Covered service providers must make their 408(b)(2) disclosures by July 1, 2012—just weeks away. The failure to make those disclosures will cause their agreements with ERISA plans to become prohibited transactions, resulting in re-payments of compensation to the plans, taxes, interest and penalties.
Continue reading ERISA Disclosures for Discretionary Investment Managers
The DOL recently issued its final regulation on conflicted investment advice to participants. Unfortunately, the scope of the regulation is not well understood. For example, if an adviser does not have any conflicts (that is, if the adviser cannot vary its revenue or that of any affiliates based on the recommended investments), then the adviser does not need to comply with the new regulation. For example, the adviser would not need to comply with the certification or audit requirements. However, if the adviser has financial conflicts of interest and can affect its own revenues (or those of an affiliate), then the adviser must comply with those requirements in order to give fiduciary investment advice to participants.
Together with other attorneys from my law firm, I have written a bulletin on the subject. If you are interested in having further information, please click on the linke below to see a copy of the bulletin:
In a departure from the recent series of 408(b)(2) articles, in this one I will be discussing the DOL’s decision to re-propose the fiduciary advice regulation.
On September 19th, the Department of Labor announced that, rather than issuing a final regulation on fiduciary investment advice, it would be re-proposing the regulation, which would allow additional comments on the re-proposed version. This is a victory for the private sector, and particularly for insurance companies and broker-dealers, who objected to a number of the provisions in the initial proposal. However, the victory may be limited, in the sense that the DOL will likely provide relief on certain issues, but not on others.
My “best guess” is that the DOL will provide relief in the following areas:
Noticeably absent from the DOL’s September 19th release, and statements by DOL officials, is any suggestion of a broad revision of the regulation. In other words, it appears that the basic structure of the proposal will remain in place, but that there will be “adjustments” to deal with specific issues. While that may be of welcome relief to the financial services industry, it will probably not be helpful to those who are concerned about fiduciary status for ongoing services and recommendations to qualified retirement plans, such as 401(k) plans. In those cases, specific recommendations are made and the services are ongoing. As a result, it is likely that the changes in the re-proposal will continue to be expansive in terms of broadening the definition of fiduciary advice—particularly for small- and mid-sized plans.
This is another in the series of articles about the 408(b)(2) disclosures – and the consequences of a failure to comply. This article discusses the legal responsibilities of plan sponsors.
If a service provider fails to make the required disclosures, then under ERISA both the service provider and the plan sponsor (that is, the responsible plan fiduciary) have engaged in a prohibited transaction. The 408(b)(2) regulation provides a procedure where plan sponsors can obtain relief for the failures of service providers; however, there is no similar provision for service providers.
What if the disclosures are made, but are not reviewed by the plan sponsor? Then the plan sponsor will have committed a fiduciary breach . . . since there is an affirmative obligation on fiduciaries to review and evaluate the compensation of service providers.
To take it a step further, what if the plan sponsor either fails to review the information, or does review the information, but fails to spot that excessive compensation is being paid to the covered service provider (for example, the recordkeeper or advisor). In that case, both the plan sponsor and the service provider will have engaged in a prohibited transaction. The service provider’s prohibited transaction is the receipt of the excessive compensation; the plan sponsor’s prohibited transaction is that it allowed the plan to pay unreasonable compensation. In these circumstances, there is not relief for the plan sponsor or for the service provider.
As a result, if the DOL or a plaintiff’s attorney spots the issue and files such a claim, both the plan sponsor and the service provider will be in a position of bearing the burden of proving that the compensation was reasonable. With benchmarking services and other comparative information, it will be easier for the Department of Labor and the plaintiff’s attorneys to identify cases where compensation may be excessive.
Together with Bruce Ashton and Summer Conley, I have authored an article titled “DOL Investigations: Broker-Dealers and RIAs as Targets.” To see the full text of the article, click on the link included here:
In the article we discuss that in recent months, we have heard of at least eight, and been involved in three, Department of Labor (DOL) investigations of broker-dealers related to their services to ERISA retirement plans. These investigations appear to be part of the DOL’s ongoing Consultant/Adviser Project (CAP). The CAP initiative is a national enforcement project designed to focus on “the receipt of improper or undisclosed compensation by employee benefit plan consultants and investment advisers.” This article discusses the background that led to the creation of CAP, the issues that financial advisers need to focus on and steps they may wish to take now to avoid liability exposure under ERISA.
This is another in a series of articles about interesting issues under the 408(b)(2) disclosure regulation.
In a previous article, I described the likely consequences of a failure to comply with the disclosure requirements—that is, the compensation paid to the service provider would need to be restored to the plan, together with interest. In that article, I also mentioned that there would be penalties imposed by the government. This article expands on that discussion.
The failure to provide the disclosures on a timely basis causes the relationship between the plan and the service provider to be a prohibited transaction. The prohibited transaction rules are found in both the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA . . . and each law has its own requirements and penalties.
Under the Internal Revenue Code, an excise tax of 15% is imposed on the “amount involved.” In the case of a 408(b)(2) disclosure failure, the amount involved would be the compensation. Thus, for the first year of the failure, the tax would be 15% of the compensation paid that year. In the second year, there would be an additional 15% tax imposed on the amount that was paid in the first year, together with a new 15% tax on the amount that was paid in the second year. The tax would continue to grow in that fashion from year to year until it is corrected.
In addition, once the IRS discovered the failure, it would demand that the transaction be reversed and corrected and, if that was not done within 90 days, the IRS could impose an additional tax equal to 100% of the amount involved.
The IRS would also require that tax returns be filed and that the tax be paid. Since, under the circumstances, the tax would not have been paid on a timely basis (since, in all likelihood, the service provider would not have recognized the failure on a timely basis), and thus there would be additional penalties for failure to file and failure to pay taxes.
The DOL could also impose penalties. Under Section 502(l) of ERISA, the DOL can impose a 20% penalty on amounts recovered for an ERISA-governed retirement plan. Thus, if the DOL investigated and identified the failure, it would demand that the “amount involved” be restored to the plan and, when the service provider complied, the DOL, depending upon the circumstances, could would impose an additional 20% penalty since it would have “recovered” the money for the plan. Fortunately, the IRS imposed taxes can be offset against the DOL penalty.
It goes without saying that these penalties are severe. As a result, service providers need to make every effort to comply with the 408(b)(2) disclosure requirements.
This is another in a series of articles on interesting issues presented under the 408(b)(2) regulation and its disclosure requirements.
It has become fairly common for plans to have expense recapture accounts (which are also known as ERISA budget accounts, PERAs—plan expense recapture or reimbursement accounts, and by a variety of other names). Typically, those accounts are established within a plan when a service provider (most often the recordkeeper) receives compensation through revenue sharing in excess of its reasonable charges. For example, if a reasonable charge for the recordkeeping/TPA services was $50,000 and the recordkeeper received $60,000 in revenue sharing, the excess amount would be deposited into the expense recapture account—thereby avoiding the prohibited transaction issue of excess compensation.
However, sometimes the recordkeeper/TPA places the money in its corporate account and tells the plan sponsor that the money can be spent for the benefit of the plan . . . at the direction of the plan sponsor. While that presents a number of fiduciary and prohibited transaction issues, it also presents an interesting, and problematic, 408(b)(2) compliance issue for service providers.
For example, when an accounting firm audits a 401(k) plan, it is usually compensated by the plan or the plan sponsor . . . and in that context, the accounting firm is not a “covered” service provider for 408(b)(2) purposes. Since the accounting firm is not covered by the 408(b)(2) regulation, it is not required to make the disclosures under the regulation. However, when an accountant receives “indirect compensation” (which, generally stated, is a payment from anyone other than the plan or plan sponsor), the accounting firm becomes a “covered” service provider and thus must make the required disclosures. Since a payment from a recordkeeper/TPA is not from the plan or the plan sponsor, it is “indirect compensation,” and as a result the accounting firm has become a covered service provider and must make the 408(b)(2) disclosures. But, what happens if the accounting firm hasn’t made those disclosures? The answer is simple . . . the arrangement is a prohibited transaction and the compensation belongs to the plan and not to the accounting firm. But, what if the accounting firm didn’t realize that it was being paid from an account of the recordkeeper/TPA? Unfortunately, there doesn’t seem to be any relief from the prohibited transaction consequences.
Similar issues exist for attorneys, actuaries, consultants and others who receive indirect payments.
This is another in a series of short articles about interesting issues under the DOL’s new disclosure requirements.
If a covered service provider (for example, an RIA or a broker-dealer, or their individual advisers) fails to timely provide the disclosures required under 408(b)(2), the “arrangement,” or relationship, between the service provider and the plan is a prohibited transaction. But, what are the consequences? Unfortunately, the law is not clear. Here are some possibilities:
In addition to those payments, there are 15% and 100% taxes under the Internal Revenue Code and a 20% penalty under ERISA. Those will be discussed in a future article.
This is another in a series of emails about interesting issues related to 408(b)(2) disclosures. Since we are doing a considerable amount of work helping service providers comply with 408(b)(2), we have run across a number of less common, or even unusual, situations where the rules may—or may not—apply.
Occasionally, retirement plans invest in partnerships, limited partnerships and LLCs. As a general rule, if 25% or more of a class of equity interest in the entity is held by “benefit plan investors,” the entity is deemed to hold plan assets. As a result, the managing partner will be a fiduciary under ERISA’s rules (similar in concept to a collective trust, in the sense that the assets are held outside the plan, but nonetheless constitute plan assets). In those cases, the managing partner will be a covered service provider under the 408(b)(2) regulation and must make the required disclosures concerning services, status and compensation. The failure to do so will cause the arrangement to become a prohibited transaction.
On the other hand, if less than 25% of the entity is held by benefit plan investors, the holdings of the entity will not be plan assets and, as a result, the managing partner will not be considered to be a covered service provider. Similarly, under ERISA, the assets in a mutual fund are not considered to be plan assets and, as a result, the investment manager of a mutual fund is not a plan fiduciary and is not a covered service provider.
Interestingly—or perhaps curiously—however, plan sponsors must still report compensation arrangements about non-ERISA entities (such as hedge funds with less than 25% benefit plan investors) and mutual funds on Schedule C to the Form 5500. That creates the odd circumstance where plan sponsors are required to report that information on Schedule C, but unlike the arrangements that are subject to 408(b)(2) disclosures, those entities are not required, at least by ERISA, to provide the necessary information to plan sponsors. In other words, we have a regulatory regime that does not fully integrate.
I make these points for several reasons. First, it may be that some people don’t understand that the Schedule C reporting requirements are slightly different than the 408(b)(2) disclosure requirements. That is, while they are identical in most regards, there are also some significant differences, such as the ones described in this article. Secondly, it is likely that some service providers—perhaps RIAs—are managing investments in partnerships or other entities that could be subject to these rules—but that may not realize it. As a result, anyone who manages investments in an entity that is outside retirement plans, but which accepts retirement plan investments, should work with their ERISA counsel to evaluate their status, both under the fiduciary laws and under 408(b)(2).
