Category Archives: prudent

Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #42


broker-dealers, DOL, fiduciary, General, prudent, registered investment advisers

Rollovers under the DOL’s Final Rule

This is my 42nd article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule and exemptions. These articles also cover the DOL’s FAQs interpreting the regulation and exemptions and related developments in the securities laws.

On April 7, 2017 the DOL issued its final regulation on the extension of the applicability date for the fiduciary definition and the related exemptions. This article discusses the impact of those changes on fiduciary status for recommendations to plan participants to take distributions and roll over to IRAs.

In its guidance, the DOL extended the applicability date of the new fiduciary definition from April 10 to June 9, but did not otherwise modify the definition. Since the fiduciary rule defined a recommendation to take a plan distribution as fiduciary advice, any recommendation to take a distribution and rollover to an IRA on or after June 9 will be a fiduciary act. As a result, an adviser will need to engage in a prudent process to develop and make such a recommendation. (For purposes of this rule, an “adviser” includes a representative of an RIA or a broker-dealer, an insurance agent or broker, or any other person who makes such a recommendation and receives compensation, directly or indirectly, as a result. An advisory fee from the IRA or a commission from an annuity or mutual fund are examples of compensation.)

However, more is involved that just the fiduciary rule. A recommendation to rollover is also a prohibited transaction, since the adviser will typically make more money if the participant rolls over than if the participant leaves the money in that plan. Because of the prohibited transaction, the adviser will need an exemption. Under the latest changes to the rules, advisers will probably use a process called “transition BIC,” which is a reference to a transition rule under the Best Interest Contract Exemption. (This process applies only from June 9 to December 31, unless it is extended. But it is likely that, at the least, these requirements will be part of any future exemption.). Transition BIC requires only that the adviser comply with the “Impartial Conduct Standards” (ICS).

The ICS requires that advisers adhere to the best interest standard of care, receive no more than reasonable compensation, and make no materially misleading statements. For this article, let’s focus on the best interest standard. Generally stated it is a combination of the ERISA prudent man rule and duty of loyalty.

So, an adviser must satisfy both ERISA’s prudent man rule (for the recommendation) and the BIC best interest rule (for the exemption). Since the two standards of care are virtually identical, I have combined them for this discussion.

But, that begs the question of, what is a prudent and best interest process?

Specifically, it is that the adviser must act “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims; . . .”

So, what would a prudent, knowledgeable and loyal person, who is making a recommendation about retirement investing (the “aims” of the “enterprise”), do? The first step is to gather the information needed to make an informed decision. Then that information needs to be evaluated in light of the participant’s needs and circumstances of the participant . . .with a duty of loyalty to the participant.

The only clear guidance from the DOL about what information needs to be gathered and evaluated is found in Q14 in the DOL’s Conflict of Interest FAQs (Part I-Exemptions).

The first part of the FAQ discusses the information needed if the adviser is a “Level Fee Fiduciary.” Basically, the information includes the investments, expenses and services in the plan and the proposed IRA.

But at the end of the FAQ, the DOL explains that those considerations must be evaluated even if the adviser is using regular BIC (as opposed to the Level Fee Fiduciary provision).

Accordingly, any fiduciary seeking to meet the best interest standard (in order to satisfy transition BIC) would engage in a prudent analysis of this information before recommending that an investor roll over plan assets to an IRA, regardless of whether the fiduciary was a “level fee” fiduciary or a fiduciary complying with BIC.

In other words, any adviser making a distribution and rollover recommendation on or after June 9, 2017 must have a process for gathering and evaluating information about the investments, expenses and services in the participant’s plan and in the proposed IRA, and about the participant’s needs and circumstances.

This subject is more complicated than can be covered adequately in a short article, but this is a start for understanding the new rules for distributions and rollovers.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #41


DOL, fiduciary, prohibited transaction, prudent

While We Wait: The Current Fiduciary Rule and Annuities

This is my 41st article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule and exemptions. These articles also cover the DOL’s FAQs interpreting the regulation and exemptions and related developments in the securities laws.

As explained in previous posts, the delay of the new fiduciary rule does not mean that we are “rule-less.” Instead, the “old” rule, and exemptions, which have been place for decades, will continue to apply. Does that mean that we are back in the “good old days” where we won’t need to pay attention to the application of the fiduciary rule to IRAs?  I don’t think so.

Over the past few years, a tremendous amount of attention has been paid to the meaning and consequences of being a fiduciary . . . and I doubt that we can walk back from that. And, with this newfound attention, it is possible that many common practices will, when closely examined, result in fiduciary status under the old rule.

The consequences of unknowingly being a fiduciary are significant. If a fiduciary recommendation results in the payment of a commission to a fiduciary adviser or insurance agent, that payment would be a prohibited transaction and, absent compliance with any exemptions (e.g.., 84-24), the commission would be prohibited.

For example, the most common reason that advisors and insurance agents haven’t considered themselves to be fiduciaries for annuities is that their services haven’t been rendered “on a regular basis”. In other words, the sales have been viewed as one-time events. Let’s see how that stands up against common practices for sales and servicing of annuities in IRAs.

What about fixed rate (or “traditional”) annuities? It’s possible, perhaps even probable, that the sale of the annuity is a one-time event and that recommendations are not provided on an on-going basis. In that case, these sales would not be fiduciary services. However, if the agent periodically recommends additional purchases, that could result in fiduciary status. (Keep in mind that the definition is “functional” and it doesn’t matter what the agreements say. Instead, the conduct of the advisor is examined.)

What about fixed indexed annuities? Similar to their fixed rate cousins, the sale could be a one-time event and, therefore, not a fiduciary recommendation. On the other hand, if there are ongoing services that would be fiduciary activities, it can result in fiduciary status.

What about variable annuities? The recommendation of a variable annuity may contemplate ongoing fiduciary services, for example, recommendations about the mutual funds inside the annuity and the allocations and reallocations among those investments. In that case, the services could result in fiduciary status and the payment of the commission could be a prohibited transaction. As a result, both advisers and agents should consider using PTE 84-24. (Remember that 84-24, in its old form, is still in effect and that, therefore, all three types of annuities are covered by the exemption.)

So, after you heave a sigh of relief for the delay of the fiduciary rule, it’s time to go back to work on fiduciary issues . . . and an important one is the treatment of the recommendation of annuities to IRAs.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #37


DOL, fiduciary, prudent, SEC

SEC Retirement-Targeted Examinations

This is my 37th article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule and exemptions. These articles also cover the DOL’s FAQs interpreting the regulation and exemptions and related developments in the securities laws.

In 2015, the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) of the SEC issued a National Exam Program Risk Alert describing its “Retirement-Targeted Industry Reviews and Examinations Initiative” (ReTIRE). The Initiative announces that the OCIE “will conduct examinations of SEC-registered investment advisers and broker-dealers (collectively, registrants) under the ReTIRE Initiative that will focus on certain high-risk areas of registrants’ sales, investment and oversight processes, with particular emphasis on select areas where retail investors saving for retirement may be harmed.”

In its Risk Alert, the OCIE says:

“The staff intends to use data analytics, information from prior examinations, and examiner-driven due diligence to identify registrants to examine under this Initiative. As part of the examinations or the selection of examination candidates, the staff may focus on the activities of investment advisory representatives and/or broker-dealer registered representatives (collectively, representatives). The risk-based examinations conducted under the ReTIRE Initiative will focus on the services offered by the registrants to investors with retirement accounts in the following areas:

Reasonable Basis for Recommendations. . . .

Conflicts of Interest. . . .

Supervision and Compliance Controls. . . .

Marketing and Disclosure. . . .”

The purpose of this post is to emphasize that there are agencies, in addition to the Department of Labor, that are focused on advisers’ practices for retirement investing and related activities (for example, the recommendation of rollovers). In future posts, I will discuss the OCIE’s focus for those examinations.

For the moment, though, a good approach is to make sure that recommendations regarding plan distributions and rollovers are in the best interest of the participants and that investment practices for IRAs should be consistent with prudent investing in retirement (and should reflect practices such as appropriate portfolio investing, diversification, and mitigation of conflicts of interest).

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #32


BICE, DOL, fiduciary, prudent

What “Level Fee Fiduciary” Means for Rollover Advice

This is my 32nd article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule and exemptions. These articles also cover the DOL’s FAQs interpreting the regulation and exemptions.

As explained in article #30 in the Angles series, in order to use the simplified, or BICE-lite, alternative for recommending that participants take distributions and roll over to IRAs with the adviser, the adviser must be a “Level Fee Fiduciary.” The Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE) defines “Level Fee Fiduciary” as:

A Financial Institution and Adviser are ‘‘Level Fee Fiduciaries’’ if the only fee received by the Financial Institution, the Adviser and any Affiliate in connection with advisory or investment management services to the Plan or IRA assets is a Level Fee that is disclosed in advance to the Retirement Investor. A ‘‘Level Fee’’ is a fee or compensation that is provided on the basis of a fixed percentage of the value of the assets or a set fee that does not vary with the particular investment recommended, rather than a commission or other transaction-based fee.

If the financial institution satisfies that definition, an adviser can use the BICE-lite, simplified process for recommending that participants rollover to IRAs. On the other hand, if the compensation does not satisfy that definition, then the adviser and the financial institution (e.g., broker-dealer) must satisfy all of the BICE conditions in order to recommend a rollover without committing a prohibited transaction.

The key words in the definition are: “only fee received.” (For the remainder of this article, I use “adviser” to collectively refer to the adviser, the financial institution, and all affiliates and related parties.) Does that mean that, if the adviser receives other forms of compensation, such as 12b-1 fees, that the adviser cannot levelize his compensation (for purposes of rollover recommendations) by offsetting the 12b-1 fees on a dollar-for-dollar basis? At least one DOL speaker has said that it does. That is, a Department of Labor employee has said that, if any additional compensation is received—even if it is offset, the Level Fee Fiduciary, or BICE-lite, approach is not available.

On the other hand, the definition does permit “compensation that is provided on the basis of a fixed percentage.” If the additional payments are offset against the advisory fee, then the only compensation received by the adviser is the stated level fee.

The preamble to the BIC exemption is worded slightly differently than the exemption:

It is important to note that the definition of Level Fee explicitly excludes receipt by the Adviser, Financial Institution or any Affiliate of commissions or other transaction-based payments. Accordingly, if either the Financial Institution or the Adviser or their Affiliates, receive any other remunerations (e.g., commissions, 12b– 1 fees or revenue sharing), beyond the Level Fee in connection with investment management or advisory services with respect to, the plan or IRA, the Financial Institution and Adviser will not be able to rely on these streamlined conditions in Section II(h).

Interestingly, the preamble, in the first sentence, suggests that no other payments can be received, but in the next sentence suggests that payments cannot be on top of (or “beyond”) the level fee (as opposed to offset against the level fee). The first sentence says that the definition “excludes receipt . . . of commissions or other transaction-based payments.” That seems clear enough (unless you want to argue that an offset effectively trumps the receipt). The next sentence refers to the receipt of “any other remunerations (e.g., commissions, 12b-1 fees, or revenue sharing), beyond the Level Fee . . .”. While not entirely clear, a reasonable interpretation is that, if the additional payments are offset against the Level Fee on a dollar-for-dollar basis, the payment of those additional amounts is not “beyond the Level Fee.” (A similar “levelizing” approach would be to pay over into the IRA any payments received from the investments.)

So, where does that leave us? For the belt-and-suspenders crowd—the very conservative advisers, the ultra-safe answer is to avoid all other payments or benefits. On the other hand, for those advisers who are willing to rely on a reasonable interpretation (or, in other words, to use a belt without suspenders), a possible approach is, in the case where additional payments are received, to offset those additional payments on a dollar-for-dollar basis (or to pay them over into the IRA). Keep in mind, though, this is a legal issue. As a result, advisers should not rely on general articles such as this one. Instead, you need to get individualized legal advice that applies to your particular circumstances and that quantifies the degree of risk, if any, that you are taking.

POST-SCRIPT: One oddity about the stricter interpretation (that is, that any payments cause the “forfeit” of BICE lite) is that, if full BICE compliance is required, there is no conflict of interest to disclose, since the DOL has separately said that the offset method works to eliminate conflicts of interest (i.e., prohibited transactions).

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #31


BICE, broker-dealers, DOL, fiduciary, prohibited transaction, prudent

“Un-levelizing” Level Fee Fiduciaries

This is my 31st article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule and exemptions. These articles also cover the DOL’s FAQs interpreting the regulation and exemptions.

In the last article I posted, I discussed the three meanings of “Level Fee Fiduciary.” This article discusses the kinds of payments or benefits that will “un-levelize” a Level Fee Fiduciary.

As a starting point, the definition of compensation, for these purposes, includes any money or things of monetary value. So, it covers both cash and non-cash amounts. However, as the DOL explains, it must be directly or indirectly connected to a recommendation:

The term ‘‘fee or other compensation, direct or indirect’’ means . . . any explicit fee or compensation for the advice received by the person (or by an affiliate) from any source, and any other fee or compensation received from any source in connection with or as a result of the purchase or sale of a security or the provision of investment advice services, . . . A fee or compensation is paid ‘‘in connection with or as a result of’’ such transaction or service if the fee or compensation would not have been paid but for the transaction or service or if eligibility for or the amount of the fee or compensation is based in whole or in part on the transaction or service. [Emphasis added.]

In other words, if an adviser ordinarily charges a level fee (for example, 1% per year) for non-discretionary investment advice or discretionary investment management for plans, participants or IRAs, and receives any additional benefits or payments attributable to those services, the additional payments will un-levelize the adviser’s compensation and result in a prohibited transaction. (However, as explained in the last article, if the payments or benefits are offset dollar-for-dollar, the adviser will re-levelize his or her compensation.)

Some forms of additional compensation are obvious. For example, that includes commissions, 12b-1 fees, revenue sharing, trailing commissions, and so on. Others, though, are more subtle and, therefore, easier to overlook. Those could include trips, gifts, awards, reimbursements, marketing support, conference registrations, and so on. The DOL pointed to some of those payments in its definition of third party payments in the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE):

‘‘Third-Party Payments’’ include sales charges when not paid directly by the Plan, participant or beneficiary account, or IRA; gross dealer concessions; revenue sharing payments; 12b–1 fees; distribution, solicitation or referral fees; volume-based fees; fees for seminars and educational programs; and any other compensation, consideration or financial benefit provided to the Financial Institution or an Affiliate or Related Entity by a third party as a result of a transaction involving a Plan, participant or beneficiary account, or IRA. [Emphasis added.]

In the fiduciary regulation, the DOL gave additional examples of compensation as:

. . . including, though not limited to, commissions, loads, finder’s fees, revenue sharing payments, shareholder servicing fees, marketing or distribution fees, underwriting compensation, payments to brokerage firms in return for shelf space, recruitment compensation paid in connection with transfers of accounts to a registered representative’s new broker-dealer firm, gifts and gratuities, and expense reimbursements.” [Emphasis added.]

While advisers to retirement plans have, by and large, been aware of these rules, my experience is that advisers who focus primarily on wealth management, including advice to IRAs, are not familiar with the rules.

To paraphrase Hill Street Blues (for those of you old enough to remember that show) . . . Be careful out there.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

 

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #29


BICE, DOL, fiduciary, prohibited transaction, prudent

Capturing Rollovers: What Information is Needed?

This is my 29th article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule and exemptions. These articles also cover the DOL’s FAQs interpreting the regulation and exemptions.

The Department of Labor’s fiduciary regulation provides that a recommendation to take a distribution from a plan, and to roll the money over to an IRA, is a fiduciary act. As a result, the recommendation must be prudent and cannot result in a prohibited transaction. However, a prohibited transaction almost automatically occurs, since an adviser typically makes higher fees in the IRA than from the plan (even where the adviser is providing services to the plan). As a result, an exemption is needed, even if the recommendation is otherwise prudent. Fortunately, the Level Fee Fiduciary provision of the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE) provides the framework for qualifying for an exemption.

In addition to the fiduciary regulation and BICE, other rules regulate the recommendation of distributions. For example, in Regulatory Notice 13-45, FINRA stated that a recommendation to take a distribution from a plan must be “suitable.” (In effect, FINRA was saying that a recommendation to take a distribution from a plan is tantamount to a recommendation to a participant to liquidate the participant’s investments in the plan; therefore, it is a securities recommendation.) FINRA then provides a number of considerations for advisers to evaluate in making a suitable recommendation. Those factors and considerations are remarkably similar to the considerations in a prudent process under ERISA.

In addition to the FINRA guidance, the DOL issued an advisory opinion (2005-23A) that concluded that a fiduciary to a plan (for example, a fiduciary adviser) who makes recommendations to participants to take distributions and roll over to IRAs is a fiduciary for the purpose of these recommendations. As with the new regulation, that implicates the fiduciary standard of care and the prohibited transaction rules.

With that in mind, the general rule for the prudence of recommending a rollover (as opposed to the prohibited transaction issues) is that a fiduciary adviser engage in a prudent process. But, that begs the question . . . what does an adviser need to do? More specifically, a prudent process produces an “informed” and “reasoned” recommendation. A recommendation is “informed” if the adviser has gathered and evaluated the information that a knowledgeable person would consider to be relevant to the issue. A reasoned decision is one that bears a reasonable relationship to the information that was evaluated.

What are the relevant factors for evaluating whether a participant should take a distribution? In other words, what information does an adviser need to gather and review?

In BICE, the DOL identifies three specific types of relevant information about the retirement plan. (Note that there may be relevant factors in addition to these three, but the DOL is saying that a recommendation to take a distribution would, at the least, need to consider these.) Those factors are: the investments in the plan; the services provided by the plan; and the expenses in the plan. Examples of other relevant matters are whether the plan permits periodic distributions without charge, and whether the participant is invested in company stock in the plan (particularly if the participant has a low basis in the company stock compared to its current value). Those factors, and other relevant matters about the plan, need to be evaluated. Of course, that means that information needs to be obtained.

Where the adviser already provides services to a plan, it should be relatively easy to gather the information. However, if the adviser does not work with the plan, the adviser will need to make a diligent effort to gather that information. (The Department of Labor says in Question 14 of the FAQs that the adviser “must make diligent and prudent efforts to obtain information on the existing plan.” Question 14 goes on to say: “In general, such information should be readily available as a result of DOL regulations mandating plan disclosure of salient information to the plan’s participants (see 29 CFR 2550.404a-5).)”

In other words, the adviser should ask the participant for a copy of the plan’s 404a-5 disclosures (which are also known as participant disclosures and/or the Investment Comparative Chart). That should be readily available to a participant, since those materials are provided to participants when initially eligible and, again, each year thereafter. In addition, an adviser could ask a participant for his most recent quarterly statement, which should reflect any expenses being charged against the participant’s account, as well as how the participant is invested and the account balance. Those statements should also be readily available since, for participant-directed plans, they are provided quarterly.

In addition a participant would have access to materials through the participant’s page on the plan’s website.

In other words, the information is readily available. (Note that the FAQs provide alternative methods of obtaining the information, but only after the adviser has engaged in “diligent and prudent efforts to obtain information,” but has not been able to do so.)

In addition to the information about investments and expenses, an adviser also needs to obtain information about plan services. In many cases, that could be done through interviewing the participant. For example, does the plan have a brokerage account option? Does the plan provide non-discretionary investment advice services or discretionary investment management services? Once that information has been gathered, an adviser should compare it to comparable information about the proposed IRA. While the gathering of information, in and of itself, can take some work, the analysis is the critical step. The information is just the foundation from which to make the analysis.

The key to the analysis and the development of a prudent recommendation is to focus on the best interest of the participant. Also, keep in mind that BICE requires that the adviser document why the recommendation is in the best interest of the investor.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #28


BICE, DOL, fiduciary, prudent

What About Rollovers that Aren’t Recommended?

This is my twenty-eighth article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule and exemptions. These articles also cover the DOL’s FAQs interpreting the regulation and exemptions.

Under the DOL’s fiduciary regulation, the recommendation of a plan distribution and IRA rollover will be fiduciary advice, subject to the best interest standard of care and the prohibited transaction rules. But, what if a participant takes a distribution and rolls over into an IRA with an adviser . . . without a recommendation by the adviser?

As background, there are three ways that a participant can make a decision to take a distribution and roll over into an IRA. The first is “unsolicited.” In other words, the participant made the decision without any input from an adviser or recordkeeper. The second is “educated.” Distribution education involves providing a participant with information about the participant’s alternatives and the important considerations for selecting among the alternatives. The information must be unbiased and substantially complete. It cannot provide guidance to a participant to make a particular decision. The third way is “recommendation.” In the case of a recommendation, the adviser must engage in a prudent process to evaluate the relevant factors and to reach a reasoned recommendation in the best interest of the participant.

Without much fanfare, the DOL explained the “unsolicited” alternative in Q4 of the FAQs. The question posed by the DOL was: “Is compliance with the BIC exemption required as a condition of executing a transaction, such as a rollover, at the direction of a client in the absence of an investment recommendation?”

The DOL answered: “No. In the absence of an investment recommendation, the rule does not treat individuals or firms as investment advice fiduciaries merely because they execute transactions at the customer’s direction.”

But, the DOL goes on to admonish: “If, however, the firm or adviser does make a recommendation concerning a rollover or investment transaction and receives compensation in connection with or as a result of that recommendation, it would be a fiduciary and would need to rely on an exemption.”

In other words, fiduciary status is tied to a recommendation by an adviser. Absent an adviser recommendation, a decision made by a participant is not regulated by the fiduciary and prohibited transaction rules.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

 

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #25


BICE, DOL, fiduciary, prudent

Reasonable Compensation Versus Neutral Factors

This is my twenty-fifth article covering interesting observations about the fiduciary rule and exemptions.

In my last post, I wrote about the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE) and the requirements for “neutral factors” and “differential compensation” between “reasonably designed investment categories.” As I pointed out, the purpose of neutral factors is to determine the relationship of compensation between different categories of investments and services. In other words, neutral factors don’t establish a dollar amount of compensation, but instead they are used for determining the relative compensation between different reasonably designed investment categories. Think of it as evaluating degree of difficulty in terms of work, complexity, value, etc.

But that begs the question, if neutral factors are used to establish the ratio of compensation, how is the compensation determined?

The best way to approach that question is to look at a single reasonably designed investment category. Within an investment category, the compensation of an adviser must be both reasonable and level. Stated slightly differently, the compensation of the adviser cannot exceed a reasonable amount (based on the services rendered) and the adviser’s compensation must be level regardless of which products are recommended . . . and regardless of the payments made to the adviser’s supervisory entity (e.g., broker-dealer or any affiliate or related party). For example, if the compensation paid to the individual adviser is 1% per year for providing non-discretionary investment advice on a portfolio of mutual funds, that compensation needs to be tested for reasonableness and needs to be level regardless of which mutual funds are recommended and regardless of the payments, if any, to the adviser’s broker-dealer (or any affiliated or related party).

“Level” is fairly easy to grasp. In my example, a level fee is 1% regardless of which mutual funds are recommended. “Reasonable” is a bit more difficult. As explained in prior posts, the DOL says that reasonable compensation is based on market data—in an open, transparent and competitive market. The easiest way to obtain that information is through a benchmarking service. It is important, though, to review the reasonableness of compensation at least every two or three years. The experience of advisers in the 401(k) world is that, as the marketplace has matured, the level of reasonable compensation has become lower and lower.

Also, advisers should be aware that, when a prohibited transaction exemption—such as BICE—is being used, the burden of proof is on the person claiming the exemption, that is, the adviser. So, you need to have information in your file that supports the reasonableness of your compensation.

Forewarned is forearmed.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

 

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #24


BICE, broker-dealers, DOL, fiduciary, prohibited transaction, prudent, registered investment advisers

The Meaning of Differential Compensation Based on Neutral Factors

This is my twenty-fourth article covering interesting observations about the fiduciary rule and exemptions.

The DOL’s fiduciary “package” consists of a regulation that expands the definition of advice and exemptions, or exceptions, from the prohibited transaction (PT) rules. If a recommendation by a fiduciary adviser does not constitute a PT (e.g., does not affect the adviser’s compensation, or that of an affiliate, and does not cause a payment from a third party), no exemption is needed. However, if the fiduciary recommendation causes a PT, an exemption must be used – and most often that will be BICE – the Best Interest Contract Exemption. Therein lies the rub . . . the compensation of the financial institution (e.g., the broker-dealer) and the adviser are regulated by BICE.

Under BICE, the compensation of broker-dealers can be “variable,” but must be “reasonable.” In other words, a broker-dealer can receive different payments from different product providers (e.g., mutual funds), so long as the total compensation received by the broker-dealer is reasonable relative to the services provided to the particular plan, participant or IRA owner.

The rules for compensating advisers are similar because the compensation of the adviser also must be reasonable (relative to the services that the adviser is providing to the plan, participant or IRA owner in the first year and in succeeding years). But, from that point on, the rules are different.

The starting point for understanding the other rules for adviser compensation is to determine “reasonably designed investment categories.” A reasonably designed investment category is an investment product or service that, when properly analyzed, should produce a certain level of compensation for the adviser’s services. For example, non-discretionary investment advice about mutual funds probably involves a different set of services and complexity than investment advice about individual variable annuities. In that sense, each could be called a reasonably designed investment category.

The next step is to understand that, within a particular investment category, the adviser’s compensation must be level. For example, where an adviser is providing non-discretionary advisory services concerning mutual funds, the adviser’s compensation must be level regardless of which mutual funds are recommended or how much those mutual funds pay the broker-dealer. In that way, the adviser will be “financially agnostic” as to which funds are recommended and will, at least in theory, only be interested in recommending the funds that are the best for the qualified investor (e.g., reasonable priced and of good quality). Similarly, if another investment category covers individual variable annuities, the adviser will be paid the same regardless of the particular annuity contract, insurance company, or imbedded mutual funds. That is, the adviser’s compensation will be the same across all variable annuity contracts, regardless of which one is recommended.

But, what if some categories require more work or services than other categories? For example, what if it takes more work to recommend and service an individual variable annuity than to provide non-discretionary investment advice about mutual funds? In that case, the Department of Labor says that it is permissible to pay differential compensation among reasonably designed investment categories, so long as the differences are based on neutral factors. So, for example, if the amount of work, the complexity of the product, and so on, means that the services for a variable annuity are twice as valuable, the adviser could earn twice as much for recommending an individual variable annuity and assisting with the selection of the embedded investments. On the other hand, if the services for the variable annuity were only 50% more difficult each year thereafter, then the adviser could be compensated 50% more than the annual fee that could be paid for a qualified account with mutual funds.

The key to understanding these concepts is to realize that the “neutral factors” differential compensation is not a dollar amount. Instead, it is a ratio established, for both the first and each subsequent year, between the different categories of investments. Where the relative compensation to the adviser for different reasonably designed investment categories could vary according to those ratios, compensation must still be reasonable.

So, as described in this article, an individual adviser’s compensation must be “reasonable,” “level” within an investment category, and “neutral” in differences between investment categories.

It is going to be difficult and time-consuming for the financial services community to adjust to these changes. And, the deadline is April 10 (with an extension for some purposes until January 1, 2018).

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #23


DOL, fiduciary, prohibited transaction, prudent, registered investment advisers

This is my twenty-third article about interesting observations concerning the fiduciary rule and exemptions.

When the definition of fiduciary advice is expanded on April 10, 2017, the investment and insurance recommendations of a much larger group of advisers will be classified as fiduciary advice and will, as a result, increase the focus on financial conflicts of interest (which ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code refer to as “prohibited transactions,” or PTs). My suspicion is that, for most ERISA retirement plans, there will not be a great impact on advisers—because, to a large degree, advisers to retirement plans already are acknowledged fiduciaries. (To be fair, though, there will be some impact . . . particularly on smaller plans, where some insurance companies and broker-dealers have, in the past, taken the position that their advisers are not fiduciaries. Nonetheless, based on my recent experience in working with broker-dealers, the adjustments are being made without a great deal of difficulty.)

On the other hand, the impact on advisers’ practices with IRAs will be significant. That is particularly true of investment and insurance services provided by broker-dealers. But, it is also true, to a lesser degree, of the services provided by RIAs. (Note: This article does not discuss recommendations to participants to take distributions and roll over to IRAs or recommendations to IRA owners to transfer their IRAs. Significant changes will be required for both RIAs and broker-dealers for those recommendations.)

One of the biggest changes—because of the fiduciary prohibited transaction rules—is that advisers will no longer be able to make recommendations that can affect the level of their compensation. An obvious example is that an adviser could not recommend a proprietary mutual fund (managed by an affiliate) without committing a prohibited transaction. That’s because a recommendation cannot increase the compensation of the adviser, his supervisory entity (e.g., a broker-dealer), or any affiliated or related party. Another example is that a financial adviser with a broker-dealer could not recommend that an IRA invest in mutual funds which pay different levels of 12b-1 fees to the broker-dealer and, indirectly, to the adviser. In effect, the adviser would be setting his own compensation (as well as the compensation of the supervisory entity). Similar issues exist for referral fees, revenue sharing, and so on. In all of those cases, the broker-dealer will need to either move to a level fee environment or to satisfy one of the prohibited transaction exemptions (most likely BICE—the Best Interest Contract Exemption).

Similar issues exist for RIAs. For example, we have seen cases where RIAs recommend proprietary products (e.g., affiliated mutual funds). That is a prohibited transaction. Another example of an RIA prohibited transaction is where the adviser recommends an allocation to fixed income and an allocation to equities, but then charges a higher fee for managing the equities. By virtue of recommending the allocations, the adviser has determined the level of its compensation . . . and, therefore, has committed a prohibited transaction.

The moral of this story is that broker-dealers and RIAs need to closely review their investment practices for qualified money. (“Qualified” money is the new terminology for money in IRAs or plans. It is an easy reference to the types of accounts that are subject to the new rules.) Since virtually all investment and insurance advice to IRAs and plans (including recommendations about distributions, withdrawals and transfers) will become fiduciary advice on April 10, 2017, two steps should be taken. First, if they don’t already exist, processes need to be put in place so that any advice satisfies the prudent person requirement. Generally speaking, that process should result in portfolio investing. Second, all payments for the advice (including indirect and non-cash compensation, whether to the adviser, the supervisory entity or any affiliates or related parties) needs to be examined. Once these rules are applicable, the compensation arrangements will need to satisfy the prohibited transaction rules in section 406(b)(1) and (3) of ERISA and the corresponding provisions in section 4975 of the Internal Revenue Code. Or, in the alternative, the condition of a prohibited transaction exemption must be satisfied.

And, all of that needs to be done by April 10, 2017.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

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