally provides that, after the initial notice is provided, no subsequent disclosures are required until there is a change in the information initially provided. But, of course, where the first notice was silent about fiduciary status, the transition to fiduciary status is a change. Here’s what the regulation says about changes:

A covered service provider must disclose a change to the information…as soon as practicable, but not later than 60 days from the date on which the covered service provider is informed of such change, unless such disclosure is precluded due to extraordinary circumstances beyond the covered service provider’s control, in which case the information must be disclosed as soon as practicable.

In other words, the service provider (e.g., the broker dealer and adviser) must make a written disclosure of the change to fiduciary status to the “responsible plan fiduciary” within “60 days from the date on which the [broker dealer/adviser] is informed of such change.” Unfortunately, there isn’t any guidance on when a service provider is “informed” of the change to fiduciary status under these circumstances. For example, was it the day that it was finally determined that the fiduciary regulation would be applicable on June 9? Or, will it be on June 9? Or, will it be the first day that the adviser makes the first post-June 9 recommendation?

In the absence of clear guidance, a conservative approach may be advisable. So, my suggestion is that the change notice be sent in June. That’s not my conclusion about the outer limit; instead, it’s a conservative position.

The consequence of the failure to make 408(b)(2) disclosures is that compensation paid the broker-dealer and the adviser is prohibited.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #48

The Last Word: The Fiduciary Rule Applies on June 9

This is my 48th article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule and exemptions. These articles also cover the DOL’s FAQs interpreting the regulation and exemptions and related developments in the securities laws.

The Department of Labor has announced that it will not further delay the application of the fiduciary rule. As a result, the new fiduciary definition and the “transition” exemptions will apply to investment and insurance advice to plans, participants and IRA owners (“Retirement Investors” of “qualified accounts”) on June 9.

When the DOL announced its decision, it also issued additional guidance, in the form of FAQs and a non-enforcement policy.

For the most part, the FAQs were helpful.

For example, they clarify that certain types of information and conversation are educational, rather than fiduciary. However, FAQ #6 appears to have increased the compliance burden on “Financial Institutions,” such as broker-dealers, RIAs, banks and insurance companies. While the general rule for conflicted advice is that the Financial Institution and adviser must adhere to the Impartial Conduct Standards (see below), that Q&A said that Financial Institutions have additional responsibilities to manage conflicts so that variable compensation does not influence advisers to make recommendations that are not in the best interest of Retirement Investors.

The non-enforcement policy (Field Assistance Bulletin [FAB] 2017-02) provides that the DOL will not enforce the fiduciary standard or the exemptions during the transition period (from June 9 to December 31), so long as the Financial Institution is making diligent and good faith efforts to comply. However, the failure to make diligent and good faith efforts to comply will result in the loss of the benefit of the non-enforcement policy. Also, the IRS and Treasury will not enforce the fiduciary advice prohibited transactions during the transition period, so long as the requirements of the DOL non-enforcement policy are met.

What does this mean?

It means that, beginning on June 9, recommendations of investment or insurance products or services to qualified accounts must be evaluated two ways.

1.   Is the recommendation prudent and loyal?

Recommendations to ERISA-governed retirement plans and participants (including rollover recommendations) are subject to ERISA’s prudent man rule and duty of loyalty. ERISA protections apply and claims can be asserted based on breaches of the fiduciary rule.

However, IRAs (other than SEPs and SIMPLEs) are not governed by ERISA and, therefore, the fiduciary standard does not automatically apply (but see the prohibited transactions discussion below).

2.  Does the recommendation result in a prohibited transaction and, if so, are the conditions of an exemption satisfied?

Simply stated, any fiduciary recommendation that results in a payment from a third party (such as a mutual fund or an insurance company) or increases the compensation of the adviser or Financial Institution is a prohibited transaction. As a result, an exemption will be needed. The two most common exemptions are 84-24 (which applies to annuities and insurance products) and BICE (which applies to all types of investments and services, including insurance products). Both require that the adviser adhere to the Impartial Conduct Standards. (However, 84-24 has other requirements, including disclosure compensation and written approval by the Retirement Investor.)

This article focuses on transition BICE, since that exemption will be used in most cases.

As explained above, BICE requires that the Financial Institution and adviser adhere to the Impartial Conduct Standards. There are three such standards:

  • The Best Interest standard of care (which is, in its essence, a combination of ERISA’s prudent man rule and duty of loyalty).
  • The Financial Institution and the adviser can receive no more than reasonable compensation.
  • The adviser and Financial Institution cannot make materially misleading statements.

Since one of the conditions of BICE is that the Financial Institution and the adviser adhere to the Best Interest standard of care, the exemption effectively imposes a fiduciary standard of care. In other words, if the Financial Institution and adviser do not satisfy the fiduciary standard, the exemption will be lost and any compensation paid to the Financial Institution and adviser must be restored to the investor’s account. As a result, even though IRAs are not subject to ERISA’s prudent man rule, the exemption has the same effect as if advice to IRAs were subject to ERISA.

Financial Institutions (including broker-dealers, RIAs, banks and trust companies, and insurance companies) need to institute policies and procedures for compliance with these rules, including training of their representatives about how to satisfy the duties of prudence and loyalty.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

 

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