I have recently written an article on “Capturing Rollovers.” The article discusses the DOL’s guidance on the issues involved in capturing rollovers, both by broker-dealers and RIAs. The article analyzed that guidance and discussed programs for RIAs and broker-dealers. You can download a PDF of the article by clicking on the link below:
http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/files/ftpupload/pdf/CapturingRollovers.pdf
Together with Bruce Ashton and Summer Conley, I have authored an article titled “DOL Investigations: Broker-Dealers and RIAs as Targets.” To see the full text of the article, click on the link included here:
In the article we discuss that in recent months, we have heard of at least eight, and been involved in three, Department of Labor (DOL) investigations of broker-dealers related to their services to ERISA retirement plans. These investigations appear to be part of the DOL’s ongoing Consultant/Adviser Project (CAP). The CAP initiative is a national enforcement project designed to focus on “the receipt of improper or undisclosed compensation by employee benefit plan consultants and investment advisers.” This article discusses the background that led to the creation of CAP, the issues that financial advisers need to focus on and steps they may wish to take now to avoid liability exposure under ERISA.
This is another in a series of short articles about interesting issues under the DOL’s new disclosure requirements.
If a covered service provider (for example, an RIA or a broker-dealer, or their individual advisers) fails to timely provide the disclosures required under 408(b)(2), the “arrangement,” or relationship, between the service provider and the plan is a prohibited transaction. But, what are the consequences? Unfortunately, the law is not clear. Here are some possibilities:
In addition to those payments, there are 15% and 100% taxes under the Internal Revenue Code and a 20% penalty under ERISA. Those will be discussed in a future article.
This is another in a series of emails about interesting issues related to 408(b)(2) disclosures. Since we are doing a considerable amount of work helping service providers comply with 408(b)(2), we have run across a number of less common, or even unusual, situations where the rules may—or may not—apply.
Occasionally, retirement plans invest in partnerships, limited partnerships and LLCs. As a general rule, if 25% or more of a class of equity interest in the entity is held by “benefit plan investors,” the entity is deemed to hold plan assets. As a result, the managing partner will be a fiduciary under ERISA’s rules (similar in concept to a collective trust, in the sense that the assets are held outside the plan, but nonetheless constitute plan assets). In those cases, the managing partner will be a covered service provider under the 408(b)(2) regulation and must make the required disclosures concerning services, status and compensation. The failure to do so will cause the arrangement to become a prohibited transaction.
On the other hand, if less than 25% of the entity is held by benefit plan investors, the holdings of the entity will not be plan assets and, as a result, the managing partner will not be considered to be a covered service provider. Similarly, under ERISA, the assets in a mutual fund are not considered to be plan assets and, as a result, the investment manager of a mutual fund is not a plan fiduciary and is not a covered service provider.
Interestingly—or perhaps curiously—however, plan sponsors must still report compensation arrangements about non-ERISA entities (such as hedge funds with less than 25% benefit plan investors) and mutual funds on Schedule C to the Form 5500. That creates the odd circumstance where plan sponsors are required to report that information on Schedule C, but unlike the arrangements that are subject to 408(b)(2) disclosures, those entities are not required, at least by ERISA, to provide the necessary information to plan sponsors. In other words, we have a regulatory regime that does not fully integrate.
I make these points for several reasons. First, it may be that some people don’t understand that the Schedule C reporting requirements are slightly different than the 408(b)(2) disclosure requirements. That is, while they are identical in most regards, there are also some significant differences, such as the ones described in this article. Secondly, it is likely that some service providers—perhaps RIAs—are managing investments in partnerships or other entities that could be subject to these rules—but that may not realize it. As a result, anyone who manages investments in an entity that is outside retirement plans, but which accepts retirement plan investments, should work with their ERISA counsel to evaluate their status, both under the fiduciary laws and under 408(b)(2).
This is the second in a series of short articles about disclosures to plan sponsors and participants under the new DOL regulations for disclosures to plans and to participants.
FACT: Many investment advisers (RIAs) and broker-dealers (BDs) use asset allocation models (AAMs) to help participants invest appropriately.
RULE: The DOL regulations require certain disclosures about “designated investment alternatives” (DIAs), including the performance history of the investments (to participants).
ISSUE: Are asset allocation models considered to be DIAs, which would invoke the disclosure requirements under both regulations?
ANSWER: Based on informal discussions with the DOL, it appears that they are leaning toward the conclusion that models are DIAs. If so, the disclosure requirements would include, among other things, reports from recordkeepers about the performance history of the models. However, we believe that most recordkeepers have not been, and may not be able to (on a reasonable basis), calculate and report those returns. (Similar difficulties may exist for AAMs for other disclosures required by the regulations.) This could result in the inability to continue to use those models.
However, if the model is “managed” by a discretionary fiduciary, it appears that the DOL may conclude that is not a model, but instead an investment management service–which apparently would not be considered a DIA.
As we do work for “covered’ service providers to ERISA plans, we have seen a number of issues that we think are “flying under the radar.” As a result, I plan to write a series of short articles, like this one, about those issues.
The first is the “related parties” and “subcontractor” issue. Under the 408(b)(2) regulation, if a service provider pays money to an affiliate or a subcontractor, it may be necessary to separately report that payment. Without going into too much detail, the regulation requires that the payment be disclosed in writing if it is incentive compensation or is charged directly to the investments.
While this can affect several of types of service providers, it occurs most often in connection with broker-dealers. Let me explain. While the large wirehouses may treat their financial advisers (or registered representatives) as employees, many broker-dealers treat some or all of their financial advisers as independent contractors. The independent contractor financial advisers typically receive a percentage of the commission paid to the broker-dealer. In other words, they receive incentive compensation. As a result, the payment to the independent contractor financial adviser must be separately disclosed to the plan.
This could also apply to RIAs—investment advisers—where, for example, an IAR receives part of a solicitor’s fee for recommending an investment manager
The regulation is going to be amended before it becomes effective. As a result, some of the 408(b)(2) requirements could change.
