Fred Reish writes a quarterly column for Investment News. This quarter’s article points out that retirement plan committees rely on their advisers to keep them informed of new developments related to 401(k) and 403(b) plans, including advice about risk management. To help advisers fulfill those expectations, this article discusses the recent settlements in the Anthem 401(k) and Vanderbilt 403(b) cases.
Continue reading 3 lessons for advisers from 401(k) and 403(b) class action settlements
This is the ninth of the series about Best Practices for Plan Sponsors.
Plan sponsors should be aware of the latest trends in fiduciary litigation in order to manage the risk of being sued and, if sued, of being liable. In my post, Best Practices for Plan Sponsors #8, I discussed the lessons from the settlement of the Anthem case. The Vanderbilt settlement is another example of the importance of using appropriate share classes and of a good process for selecting investments and monitoring service providers. This article discusses the Vanderbilt lawsuit and the conditions in the settlement agreement.
I am writing two series of articles that together are called “The Bests.” One is about Best Practices for plan sponsors, while the other is about the Best Interest Standard of Care for advisors. Each series is numbered separately to make it easier to identify the subject that is most relevant to you.
This is the eighth of the series about Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors.
The SEC has initiated examinations of investment advisers concerning their practices in working with Senior Clients. According to the SEC, a “ ‘Senior Client’ is defined as any retail advisory client who is age 62 or older, retired, or transitioning to retirement, including accounts of deceased clients, and retail clients in joint accounts with at least one individual meeting this definition.”
Continue reading Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #8
What Does “Best Interest” Mean? (Part 1)
I am writing two series of articles that together are called “The Bests.” One is about Best Practices for plan sponsors, while the other is about the Best Interest Standard of Care for advisors. Each series is numbered separately to make it easier to identify the subject that is most relevant to you.
This is the fourth of the series about the Best Interest Standard of Care.
“Best Interest” has become part of the American lexicon . . . as an aspirational goal or a demanding standard—depending on the point of view. But, what does best interest mean? It may mean different things to different people . . . and perhaps even to different regulators. However, I believe that most people would agree on the definition in this article.
As I read the guidance issued by the Department of Labor (DOL), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and New York State, there are actually two different best interests. The first is a standard of care and the second is a duty of loyalty. Of the two, the duty of loyalty is the easiest to define because, in all of the guidance it boils down to a requirement that an advisor cannot put his interest ahead of the investor’s.
Continue reading Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #4
Fiduciary Training: The Need for Basics
This is the fifth of the series about Best Practices for Plan Sponsors.
In three earlier posts—Best Practices for Plan Sponsors #2, #3, and #4—about the Sacerdote v. New York University decision, I discussed the good and the bad of the NYU plan committee and made several suggestions about best practices for improving committee performance. This article focuses on one of those suggestions—fiduciary education for committee members.
As a starting point, there is not a legal requirement that committee members receive fiduciary training. Instead, it’s a best practice and good risk management.
But, what should the fiduciary education cover? Based on my analysis of court decisions on fiduciary responsibility, I am worried that fiduciaries may not be adequately educated about their basic responsibilities and particularly their administrative oversight duties. If you look at decisions, such as the NYU case, the issues are basic. For example, one of the defendants did not know if he was still a member of the committee. Another committee member didn’t believe that she was a fiduciary or that she had legal responsibility for the decisions made by the committee. Instead, she thought her role was ministerial, in terms of setting up the meetings and distributing information.
SEC Best Interests . . . When? And What About the DOL
I am writing two series of articles that together are called “The Bests.” One is about Best Practices for plan sponsors, while the other is about the Best Interest Standard of Care for advisors. Each series is numbered separately to make it easier to identify the subject that is most relevant to you.
This is the third of the series about the Best Interest Standard of Care.
The Regulatory Agendas for the SEC and DOL were recently issued. Both have plans for guidance by September of 2019, but the anticipated timing of the guidance has, by and large, been misinterpreted. To understand what I mean, read on.
The SEC’s Agenda said that Final Action on the Regulation Best Interest proposal for broker-dealers and the Interpretation of Standard of Conduct for investment advisers would be “09/00/2019.”
Similarly, the Department of Labor Agenda said that there would be a final rule on the “Fiduciary Rule and Prohibited Transaction Exemptions” with the date of “09/00/2019.”
Continue reading Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #3
What is the Baseline for A Committee to Act in the Best Interest of Its Participants? (Part 2)
This is the third of the series about Best Practices for Plan Sponsors.
This is my second article about the case of Sacerdote v. New York University. As I discussed in my last post, the Court’s opinion pointed out the deficiencies in the understandings and conduct of some committee members. However, the Court ultimately ruled in favor of the plan fiduciaries and against the plaintiffs. Why was that?
What is the Baseline for A Committee to Act in the Best Interest of Its Participants? (Part 1)
This is the second of the series about Best Practices for Plan Sponsors.
The recent decision in the case of Sacerdote v. New York University is a classic story of the good and bad of plan committees. Let’s start with the bad.
Five current and former committee members testified at the trial. But not all of the testimony was helpful.
Projection of Retirement Income
This is the first of the series about Best Practices for Plan Sponsors.
“Best Practice” is above and beyond the legal requirements. Best Practices are not mandated; they are elected.
While the most obvious Best Practices are automatic enrollment and automatic deferral increases, I want to start with the projection of retirement income for participants. That’s partially because it is in a current legislative proposal—in the Retirement Enhancement and Savings Act (RESA), and also because, in my opinion, it doesn’t receive the attention that it deserves.
The DOL recently issued its final regulation on conflicted investment advice to participants. Unfortunately, the scope of the regulation is not well understood. For example, if an adviser does not have any conflicts (that is, if the adviser cannot vary its revenue or that of any affiliates based on the recommended investments), then the adviser does not need to comply with the new regulation. For example, the adviser would not need to comply with the certification or audit requirements. However, if the adviser has financial conflicts of interest and can affect its own revenues (or those of an affiliate), then the adviser must comply with those requirements in order to give fiduciary investment advice to participants.
Together with other attorneys from my law firm, I have written a bulletin on the subject. If you are interested in having further information, please click on the linke below to see a copy of the bulletin:
