Category Archives: Plan Sponsors

Best Practices for Plan Sponsors #1

Projection of Retirement Income

This is the first of the series about Best Practices for Plan Sponsors.

“Best Practice” is above and beyond the legal requirements. Best Practices are not mandated; they are elected.

While the most obvious Best Practices are automatic enrollment and automatic deferral increases, I want to start with the projection of retirement income for participants. That’s partially because it is in a current legislative proposal—in the Retirement Enhancement and Savings Act (RESA), and also because, in my opinion, it doesn’t receive the attention that it deserves.

Continue reading Best Practices for Plan Sponsors #1


Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #84

What Does the 5th Circuit Decision Mean for Rollover Recommendations?

This is my 84th article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor’s (DOL) fiduciary rule and exemptions. These articles also cover the DOL’s FAQs interpreting the regulation and exemptions and related developments in the securities laws.

The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals has “vacated” the DOL’s fiduciary rule and exemptions. What does that mean for recommendations to participants that they take plan distributions and rollover to IRAs?

It means a lot . . . in some cases.

But before discussing that, it’s important to note that the decision isn’t applicable yet. At the earliest, it will take effect on May 7. However, if the DOL contests that decision and the courts “stay”–or block—it as the hearings and appeals take place, it may not apply for a year or more . . . or it may be overturned. So, the only thing we know is that we don’t know whether advisors are governed by the new fiduciary rule–the one the court vacated–or if the “old” pre-June 9, 2017 rules apply. Unfortunately, when it comes to recommendations of plan distributions and rollovers, those two sets of rules are different in significant ways.

Let’s look at the post-June 8, or “new,” rules–the ones that the 5th Circuit considered. Under those rules, a recommendation to take a plan distribution and rollover is a fiduciary act and must be based on a prudent analysis of the participant’s needs and a comparison of the plan and the IRA. Also, it’s a prohibited transaction if the advisor makes more money if the recommendation is accepted by the participant, that is, if the money is rolled to an IRA with the advisor. Fortunately, there is an exemption–the transition Best Interest Contract Exemption, BICE. Unfortunately, it’s hard to comply with BICE.

But, what if the new rules (including BICE) are thrown out? Under the old rules, a recommendation to a participant to take a distribution and rollover was not, in most cases, a fiduciary recommendation. As a result, it was not subject to the prudent man and loyalty requirements, and it was not a prohibited transaction. (Note, though, both FINRA and the SEC view that advice as a securities recommendation subject to their jurisdiction. See, e.g., Regulatory Notice 13-45.)

However, it the advisor was a fiduciary to the plan, a recommendation to rollover would be a fiduciary act. See DOL Advisory Opinion 2005-23A. Of course, that implicates the fiduciary standard of care–prudence and loyalty. It also is a prohibited transaction if the fiduciary recommendation causes the advisor (or the advisor’s firm) to earn more from the IRA than it did from the plan. For example, if the advisor is a fiduciary to the plan and the compensation from the plan is 25 basis points a year, but the compensation from the IRA will be 100 basis points per year, that’s a prohibited transaction. Unfortunately, there isn’t an old rule exemption . . . meaning there’s no way around the prohibition.

To make matters worse, many broker-dealers have allowed their advisors to be fiduciaries to the plans they work with . . . so the number of fiduciary advisors to plans is much greater than it was before June 9 of last year. And some of those advisors had counted on rollovers as part of the bargain for their services to the plans.

To further compound matters, I suspect that the attention given to fiduciary services in recent years means that more advisors are fiduciaries whether they declare that status or not. That’s because the old rule had a functional definition that will be satisfied in many cases. Two provisions in the old rule are that the advice must be given regularly and there has to be a mutual understanding that the advice will be a primary basis for the plan sponsor to make investment decisions. Since most advisors now meet with plan sponsors at least once a year, the “regularly” requirement appears to be satisfied. And, it’s possible that a disinterested reasonable third party would view the materials and statements by the advisor are a primary basis for investment decisions. In that case, the second prong may also be satisfied. (Some people think that the mutuality is about an explicit understanding between an advisor and a plan sponsor. The DOL, though, would probably take the position that the test should be what a reasonable third party would think of the interactions.)

What does this mean? What should advisors and their firms do?

Until this plays out, advisors and their firms need to satisfy two conflicting rules. Of course, that’s impossible.

If the new rules are followed, rollover recommendations must be prudent and loyal. The benefit of that burden, though, is that BICE would be available. That’s not a bad result under the transition rules for BICE.

But, if the old rules are followed, many advisors will not be fiduciaries . . . and therefore won’t need an exemption. However, for those advisors who are fiduciaries to plans, recommendations to rollover will be fiduciary acts and likely prohibited transactions–without relief. Perhaps they could use education, rather than make recommendations.

Unfortunately, though, until the legal “dust” settles, in the sense of a resolution of the litigation, we won’t know which rules apply.

More practically, I suspect that many advisors and their firms will continue under the new rules until the situation clears up. That could be as early as late April, or it could be delayed until the Supreme Court rules–if the case gets that far, perhaps more than a year from now.

If that wasn’t complicated enough, it’s likely that the DOL will come out with a new proposed rule and exemptions in the second half of this year. If I had to guess, I would say that these revised rules will still say that a recommendation to take a distribution and roll over was still a fiduciary act. The interesting part would be what the new exemption will require.

Bottom line . . . get legal advice; this is risky.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.


Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #73

Recordkeeper Investment Support for Plan Sponsors

This is my 73rd article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor’s (DOL’) fiduciary rule and exemptions. These articles also cover the DOL’s FAQs interpreting the regulation and exemptions and related developments in the securities laws.

In Angles article #70, I discussed three areas where the fiduciary rule is impacting recordkeepers. Those are: acceptance of fiduciary status; non-fiduciary investment services for advisors; and non-fiduciary investment services for plan sponsors. Angles articles #71 and #72 discussed the first two points. This article discusses the third.

In the past, recordkeepers often provided sample line-ups to start-up plans and to existing plans that were transferring to their recordkeeping platform. However, under the new fiduciary definition, a selective list of investments is considered to be fiduciary investment advice, which means that the recordkeeper would need to make prudent recommendations and would be subject to ERISA’s prohibited transaction rules (e.g., for any proprietary investments and revenue sharing). Fortunately, there is an exception in the fiduciary regulation; unfortunately, though, the scope of the exception is limited. Let me explain.

The DOL’s fiduciary regulation—which applied on June 9, 2017—expands the definition of fiduciary advice. However, it also includes “carve-outs,” or exceptions, from the fiduciary definition. One of those exceptions is that fiduciary advice does not include a line-up of investments that is provided:

“ . . . In response to a request for information, request for proposal, or similar solicitation by or on behalf of the plan, identifying a limited or sample set of investment alternatives based on only the size of the employer or plan, the current investment alternatives designated under the plan, or both, provided that the response is in writing and discloses whether the person identifying the limited or sample set of investment alternatives has a financial interest in any of the alternatives, and if so the precise nature of such interest; . . .”

As a result, a recordkeeper can provide a plan sponsor with a sample list of investments (for example, for a 401(k) plan) without becoming an investment advisor fiduciary. However, the investment line-up can only be based on the size of the employer or the size of the plan, the plan’s current investment alternatives (if it is an existing plan), or both. In other words, the line-up cannot be customized for the particular plan (by, e.g., taking into account other factions). If it is customized, that would be fiduciary investment advice.

In addition, the sample line-up must be:

  • In response to a request for information, request for proposal, or similar solicitation by or on behalf of the plan.
  • In a written form which discloses whether the recordkeeper has a financial interest in any of the investments in the line-up and, if so, the precise nature of the interests must be described. That would include any proprietary investments and any investments that pay revenue sharing to the recordkeeper.

The sample list is limited to line-ups that would generally be proposed for plans or employers of a particular size (or be based on the line-up of an existing plan) and, therefore, would be of limited value to many plans, this RFP/RFI exception will likely provide some value to small, start-up plans which are serviced by advisors with little or no 401(k) experience and to plans that do not have advisors.

However, where plans do have advisors (even if they have limited experience with plans), the better approach would probably be the wholesalers exception, which was discussed in a prior post, Angles article #72.

Interestingly, if a recordkeeper goes beyond the limits of the RFP/RFI exception (for example, customizes the investment line-up), the recordkeeper will be a fiduciary to the plan, which implicates both the fiduciary standard of care and the prohibited transaction rules. Since recordkeepers commonly receive revenue sharing from a plan’s investments and, therefore, engage in prohibited transactions, they would need to comply with the transition rules for the Best Interest Contract Exemption. Those rules are: adherence to the best interest standard of care; receipt of no more than reasonable compensation; and not making materially misleading statements. For the duration of the transition period (until July 1, 2019), those requirements do not appear to be insurmountable. As a result, some recordkeepers may decide to provide fiduciary investment advice to plan sponsors, rather than use the RFP/RFI carve-out. To this point in time, though, I haven’t seen a movement in that direction.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.




Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #72

Advice to Advisors: The “Wholesaler” Exception

This is my 72nd article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor’s (DOL) fiduciary rule and exemptions. These articles also cover the DOL’s FAQs interpreting the regulation and exemptions and related developments in the securities laws.

In my Angles post #70, I discussed three issues for recordkeepers related to the fiduciary rule and exemptions. Angles #71 discussed the financial wellness programs developed by some recordkeepers. This article covers investment advice to advisors.

It is common knowledge that the recommendation of investments to a plan sponsor (that is, to a plan fiduciary such as a 401(k) committee) is fiduciary advice. However, it is less known that, under the new rules, investment recommendations made to fiduciary advisors is also considered fiduciary advice. And, since virtually every advisor to a plan, participant or IRA is now a fiduciary, that means that the presentation of sample investment line-ups to advisors can be fiduciary investment advice, resulting in a recordkeeper becoming a fiduciary. That is obviously problematic for the recordkeepers, but is also a problem for advisors and particularly for advisors who are not experienced in working with retirement plans.

Fortunately, though, there is at least a partial solution.

The fiduciary rules include an exception for fiduciary advice to “independent fiduciaries with financial expertise.” Simply stated, an independent fiduciary with financial expertise (or IFFE) is a broker-dealer, RIA, bank or trust company, or insurance company that is willing to serve as a fiduciary and who will, in that capacity, oversee the advisor who is providing fiduciary advice to a plan. This is sometimes refer to as the “wholesaler’s exception,” and it covers recommendations made by both recordkeepers’ wholesalers, and home office personnel.

Note that there is also an IFFE exception for advice to primary plan fiduciaries (e.g., plan committees) who oversee at least $50,000,000 in assets. However, that is a subject of another article.

The wholesaler’s exception permits recordkeepers to provide investment line-ups to fiduciary advisors, but not to plan sponsors. However, in a set of FAQs, the DOL noted that wholesaler recommendations could be made in the presence of a plan sponsor, so long as the fiduciary advisor was also at the meeting. So, the recordkeeper (and the wholesaler) can avoid fiduciary status by, for example, initially meeting with the advisor to discuss the investment line-up, and then making a presentation to the plan sponsor in the presence of the advisor (or, alternatively, having the advisor make the presentation, but with the wholesaler being able to provide comments and answer questions). It’s important to know, though, that it must be clear that the recommendations are being vetted by the fiduciary advisor so that, in a sense, the recommendations are technically fiduciary advice by the advisor and not by the recordkeeper/wholesaler. As a result, advisors should make sure that they approve of the recommendations either before they are presented or at the meeting.

In my experience, broker-dealers, RIAs, and banks and trust companies will ordinarily serve as fiduciaries for the advice given by their representatives and employees. As a result, recordkeepers and wholesalers will be able to provide investment advice to these representatives without becoming fiduciaries. However, insurance companies are generally not willing to serve as co-fiduciaries with their insurance agents, and that is particularly true of independent insurance agents and brokers. However, if the insurance agents are also registered representatives of a broker-dealer, that does not present a problem, since the broker-dealer can, from a fiduciary perspective, oversee advice about insurance products; as a result, the agents will have a financial institution to qualify as the IFFE.

As described above, where an insurance agent is only licensed to sell insurance, there will not usually be a financial institution that will serve as the IFFE. That presents a significant problem for the distribution of insurance products to plans, participants, and IRAs through independent insurance agents and brokers. While group annuity contracts can be recommended under Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-24, and the agent or broker can receive a commission, a wholesaler cannot provide the independent agent or broker with a recommended line-up — without the wholesaler and the recordkeeper becoming fiduciaries.

If properly done, a possible solution would be for the independent insurance agent or broker to not make any recommendations about investments, but instead for the plan sponsor to utilize the services of a fiduciary on the platform, for example, a 3(21) or 3(38) platform fiduciary.

The IFFE exception will likely be embraced by the recordkeeper community. As a result, the common approach will be to provide investment line-ups to fiduciary advisors who are supervised by IFFEs. That does present an issue, though, for recordkeepers who sell directly to plan sponsors without the use of an advisor. My next article will discuss the RFP/RFI approach that can be used for that purpose.

POSTSCRIPT: This article does not discuss some of the requirements for satisfying the IFFE exception to the fiduciary definition. If an advisor or a firm intends to use that exception, it should only do so with legal guidance.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.




Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #70

The Fiduciary Rule and Recordkeeper Services

This is my 70th article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor’s (DOL) fiduciary rule and exemptions. These articles also cover the DOL’s FAQs interpreting the regulation and exemptions and related developments in the securities laws.

Almost all of my Angles articles have been about the impact of the fiduciary rule on advisors—representatives of broker-dealers and RIAs. However, the fiduciary rule also affects recordkeepers and the services that they offer to plans and advisors. In that regard, most of the work that we are doing for recordkeepers falls into three categories:

  • Acceptance of fiduciary responsibility by recordkeepers for “financial wellness” of participants.
  • Providing investment services and support for advisors, without becoming a fiduciary.
  • Providing investment services and support for plan sponsors, without becoming a fiduciary.

The next few Angles articles will discuss these issues in detail. This article is just to introduce the topics.

Financial Wellness

Financial wellness combines a focus on benefit adequacy with basic budgeting and financial management. Typically, it covers advice on plan participation, amounts to defer, repayment of indebtedness, budgeting and management of regular expenses, basic savings, investment advice and management of participants’ accounts, roll-ins to plans, and rollovers from plans. The objective is to help employees with financial decision-making for the short, intermediate and long terms. Where the recommendations constitute fiduciary advice under ERISA and the Best Interest Contract Exemption, the recordkeepers are accepting fiduciary status.

Investment Assistance to Advisors

The fiduciary rule includes an exception for investment services provided to “independent fiduciaries with financial expertise,” or “IFFEs.” Those fiduciaries include broker-dealers, RIAs, banks and trust companies, and insurance companies. In turn, where those financial institutions are willing to serve as fiduciaries with their advisors, recordkeepers can provide investment recommendations to the advisors without becoming fiduciaries. That is because the financial institution and the advisors are considered to be independent and knowledgeable fiduciaries who can evaluate the recordkeeper recommendations on behalf of their plan, participant and IRA clients.

Investment Assistance to Plan Sponsors

While recordkeepers have great flexibility to provide investment advice to advisors (who qualify as IFFEs) without becoming fiduciaries, the same is not true for advice to plan sponsors. (The IFFE provision also applies to some larger plans.)

However, there are some exceptions of general application for providing investment information to plan sponsors. The most useable exception is for responding to requests for proposals (RFPs) and requests for information (RFIs). But, even that exception is limited. The investment list provided by the recordkeeper can only be based on the size of the employer or the size of the plan, or both. For existing plans, it could be based on the current investment line-up.

A Prediction About Future Directions

As a prediction, recordkeepers will increasingly take advantage of the IFFE carve-out. That means that they will be providing suggested investment line-ups to qualifying IFFE advisors. The advisor will then need to evaluate the line-up and decide whether to present it to the plan sponsor. If an advisor then gives that investment line-up to the plan sponsor, the law will treat it as the advisor’s fiduciary recommendation (and, therefore, not as a recommendation by the recordkeeper).

That is the only meaningful exception for individualized non-fiduciary investment recommendations by recordkeepers. The RFP/RFI exception will also help, but it provides, by definition, a generic list of investments.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.


Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #8

This is my eighth article about interesting observations “hidden” in the fiduciary regulation and the exemptions.

The final regulation on fiduciary advice continues, as education, the current practice of providing participants with asset allocation models that are populated with a plan’s designated investment alternatives (DIAs).

However, the rule imposes a burden on plan sponsors to monitor those models and which DIAs are used for the models. The fiduciary focus should be on the costs and payments from investments to providers and advisers. The preamble says:

 “In this connection, it is important to emphasize that a responsible plan fiduciary would also have, as part of the ERISA obligation to monitor plan service providers, an obligation to evaluate and periodically monitor the asset allocation model and interactive materials being made available to the plan participants and beneficiaries as part of any education program.

That evaluation should include an evaluation of whether the models and materials are in fact unbiased and not designed to influence investment decisions towards particular investments that result in higher fees or compensation being paid to parties that provide investments or investment-related services to the plan.

Who will help plan sponsors satisfy that fiduciary duty?

Most plan sponsors won’t know about this duty. Even if they become aware of the responsibility, they probably won’t know how to evaluate if the “education” models are disguised vehicles for generating management fees for proprietary products or more revenues for advisers or their financial institutions.

This looks like an opportunity for high quality advisers to provide a valuable service to plan sponsors.


Distribution and Rollover Education

A reporter recently asked me to explain why people are saying that, under the DOL’s fiduciary proposal, an adviser should not recommend that a participant take a distribution and roll over to an IRA, but instead should provide distribution education. Here’s my answer:

There are two issues.

The first is that the recommendation to take a distribution must be in the best interest of the participant. That is, it must be a prudent recommendation and it must be done with a duty of loyalty to the participant.  In order to make a prudent recommendation, the adviser needs to investigate the relevant factors that a knowledgeable person would want to know to make that decision.  Some of those factors are:  the investment expenses in the plan as opposed to those in an IRA; the costs for advice in the plan versus those in an IRA; the range of investment options in the plan versus those in an IRA, and whether a larger range of investments is advantageous to the participant; the flexibility and costs of withdrawals from the plan as compared to an IRA.  That requires quite a bit of investigation and analysis, but does not prohibit a recommendation.

The second is that, if the adviser makes more in the IRA than in the plan, it is a prohibited transaction. For example, if the adviser doesn’t make anything from the plan (that is, he isn’t the adviser for the plan), but will receive 1% per year for advising the IRA, it is clearly in the best interest of the adviser to recommend a rollover, but is it right for the participant?  The DOL says that is a conflict, and financial conflicts are prohibited unless there is an exemption.  But, there isn’t an exemption specifically on point.  And, while people think that the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE) is intended to apply, it isn’t clear what BICE requires in this situation.  So, until the final BIC exemption is issued, it isn’t clear how advisers will be able to avoid prohibited transactions if they make distribution recommendations.

However, if an adviser provides non-biased and good quality distribution education, that’s not considered a recommendation. As a result, the prohibited transaction rules don’t apply.

Note: These rules will also apply to recommendations to withdraw or transfer money from IRAs. It is not just a plan issue.


What’s Hot . . . in the First Quarter of 2015?

Over the last few months, the most common questions asked by clients . . . and most of my work . . . have been about three issues:

  • The DOL’s new fiduciary proposal . . . not surprising.
  • Capturing rollovers from retirement plans. Again, not surprising because of the large amount of money coming out of plans and in light of the attention being given to rollovers by the SEC, FINRA, DOL and GAO.
  • The use and allocation of revenue sharing in 401(k) plans.

I will be writing about the first two points in the future, so let’s focus on the third one now.

For about 20 years, mutual funds have paid revenue sharing to 401(k) recordkeepers for services provided to the mutual funds. That includes 12b-1 shareholder servicing fees, 12b-1 distribution fees, and subtransfer agency fees. The view was that the money was paid for services to the mutual funds . . . and only incidentally involved the plans. However, that is changing—at least partially because the 408(b)(2) regulation treated those payments as compensation to the recordkeeper for services to the plans. Because of that change, there is a growing perception that the revenue sharing payments belong to the plan, and not to the provider.

Regardless of those perceptions, the DOL’s position, and the 408(b)(2) regulation, treat the payments as compensation to recordkeepers for their services related to the plans and their investments. As a result, if the total compensation from revenue sharing exceeds the reasonable cost of recordkeeping services, the plan sponsor has a fiduciary obligation to be aware of that and to recoup the excess compensation for the benefit of the participants.

The “new news” is that some providers and some plan sponsors are allocating all of the revenue sharing back to the participants and then charging participants’ accounts for the recordkeeping costs. Why? The general answer is because it is seen as being fair. The more detailed answer is that fiduciaries have a duty to oversee the use of revenue sharing by the recordkeeper and, when they delve into the matter (in order to understand the issues and fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities), the fiduciaries often determine that the equitable allocation of revenue sharing, and then proper allocation of plan costs, produces a result that is fair and that manages the fiduciary risk.

That raises the obvious question . . . what fiduciary risk am I talking about? The risk is that there is no guidance from the DOL on the proper use and allocation of revenue sharing. In other words, plan sponsors, advisers and ERISA attorneys are operating in a vacuum. We are making educated guesses about what will ultimately happen in terms of DOL guidance or ERISA litigation. When “walking on thin ice,” it is often preferable to take a relatively conservative position. In this case, the conservative position is to allocate the revenue sharing back to the participants.

To give you an example, think about a large plan where 50% of the participants’ money is in revenue sharing mutual funds, 40% of the participants’ money is in non-revenue sharing mutual funds, and 10% is in a company stock fund (that does not pay any revenue for recordkeeping). In this case, the 50% of the participants in the revenue sharing mutual funds are carrying the cost of the whole plan. Expressed slightly differently, half of the participants are in the plan for free, because the other half are paying the cost of recordkeeping. If we assume that the half of the participants in the revenue sharing mutual funds are paying higher expense ratios, then the problem becomes obvious. Not only are those participants paying for the plan, but they are bearing a financial burden to do that.

A similar case could occur where some of the participants (probably high-compensated ones) are in stock brokerage accounts, while the rank-and-file employees are in mutual funds that pay revenue sharing. The brokerage accounts aren’t paying anything to support the plan, while the rank-and-file employees are bearing the full cost of the plan.

The fundamental question is, how should your plan sponsor clients be positioning themselves in light of the lack of DOL guidance and the potential risk?



Aging Boomers and Rollovers to IRAs

As baby boomers approach retirement in a defined contribution world, the regulators are focusing on distributions and rollovers to IRAs. The SEC, FINRA, DOL and GAO have all spoken on the subject. Their conclusion appears to be that plan fiduciaries, advisors and recordkeepers need to reconsider their current practices and, in some cases, change their practices.

Why? The reason is relatively straightforward. As large numbers of 401(k) and 403(b) participants approach retirement, regulators are becoming increasingly aware that they will be moving from a plan environment where they are “bubble wrapped” by plan fiduciaries . . . and have the benefit of being able to select from investments that have been vetted by the fiduciaries and that are, as a result, good quality and relatively low-cost investments. Based on current practices, most of those participants will rollover into IRAs with investments and advisors that are using retail pricing.

In addition, participants will go from a fiduciary environment that is protected from conflicts of interest into a retail environment that allows conflicts of interest. (Note that there is a difference between a conflict of interest and “succumbing” to a conflict of interest. In my experience, most—but not all—advisors provide good advice at reasonable costs.)

The regulators are asking, “Does it make sense for participants to leave the protected environment of retirement plans and go into the retail environment of IRAs?”

To create a worse-case scenario, imagine a 401(k) participant who is defaulted into a target date fund and stayed there during his working career. In effect, the participant has never selected an investment, and it is possible that the participant never learned anything about mutual funds. At retirement, that participant is encouraged to rollover his money into a retail market.

So, where does that leave us? For plan sponsors, I think that it means that they should consider allowing participants to stay in the plan, even after retirement, and should provide flexible distribution alternatives through their recordkeeper. For advisors and recordkeepers, I think that it means that they need to create meaningful educational materials and help participants make the right decisions, depending on the participants’ needs and preferences.

This is just the beginning of this story. There is too much at stake for it to end here. For example, it is estimated that over two trillion dollars will become eligible for distribution between January 1, 2014 and December 31, 2018.