Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #19


DOL, fiduciary, General, prudent

This is my nineteenth article about interesting observations about the fiduciary regulation and the exemptions.

In an earlier post (Angles #16), I described how advisers could use the “hire me” approach to explain their services and fees without becoming a fiduciary for that purpose. Generally stated, under that approach, an adviser could explain his services and fees, but could not discuss specific products or platforms. In other words, if the adviser “suggested” specific products or platforms, the adviser would become a fiduciary even under “hire me.” The DOL explained that result in the preamble to the fiduciary regulation:

“An adviser can recommend that a retirement investor enter into an advisory relationship with the adviser without acting as a fiduciary. But when the adviser recommends, for example, that the investor pull money out of a plan or invest in a particular fund, that advice is given in a fiduciary capacity even if part of a presentation in which the adviser is also recommending that the person enter into an advisory relationship. The adviser also could not recommend that a plan participant roll money out of a plan into investments that generate a fee for the adviser, but leave the participant in a worse position than if he had left the money in the plan. Thus, when a recommendation to ‘‘hire me’’ effectively includes a recommendation on how to invest or manage plan or IRA assets (e.g., whether to roll assets into an IRA or plan or how to invest assets if rolled over), that recommendation would need to be evaluated separately under the provisions in the final rule”

I mention this because I have recently seen some confusion about the extent and scope of “hire me.” As you might expect, it is because people want to extend “hire me” to all kinds of scenarios, and thereby limit their fiduciary status and legal exposure. For example, I was recently asked if an adviser could tell an IRA owner that the adviser would charge 1% per year to help select, manage, and monitor individual variable annuities. That might work if the IRA owner initially told the adviser that he wanted to hire someone to search for individual variable annuities. However, if the “suggestion” that an individual variable annuity would be appropriate comes from the adviser, that would likely result in fiduciary status for identifying the particular type of investment to be made (and, therefore, cause the loss of the non-fiduciary “hire me” approach).

So, as a word of warning, if you intend to use “hire me” to market your services, keep in mind that it is to describe your services and fees, but without a suggestion that any particular product, investment or platform, be used by the IRA owner.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

 

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #18


BICE, DOL, fiduciary, prohibited transaction, prudent

As advisers who work with ERISA-governed retirement plans already know, an adviser’s compensation cannot be more than a reasonable amount. Because of the new fiduciary advice regulation, and the associated prohibited transaction exemptions (84-24 and the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE)), that requirement is being imposed on investment and insurance recommendations to IRAs. Interestingly, under the Internal Revenue Code (section 4975(d)(2)), it is already a prohibited transaction for an adviser to earn more than reasonable compensation from an IRA. However, because of lack of enforcement by the IRS, that requirement is often overlooked. As evidence of the fact that it is overlooked, think about the lack of benchmarking or similar services to help advisers determine if their compensation from an IRA is reasonable. But, that is about to change.

To appreciate the “reasonable compensation” requirement, a person needs to understand that the amount that is reasonable is determined based on the services that are provided. In its guidance, the DOL explains how reasonableness is to be determined:

“The reasonableness of the fees depends on the particular facts and circumstances at the time of the recommendation. Several factors inform whether compensation is reasonable including, inter alia, the market pricing of service(s) provided and the underlying asset(s), the scope of monitoring, and the complexity of the product. No single factor is dispositive in determining whether compensation is reasonable; the essential question is whether the charges are reasonable in relation to what the investor receives.”

However, there is a difference between “market” compensation and “customary” compensation. That difference is primarily whether the market is transparent and competitive:

“Ultimately, the “reasonable compensation” standard is a market based standard. As noted above, the standard incorporates the familiar ERISA section 408(b)(2) and Code section 4975(d)(2) standards. The Department is unwilling to condone all “customary” compensation arrangements and declines to adopt a standard that turns on whether the agreement is “customary.” For example, it may in some instances be “customary” to charge customers fees that are not transparent or that bear little relationship to the value of the services actually rendered, but that does not make the charges reasonable.”

As a hypothetical example . . . if an adviser provides a wide range of services, that might justify compensation of 1% per year of the assets under management. On the other hand, if an adviser provides a more limited range of services, that might be worth one-half of 1% per year (that is, 50 basis points). As a more specific example, BICE requires that advisers state whether or not they will be monitoring the investments on behalf of the IRA owner or plan. Obviously, all other things being equal, an adviser that provides fiduciary monitoring services is entitled to more money than one that does not.

With that understanding, the key question is, how will an adviser determine whether its compensation is reasonable? Most likely, it will be done in the same way that is in the 401(k) world. In other words, the value of services will be determined by the competitive marketplace. Since competitive market data is not generally available for IRAs, RIA firms and broker-dealers will need to work with service providers who have that information. In the 401(k) world, those are called benchmarking services.

The better benchmarking services will consider both the range of services and the compensation of the adviser. As explained above, the calculation of reasonable compensation is based on the services provided, but not just on the size of the account. In that regard, there will need to be a range of benchmarking alternatives, for example, discretionary investment advice for individual securities; discretionary investment advice for mutual funds; non-discretionary advice for both of those scenarios; recommendations for the purchase of individual annuities, including evaluations that take into account the different types of annuities (e.g., fixed rates annuities, fixed indexed annuities, and variable annuities); referrals to discretionary investment managers; and so on. The benchmarking will need to consider services and compensation in the first year and in subsequent years (for example, will the adviser be monitoring the investments).

While the services do not exist today, it is likely that they will in the relatively near future, say, in the next six to 12 months.

Forewarned is forearmed. Advisers need to be attentive to these issues, now that they are front and center.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

 

 

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #17


BICE, DOL, fiduciary

Much attention has been given to the new fiduciary rules (applicable April 10, 2017) for recommending distributions from retirement plans and rollovers to IRAs. Where the adviser making the recommendation is a “Level Fee Fiduciary,” the new requirements are sometimes referred to as “BICE-lite,” because only certain of the requirements of the Best Interest Contract Exemption must be satisfied. However, where the adviser will not be a Level Fee Fiduciary, the adviser and his Financial Institution (e.g., broker-dealer or RIA) must comply with all of the BICE conditions.

However, not much attention has been paid to the other BICE-lite recommendations—a recommendation to transfer an IRA from another adviser and a recommendation to change from a transaction-based account to a fee-based account. This article discusses the first of those two . . . a recommendation to transfer an IRA.

The starting point is to know that the fiduciary regulation says that a recommendation to transfer an IRA is a fiduciary act. More specifically, it says that fiduciary acts include:

“…recommendations with respect to rollovers, transfers, or distributions from a plan or IRA, including whether, in what amount, in what form, and to what destination such a rollover, transfer, or distribution should be made.”

The next step is to understand that the recommendation will almost necessarily result in a financial conflict of interest, which the Internal Revenue Code refers to as a prohibited transaction. In other words, a receipt of compensation as a result of the recommendation is prohibited. Fortunately, though, there is an exception, which the Code calls an exemption, that if its conditions are satisfied, allows the adviser to receive compensation on a transferred IRA. The exemption is BICE.

BICE-lite has several requirements, including that the adviser receive only reasonable compensation, that no misleading statements be made, and that the recommendation to transfer the IRA satisfy the best interest standard of care. However, the most demanding requirement is that the adviser document why the recommendation is in the best interest of the investor. (More accurately, BICE-lite requires that the Financial Institution—for example, the broker-dealer or RIA firm—document why the recommendation is in the best interest of the investor.) To quote from the exemption:

“…in the case of a recommendation to rollover from another IRA or to switch from a commission-based account to a level fee arrangement, the Level Fee Fiduciary documents the reasons that the arrangement is considered to be in the Best Interest of the Retirement Investor, including, specifically, the services that will be provided for the fee.”

In doing the analysis to determine whether the recommendation is in the IRA owner’s best interest, BICE specifically requires that the adviser consider the services offered in the existing IRA and the services that the adviser will offer in the new IRA. In that regard, it would be risky to document the “best interest” recommendation without some specific consideration of the services. However, that is not the end of the story. The rule more generally requires that the adviser act in the best interest of the IRA owner, which could involve other considerations. For example, the general rule for a prudent process is that the fiduciary adviser consider the “relevant” factors. (Those are the factors that a hypothetical knowledgeable person would want to review in making the decision.) The best interest standard also requires that the adviser consider the needs, circumstances, objectives and risk tolerance of the IRA owner.

So, what does all of that mean? While there could be a number of ways of satisfying the requirements, I believe that one way—and probably a good way—is to have procedures, forms and services for gathering and evaluating the information and for documenting why the analysis of that information results in a recommendation that the transfer (or not transferring) is in the best interest of the IRA owner.

Also, while BICE does not specifically discuss the analysis that needs to be made if the adviser will not be providing “Level Fee Fiduciary” advice to the IRA, the logical conclusion would be that the requirements are the same (in addition to satisfying the other conditions of BICE that do not apply to Level Fee Fiduciary advice).

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

 

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #16


DOL, fiduciary

This is my sixteenth article about interesting observations “hidden” in the fiduciary regulation and the exemptions.

Beginning April 10, 2017, the recommendation of almost any investment or insurance product to a plan, a participant or an IRA owner will be a fiduciary act. (While individualized recommendations are already fiduciary acts, the definition of advice will be extended to include a “suggestion” that the advice recipient engage in, or refrain from, a particular course of action. In other words, the definition of fiduciary advice is being greatly expanded, and enforcement mechanisms are being added.) Also, a fiduciary recommendation includes a referral to a fiduciary investment adviser or manager. Since almost all advisers to plans, participants and IRA owners will be fiduciaries, that means that virtually any referral to an adviser will be a fiduciary act (where some compensation is associated with the referral).

But what if an adviser recommends himself? Not a problem!

The DOL has created the concept of “hire me” and explained that touting one’s own advisory services (as opposed to products or strategies) is not a fiduciary act. In the preamble to the fiduciary advice regulation the DOL said:

“It was not the intent of the Department, however, that one could become a fiduciary merely by engaging in the normal activity of marketing oneself or an affiliate as a potential fiduciary to be selected by a plan fiduciary or IRA owner, without making an investment recommendation covered by (a)(1)(i) or (ii).”

“Accordingly, a person or firm can tout the quality of his, her, or its own advisory or investment management services or those of any other person known by the investor to be, or fairly identified by the adviser as, an affiliate, without triggering fiduciary obligations.”

Advisers should be careful in using this approach. While it’s not fiduciary advice to explain one’s services and fees, if the discussion also includes the recommendation of a particular investment or strategy (or a rollover), that’s fiduciary advice.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #15


BICE, DOL, fiduciary, prudent

This is my fifteenth article about interesting observations “hidden” in the fiduciary regulation and the exemptions.

In my last post (Angles #14), I said that the prudent process requirement would apply to many, but not all, advisers. This article explains that statement.

ERISA does not apply to individual IRAs (but does apply to SEP and SIMPLE IRAs). As a result, ERISA’s prudent man rule does not govern the conduct of advisers when providing investment advice to individual IRAs.

However, when the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE) applies to “conflicted” advice on April 10, 2017, those advisers will need to, among other things, satisfy the Best Interest standard of care (which is, in its essence, a combination of ERISA’s prudent man rule and duty of loyalty). In effect, conflicted advisers will be bootstrapped into a prudent process requirement. (As background, a “conflicted” fiduciary adviser is one with a conflict of interest, e.g., the advice can result in higher compensation or payments from third parties – such as 12b-1 fees or where proprietary investments are used.)

However, a pure level fee adviser does not have any financial conflicts and therefore will not need to use BICE. (A “pure level fee adviser” is one who charges a level fee, e.g., one percent per year, and neither the adviser, his supervisory entity nor any affiliated or related party receives any money or financial benefit on top of that fee.) Since a pure level fee, or non-conflicted, adviser won’t commit a prohibited transaction and therefore won’t need an exemption, that adviser will not be bound by the best interest standard for investment advice to individual IRAs. Instead, the adviser will only be subject to the conduct standards in the securities laws.

As a result, pure level fee advisers for IRAs won’t be affected by the new fiduciary rules . . . with a couple of notable exceptions. The biggest of those exceptions is a recommendation to a plan participant to take a distribution and roll over to an IRA with the adviser. But that is a subject for a future article.

For the moment, though, let me leave you with a positive thought. If you are a pure level fee adviser, your existing IRA clients, and your services to those clients, will not be affected by the new rules.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #14


DOL, fiduciary, prudent

This is my fourteenth article about interesting observations “hidden” in the fiduciary regulation and the exemptions.

When the new fiduciary regulation applies on April 10, 2017, anyone who makes investment recommendations or investment “suggestions” to retirement plans will be a fiduciary adviser. As a result, the adviser must engage in a prudent process for developing those recommendations. However, that is not a dramatic change for many advisers, since they already serve as fiduciaries and use prudent process.

But, the same rules will apply to many advisers to IRAs. (In my next blog I will explain why I say “many” rather than “all.”) As a result, advisers to IRAs will also need to use prudent processes to develop their investment recommendations.

What does that process look like? The DOL explains:

“Thus the prudence standard, as incorporated in the Best Interest standard, is an objective standard of care that requires investment advice fiduciaries to investigate and evaluate investments, make recommendations, and exercise sound judgment in the same way that knowledgeable and impartial professionals would. “[T]his is not a search for subjective good faith – a pure heart and an empty head are not enough.” Whether or not the fiduciary is actually familiar with the sound investment principles necessary to make particular recommendations, the fiduciary must adhere to an objective professional standard. Additionally, fiduciaries are held to a particularly stringent standard of prudence when they have a conflict of interest.”

In other words, fiduciary advisers are held to the standard by a hypothetical person who is knowledgeable about retirement investing. First and foremost, that means that the adviser must engage in a prudent process to formulate the recommendations to the investor. That includes an investigation of the needs, circumstances and objectives of the investor. A prudent process also includes application of generally accepted investment theories, such as modern portfolio theory. Courts have said that a prudent fiduciary would utilize prevailing investment industry practices in selecting investments (which could include consideration of costs and quality).

As good risk management, advisers should retain documentation of their process for developing their recommendations for at least six years.

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #13


DOL, fiduciary, General

This is my thirteenth article about interesting observations “hidden” in the fiduciary regulation and the exemptions.

It is not clear under current rules whether “suggesting” investment policies is a fiduciary act. In that vein, it’s also not clear if providing a sample investment policy statement (IPS) is a fiduciary act. However, that is about to change.

When the new fiduciary regulation applies—on April 10, 2017, the recommendation of investment policies, strategies or portfolio composition will be fiduciary activities. As the DOL says in the preamble to the fiduciary regulation:

Specifically, the final rule includes text that describes management of securities or other investment property, as including, among other things, recommendations on investment policies or strategies, portfolio composition, or recommendations on distributions, including rollovers, from a plan or IRA.

And, a mere suggestion to use certain investment policies can result in fiduciary status. The DOL defines a fiduciary recommendation as:

For purposes of this section, ‘‘recommendation’’ means a communication that, based on its content, context, and presentation, would reasonably be viewed as a suggestion that the advice recipient engage in or refrain from taking a particular course of action.

So, what does this mean? First, if you don’t want to be a fiduciary for that purpose, the safest bet is to avoid suggestions of investment policies or providing a sample IPS. A reasonable question is . . . if you didn’t mean for your comments or the sample document to suggest the use of the policies or IPS, why did you bring it up?

On the other hand, if you are willing to be a fiduciary for this purpose, make sure that you are a fiduciary (that is, that the recommendations/IPS are prudent under the circumstances). Keep in mind that ERISA’s prudent process rule is based on generally accepted investment theories and prevailing investment industry standards. Your policy recommendations should be based on those concepts (absent an explicit instruction from the investor to the contrary).

If you have read to this point, you are probably thinking about these issues in the context of retirement plans. That’s valid, but only partially so. Beginning April 10, these rules also apply to IRAs. Do you suggest investment policies to IRA owners or supply an IPS? If so, the same concepts will apply.

Forewarned is forearmed.

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #12


DOL, fiduciary, prohibited transaction

This is my twelfth article about interesting observations “hidden” in the fiduciary regulation and the exemptions.

The DOL has long taken the position that the recommendation of a discretionary investment manager is a fiduciary act. (At least one court has adopted that position – in a case involving investments with Madoff.)

While I am not aware of any guidance or litigation about potential prohibited transactions because of payments to persons who recommend investment managers (e.g., solicitor’s fees), from a legal perspective, if the person making the referral is a fiduciary and that person receives a fee, it may be a prohibited transaction under ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code.

To further complicate matters, when the new fiduciary rule becomes applicable on April 10, 2017, the definition of “fiduciary” will cover someone who makes referrals to both discretionary investment managers and non-discretionary investment advisers for plans, participants and IRAs. More specifically, the fiduciary definition includes:

“A recommendation as to the management of securities or other investment property, including, among other things, recommendations on investment policies or strategies, portfolio composition, selection of other persons to provide investment advice or investment management services . . .” [Emphasis added.]

In other words, a person who recommends a fiduciary adviser (which could include financial advisers, insurance agents and investment advisers under the new definition) will be a fiduciary for that purpose, if a fee is paid for the referral; and the payment of that fee could be (or, perhaps, probably will be) a prohibited transaction.

This is a significant change. Advisers who pay fees for referrals should consider its impact.

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #11


BICE, DOL, fiduciary, General

This is my eleventh article about interesting observations “hidden” in the fiduciary regulation and the exemptions.

ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code limit compensation for services to plans and IRAs to “reasonable” amounts. Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) 84-24 and the Best Interest Contact Exemption (BICE) also limit compensation to reasonable amounts.

While the concept of reasonable compensation is old-hat for advisers and service providers to ERISA qualified retirement plans, it has not, by and large, been used in the IRA world. As a result, some people are asking . . . what is reasonable compensation? The DOL explained the concept in a preamble:

“The obligation to pay no more than reasonable compensation to service providers is long recognized under ERISA and the Code. ERISA section 408(b)(2) and Code section 4975(d)(2) require that services arrangements involving plans and IRAs result in no more than reasonable compensation to the service provider. Accordingly, Advisers and Financial Institutions – as service providers – have long been subject to this requirement, regardless of their fiduciary status. At bottom, the standard simple requires that compensation not be excessive, as measured by the market value of the particular services, rights, and benefits the Adviser and Financial Institution are delivering to the Retirement Investor.

The reasonableness of the fees depends on the particular facts and circumstances at the time of the recommendation. Several factors inform whether compensation is reasonable including, inter alia, the market pricing of service(s) provided and the underlying asset(s), the scope of monitoring, and the complexity of the product. No single factor is dispositive in determining whether compensation is reasonable; the essential question is whether the charges are reasonable in relation to what the investor receives.”

In other words, “reasonableness” is defined by free market practices . . . in a market where the costs and compensation are transparent and, therefore, where the market is truly competitive. As a result, broker-dealers, RIAs, insurance companies and banks will need to use market data to evaluate the compensation they receive for the distribution of their products and services to plans and IRAs.

Benchmarking is on its way to IRAs. Expect compensation to drop – for the more “expensive” advisers.

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Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #10


DOL, fiduciary, General, prohibited transaction

This is my tenth article about interesting observations “hidden” in the fiduciary regulation and the exemptions.

When the new fiduciary advice regulation is applicable on April 10, 2017, a recommendation to a participant to take a distribution and rollover to an IRA will be a fiduciary act. It doesn’t matter if the adviser has a pre-existing relationship with the plan or the participant, or not.

Some RIA firms and broker-dealers focused on a similar issue when FINRA issued its Regulatory Notice 13-45 in late 2013. As that notice explained, distribution recommendations are investment recommendations (and thus, in the case of FINRA, are subject to the suitability standard), but distribution education is not an investment recommendation. To avoid the additional compliance work (and possibly prohibited transactions), many RIA firms and broker-dealers adopted a distributions education approach using 13-45 as the model. While the DOL agrees that distribution education is not a fiduciary recommendation, it does not agree that 13-45 is a safe harbor:

“In response to the comments suggesting that the Department adopt FINRA Notice 13-45 as a safe harbor for communications on benefits distributions, the FINRA notice did not purport to define a line between education and advice. The final rule [i.e., the fiduciary advice regulation] seeks to ensure that all investment advice to retirement investors adheres to fiduciary norms, particularly including advice as critically important as recommendations on how to manage a lifetime of savings held in a retirement plan and on whether to roll over plan accounts. Following FINRA and SEC guidance on best practices is a good way for advisers to look at for the interests of their customers, but it does not give them a pass from ERISA fiduciary status.”

As a word to the wise, RIAs and broker-dealers should revisit their 13-45 distribution education materials, and revise them to be consistent with the DOL’s approach.

 

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