Category Archives: prudent

Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #21


BICE, DOL, fiduciary, prudent

This is my twenty-first article covering interesting observations about the fiduciary rule and exemptions.

While most of the requirements in the new fiduciary rule and exemptions are “old news” for retirement plan advisers, they may require significant changes for advisers to IRAs. For example, ERISA’s prudent man rule and the new best interest standard of care both require that fiduciary advisers (which will include virtually all advisers to plans, participants and IRA owners when the rules are applicable on April 10, 2017) engage in a prudent process to develop recommendations. Using variable annuities as an example, here are some of the important steps in a prudent process: evaluating whether the insurance company will be able to satisfy its commitments in the future (based on today’s information); a determination of whether the expenses for the variable annuity contract, including expenses of the underlying mutual funds, are reasonable; and determining what portion of an investor’s financial assets should be allocated to the annuity. To do that job, fiduciary advisers will need to gather the information necessary to make an appropriate recommendation and then prudently evaluate that information. Stated slightly differently, there is a duty to investigate. The DOL described that responsibility in the preamble to the best interest contract exemption (BICE):

This is not to suggest that the ERISA section 404 prudence standard or Best Interest standard, are solely procedural standards. Thus, the prudence standard, as incorporated in the Best Interest standard, is an objective standard of care that requires investment advice fiduciaries to investigate and evaluate investments, make recommendations, and exercise sound judgment in the same way that knowledgeable and impartial professionals would.

Here are two more thoughts on that. First, the DOL has historically taken the position that a prudent process for advice to retirement plans must be documented. That could easily be extended to advice to IRAs as well. In fact, there is a specific documentation retention requirement under BICE. Second, there is an argument that, if a fiduciary adviser cannot obtain – through the investigation – enough information to formulate a prudent recommendation, the adviser needs to abstain from making a recommendation. One obvious example is where an adviser is developing a recommendation to a participant to take a distribution and roll it over into an IRA. In that situation, BICE specifically requires that the adviser consider the investments, expenses and services in the plan, and then compare them to the investments, expenses and services in the proposed IRA. The best interest analysis must be documented by the adviser. If the adviser cannot obtain adequate information about the investments, expenses and/or services in the plan, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to make and document that analysis.

As I said earlier in this article, for a retirement plan perspective, this is not a new requirement. Instead, these are long standing rules. However, for IRAs the fiduciary guidance will, in many cases, require changes in processes and practices. Since IRAs are smaller than plans, and therefore can’t afford to pay as much money for services, advisers and their supervisory entities need to develop efficient processes for gathering information and performing the analysis. I suspect this will lead to new programs and computer-based systems.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #20


DOL, fiduciary, prudent

As I discussed in an earlier post (Angles #7), the Best Interest Standard of Care has three parts: The prudent man rule; a requirement for individualization; and a duty of loyalty. Notice that none of the three parts requires that the “best” investment be recommended

Because of concerns that the fiduciary rule might be interpreted to require that a “best” investment requirement would apply, the Department of Labor explained in the preamble to the fiduciary regulation that:

In response to commenter concerns, the Department also confirms that the Best Interest standard does not impose an unattainable obligation on Advisers and Financial Institutions to somehow identify the single ‘‘best’’ investment for the Retirement Investor out of all the investments in the national or international marketplace, assuming such advice were even possible. 

So, if you ever had any doubts, it should be clear now that the “Best” Interest Standard of Care is just a label (but a label which, at some level, resonates politically).

If the requirement isn’t that the best investment be recommended, what is it? The answer is that it’s the same standard that advisers have used for about 40 years in recommending investments to ERISA-governed, tax-qualified retirement plans. In other words, it’s been around for a long time and many advisers have survived and thrived under that standard. As the DOL explained in the guidance:

The Best Interest standard . . . is intended to effectively incorporate the objective standards of care and undivided loyalty that have been applied under ERISA for more than 40 years.

But, the duty of prudence should not be confused with the suitability standard. While unsuitable recommendations will not be prudent, it does not necessarily mean that suitable recommendations will be prudent. As the DOL explained:

The Department has not specifically incorporated the suitability obligation as an element of the Best Interest standard, as suggested by FINRA but many aspects of suitability are also elements of the Best Interest standard. An investment recommendation that is not suitable under the securities laws would not meet the Best Interest standard.

As a result, advisers who have not worked with retirement plans under ERISA’s prudent man rule should consider education about the processes required for compliance with the fiduciary standard.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #19


DOL, fiduciary, General, prudent

This is my nineteenth article about interesting observations about the fiduciary regulation and the exemptions.

In an earlier post (Angles #16), I described how advisers could use the “hire me” approach to explain their services and fees without becoming a fiduciary for that purpose. Generally stated, under that approach, an adviser could explain his services and fees, but could not discuss specific products or platforms. In other words, if the adviser “suggested” specific products or platforms, the adviser would become a fiduciary even under “hire me.” The DOL explained that result in the preamble to the fiduciary regulation:

“An adviser can recommend that a retirement investor enter into an advisory relationship with the adviser without acting as a fiduciary. But when the adviser recommends, for example, that the investor pull money out of a plan or invest in a particular fund, that advice is given in a fiduciary capacity even if part of a presentation in which the adviser is also recommending that the person enter into an advisory relationship. The adviser also could not recommend that a plan participant roll money out of a plan into investments that generate a fee for the adviser, but leave the participant in a worse position than if he had left the money in the plan. Thus, when a recommendation to ‘‘hire me’’ effectively includes a recommendation on how to invest or manage plan or IRA assets (e.g., whether to roll assets into an IRA or plan or how to invest assets if rolled over), that recommendation would need to be evaluated separately under the provisions in the final rule”

I mention this because I have recently seen some confusion about the extent and scope of “hire me.” As you might expect, it is because people want to extend “hire me” to all kinds of scenarios, and thereby limit their fiduciary status and legal exposure. For example, I was recently asked if an adviser could tell an IRA owner that the adviser would charge 1% per year to help select, manage, and monitor individual variable annuities. That might work if the IRA owner initially told the adviser that he wanted to hire someone to search for individual variable annuities. However, if the “suggestion” that an individual variable annuity would be appropriate comes from the adviser, that would likely result in fiduciary status for identifying the particular type of investment to be made (and, therefore, cause the loss of the non-fiduciary “hire me” approach).

So, as a word of warning, if you intend to use “hire me” to market your services, keep in mind that it is to describe your services and fees, but without a suggestion that any particular product, investment or platform, be used by the IRA owner.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

 

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #18


BICE, DOL, fiduciary, prohibited transaction, prudent

As advisers who work with ERISA-governed retirement plans already know, an adviser’s compensation cannot be more than a reasonable amount. Because of the new fiduciary advice regulation, and the associated prohibited transaction exemptions (84-24 and the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE)), that requirement is being imposed on investment and insurance recommendations to IRAs. Interestingly, under the Internal Revenue Code (section 4975(d)(2)), it is already a prohibited transaction for an adviser to earn more than reasonable compensation from an IRA. However, because of lack of enforcement by the IRS, that requirement is often overlooked. As evidence of the fact that it is overlooked, think about the lack of benchmarking or similar services to help advisers determine if their compensation from an IRA is reasonable. But, that is about to change.

To appreciate the “reasonable compensation” requirement, a person needs to understand that the amount that is reasonable is determined based on the services that are provided. In its guidance, the DOL explains how reasonableness is to be determined:

“The reasonableness of the fees depends on the particular facts and circumstances at the time of the recommendation. Several factors inform whether compensation is reasonable including, inter alia, the market pricing of service(s) provided and the underlying asset(s), the scope of monitoring, and the complexity of the product. No single factor is dispositive in determining whether compensation is reasonable; the essential question is whether the charges are reasonable in relation to what the investor receives.”

However, there is a difference between “market” compensation and “customary” compensation. That difference is primarily whether the market is transparent and competitive:

“Ultimately, the “reasonable compensation” standard is a market based standard. As noted above, the standard incorporates the familiar ERISA section 408(b)(2) and Code section 4975(d)(2) standards. The Department is unwilling to condone all “customary” compensation arrangements and declines to adopt a standard that turns on whether the agreement is “customary.” For example, it may in some instances be “customary” to charge customers fees that are not transparent or that bear little relationship to the value of the services actually rendered, but that does not make the charges reasonable.”

As a hypothetical example . . . if an adviser provides a wide range of services, that might justify compensation of 1% per year of the assets under management. On the other hand, if an adviser provides a more limited range of services, that might be worth one-half of 1% per year (that is, 50 basis points). As a more specific example, BICE requires that advisers state whether or not they will be monitoring the investments on behalf of the IRA owner or plan. Obviously, all other things being equal, an adviser that provides fiduciary monitoring services is entitled to more money than one that does not.

With that understanding, the key question is, how will an adviser determine whether its compensation is reasonable? Most likely, it will be done in the same way that is in the 401(k) world. In other words, the value of services will be determined by the competitive marketplace. Since competitive market data is not generally available for IRAs, RIA firms and broker-dealers will need to work with service providers who have that information. In the 401(k) world, those are called benchmarking services.

The better benchmarking services will consider both the range of services and the compensation of the adviser. As explained above, the calculation of reasonable compensation is based on the services provided, but not just on the size of the account. In that regard, there will need to be a range of benchmarking alternatives, for example, discretionary investment advice for individual securities; discretionary investment advice for mutual funds; non-discretionary advice for both of those scenarios; recommendations for the purchase of individual annuities, including evaluations that take into account the different types of annuities (e.g., fixed rates annuities, fixed indexed annuities, and variable annuities); referrals to discretionary investment managers; and so on. The benchmarking will need to consider services and compensation in the first year and in subsequent years (for example, will the adviser be monitoring the investments).

While the services do not exist today, it is likely that they will in the relatively near future, say, in the next six to 12 months.

Forewarned is forearmed. Advisers need to be attentive to these issues, now that they are front and center.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

 

 

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #15


BICE, DOL, fiduciary, prudent

This is my fifteenth article about interesting observations “hidden” in the fiduciary regulation and the exemptions.

In my last post (Angles #14), I said that the prudent process requirement would apply to many, but not all, advisers. This article explains that statement.

ERISA does not apply to individual IRAs (but does apply to SEP and SIMPLE IRAs). As a result, ERISA’s prudent man rule does not govern the conduct of advisers when providing investment advice to individual IRAs.

However, when the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE) applies to “conflicted” advice on April 10, 2017, those advisers will need to, among other things, satisfy the Best Interest standard of care (which is, in its essence, a combination of ERISA’s prudent man rule and duty of loyalty). In effect, conflicted advisers will be bootstrapped into a prudent process requirement. (As background, a “conflicted” fiduciary adviser is one with a conflict of interest, e.g., the advice can result in higher compensation or payments from third parties – such as 12b-1 fees or where proprietary investments are used.)

However, a pure level fee adviser does not have any financial conflicts and therefore will not need to use BICE. (A “pure level fee adviser” is one who charges a level fee, e.g., one percent per year, and neither the adviser, his supervisory entity nor any affiliated or related party receives any money or financial benefit on top of that fee.) Since a pure level fee, or non-conflicted, adviser won’t commit a prohibited transaction and therefore won’t need an exemption, that adviser will not be bound by the best interest standard for investment advice to individual IRAs. Instead, the adviser will only be subject to the conduct standards in the securities laws.

As a result, pure level fee advisers for IRAs won’t be affected by the new fiduciary rules . . . with a couple of notable exceptions. The biggest of those exceptions is a recommendation to a plan participant to take a distribution and roll over to an IRA with the adviser. But that is a subject for a future article.

For the moment, though, let me leave you with a positive thought. If you are a pure level fee adviser, your existing IRA clients, and your services to those clients, will not be affected by the new rules.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #14


DOL, fiduciary, prudent

This is my fourteenth article about interesting observations “hidden” in the fiduciary regulation and the exemptions.

When the new fiduciary regulation applies on April 10, 2017, anyone who makes investment recommendations or investment “suggestions” to retirement plans will be a fiduciary adviser. As a result, the adviser must engage in a prudent process for developing those recommendations. However, that is not a dramatic change for many advisers, since they already serve as fiduciaries and use prudent process.

But, the same rules will apply to many advisers to IRAs. (In my next blog I will explain why I say “many” rather than “all.”) As a result, advisers to IRAs will also need to use prudent processes to develop their investment recommendations.

What does that process look like? The DOL explains:

“Thus the prudence standard, as incorporated in the Best Interest standard, is an objective standard of care that requires investment advice fiduciaries to investigate and evaluate investments, make recommendations, and exercise sound judgment in the same way that knowledgeable and impartial professionals would. “[T]his is not a search for subjective good faith – a pure heart and an empty head are not enough.” Whether or not the fiduciary is actually familiar with the sound investment principles necessary to make particular recommendations, the fiduciary must adhere to an objective professional standard. Additionally, fiduciaries are held to a particularly stringent standard of prudence when they have a conflict of interest.”

In other words, fiduciary advisers are held to the standard by a hypothetical person who is knowledgeable about retirement investing. First and foremost, that means that the adviser must engage in a prudent process to formulate the recommendations to the investor. That includes an investigation of the needs, circumstances and objectives of the investor. A prudent process also includes application of generally accepted investment theories, such as modern portfolio theory. Courts have said that a prudent fiduciary would utilize prevailing investment industry practices in selecting investments (which could include consideration of costs and quality).

As good risk management, advisers should retain documentation of their process for developing their recommendations for at least six years.

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #9


DOL, fiduciary, prudent

This is my ninth article about interesting observations “hidden” in the fiduciary regulation and the exemptions.

As I explained in an earlier post, there are three parts to the best interest standard . . .

  • Prudence: “. . . the fiduciary acts with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims, . . .”
  • Individualization: “. . . based on the investment objectives, risk tolerance, financial circumstances, and needs of the retirement investor, . . .”
  • Loyalty: “. . . without regard to the financial or other interests of the Adviser, Financial Institution or any Affiliate, Related Entity, or other party.”

The question for this “angles” article is, what is the difference between the prudence part of the Best Interest standard and the prudent man rule in ERISA?

Easy . . . one word. “Man” in ERISA was changed to “person” in the Best Interest standard. So, the prudent man rule has become the prudent person rule. It’s more modern and politically correct.

But, other than that, it is verbatim the same. That means that we have over 40 years of history of DOL guidance and fiduciary litigation to consider in applying the prudent person rule to IRA and rollover recommendations. Think in terms of generally accepted investment theories, (e.g., modern portfolio theory); reasonable costs; compensation that is consistent with services, not products. In terms of its impact, think of transparency, fee and expense compression, and competition.

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #7


DOL, fiduciary, prudent

This is my seventh article about interesting observations “hidden” in the fiduciary regulation and the exemptions.

There are three parts to the best interest standard . . .

  • The prudent person rule.
  • Individualization to the retirement investor’s circumstances.
  • The duty of loyalty.

See the three parts below. Interestingly, none of the parts uses the word “best.” In other words, “best interest” is just a label; the real requirements are prudence and loyalty.

  • Prudence: “. . . the fiduciary acts with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims, . . .”
  • Individualization: “. . . based on the investment objectives, risk tolerance, financial circumstances, and needs of the retirement investor, . . .”
  • Loyalty: “. . . without regard to the financial or other interests of the Adviser, Financial Institution or any Affiliate, Related Entity, or other party.”

Moral of the story: Don’t let the label confuse you. There isn’t any requirement to pick the best investment . . . if such a thing exists. It’s just old-fashioned prudence and loyalty. The result is that investment advice to IRAs will often look like investment advice to 401(k) participants: good quality investments, appropriate asset allocation and diversification, and reasonable costs.

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #6


DOL, fiduciary, General, prohibited transaction, prudent

This is my sixth article about interesting observations “hidden” in the preambles to the fiduciary regulation and the exemptions.

In some cases, the concerns about the scope of the fiduciary rule are overblown. For example, there have been some statements that advice about minimum required distributions for IRAs would be fiduciary advice. That is not the case.

In the preamble to the fiduciary regulation, the DOL explained:

“With respect to the tax code provisions regarding required minimum distributions, the Department agrees with commenters that merely advising a participant or IRA owner that certain distributions are required by tax law would not constitute investment advice. Whether such “tax” advice is accompanied by a recommendation that constitutes “investment advice” would depend on the particular facts and circumstances involved.”

So, basic advice about tax requirements and consequences is not fiduciary advice. However, if the adviser recommends which investments the IRA owner should sell to fund the distribution, that is fiduciary investment advice which must be:

  • prudent and in the best interest of the IRA owner, and
  • free from financial conflicts of interest (or in compliance with a prohibited transaction exemption).
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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #4


DOL, fiduciary, prudent

This is my fourth article about interesting observations “hidden” in the preambles to the fiduciary regulation and the exemptions.

During a recent webinar for TD Ameritrade, one of the attendees asked if Jim Cramer’s TV stock tips would be considered fiduciary advice. I said that they would not be, since they were not directed to a specific investor.

In hindsight, I wish that I had told him that the preamble to the fiduciary regulation specifically addressed that issue . . . more specifically than you might think. Here’s what the DOL said:

“Many commenters, as the Department noted above, expressed concern about the phrase ‘‘specifically directed’’ in the proposal under paragraph (a)(2)(ii) and asked that the Department clarify the application of the final rule to certain communications including casual conversations with clients about an investment, distribution, or rollovers; responding to participant inquiries about their investment options; ordinary sales activities; providing research reports; sample fund menus; and other similar support activities. For example, they were concerned about communications made in newsletters, media commentary, or remarks directed to no one in particular. Commenters specifically raised the issue of whether on-air personalities like Dave Ramsey, Jim Cramer, or Suze Orman would be treated as fiduciary investment advisers based on their broadcast communications. The concern is unfounded. With respect to media personalities, the rule is focused on ensuring that paid investment professionals make recommendations that are in the best interest of retirement investors, not on regulating journalism or the entertainment industry.”

 

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