Re-Proposal of DOL Fiduciary Advice Regulation

As you have undoubtedly heard, the Department of Labor has pushed back the date for the re-proposal of the fiduciary advice regulation to January of next year. In addition, the SEC is working with the DOL to help determine the impact of an expanded fiduciary advice regulation on the ability of investors to continue to receive adequate investment services. Finally, the White House is also evaluating the potential impact of a regulation that expands the definition of fiduciary advice. The big question, of course, is what does all of this mean?

As you might expect, everyone has an opinion on that subject. So, depending upon your personal beliefs, you can find opinions that either agree or disagree with your position. But, the truth is that the people who know aren’t talking, and the people who are talking don’t know.

One plausible explanation is that the controversy concerning the regulation has risen to the point that it is a political liability. In other words, that line of reasoning holds that these activities are signs that the re-proposal is in danger.

However, another line of reasoning is that the regulation remains viable, and probable, but that the politicians and the regulators want to make sure that they get it right. (If that is the case, then “right” probably means that appropriate prohibited transaction exemptions are crafted so that valuable services and quality products are not prohibited.)

If I were a betting man (and, for this purpose, I am), my bet would be that the second scenario is the more likely. I have a hard time believing that all of this political and regulatory effort is being made for a proposal that will be killed. In other words, I think that there is a good chance that the DOL will issue a proposed regulation in the first half of next year. I also think that there is a good chance that the proposed prohibited transaction exemptions that accompany the guidance will be more thoughtful and practical than might be expected.

In any event, if and when we get the proposal, the first thing that I will look at is . . . the proposed prohibited transaction exemption concerning fiduciary investment advice to IRAs. In particular, I want to see what it says about variable compensation and about proprietary investments and products.

 

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Providing Compliant Services

The increasing regulation of 401(k) distributions and rollovers to IRAs continues to be a subject of great interest to my clients . . . and a considerable amount of work for me. One of the benefits of concentrated work in that area has been an enhanced appreciation of the difficulty of broker-dealers, provider call centers, and RIAs in providing compliant services . . . from a practical perspective.

For example, viewed academically, it is possible to put together a compliant rollover program under FINRA’s guidance in Regulatory Notice 13-45. At the least, that would involve written materials and discussions about the seven factors listed in the guidance. The written materials would be provided to participants to both educate them and to support compliance and supervision. The conversations would be structured to provide a reasonable basis for developing a suitable recommendation, based on the individual needs and circumstances of the participant.

On a practical level, it is feasible for a financial adviser or an investment adviser to engage in that process . . . for a participant with a large account balance. However, that is only a small part of the real world of 401(k) participants. Many of the conversations are with participants with small account balances and, for a provider’s call center, are of limited duration. As a result, the compliance procedures and “scripts” for participants with small account balances are often more difficult to develop than for the individualized treatment that can be financially justified for wealthier participants.

Nonetheless, the regulators—FINRA, the SEC and the DOL—now expect broker-dealers and RIAs to have compliant procedures for “capturing” IRA rollovers. Based on my experience, this is not an easy job. I recommend that, at the least, your procedures incorporate unbiased and relatively thorough educational materials that are given to all participants who are eligible for distributions and a process that solicits the most important information about the needs and circumstances of the participants. Without that kind of approach (or something similar to it), it will be difficult to formulate a suitable or prudent distribution and rollover recommendation.

The FINRA guidance, and the SEC and FINRA 2014 Examination Priorities List, are posted under the “external resources” page on my blog at http://fredreish.wpengine.com/external-resources-2/.

 

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DOL Proposed Guide

Several of my colleagues and I have provided comments to the DOL about its proposal to require a 408(b)(2) guide   Most other commentators have or will be addressing the policy issue — is it a good idea to require a guide or not?   We avoided the policy issues.   Instead, our comments focused on making the requirements clear and implementable — if the guide requirement is adopted.

For example, we asked that the DOL clarify the requirement to “furnish” a guide and “disclose” changes to the guide later on.   In raising this question, our concern is that the language in the proposal may not clearly express the DOL’s intent.  Without clarity on the meaning of these terms, a service provider might inadvertently violate the requirement.  Since the regulation is a prohibited transaction exemption, an unambiguous statement of the requirements is essential  for us to be able to properly advise our clients on how to comply.

There are a number of other areas on which we requested clarification if the proposal is finalized.  A copy of our comments can be accessed here:  http://www.scribd.com/doc/234166566/060214-Ltr-to-DOL-Re-Proposed-Guide.  The signers of the letter other than me were Bruce Ashton, Brad Campbell, Joan Neri and Josh Waldbeser.

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Advisory Opinion 2013-03A

In Advisory Opinion 2013-03A, the Department of Labor said: “This letter also does not address any fiduciary issues that may arise from the allocation of revenue sharing among plan expenses or individual participant accounts . . .”

In effect, the DOL was saying that it has not issued any guidance—and is not prepared to issue guidance—concerning the allocation of revenue sharing. That is a reminder that there isn’t any explicit guidance on how to allocate revenue sharing. As a result, fiduciaries need to engage in a prudent process to make that decision.

In most cases, revenue sharing is used to pay the cost of recordkeeping. In effect, it is arguable that, when the recordkeeper keeps the money, it is a pro rata allocation among the participants’ accounts. That is because the most common way of allocating expenses (for example, recordkeeping or RIA charges) among participants’ accounts is the pro rata method. So, when a recordkeeper keeps the revenue sharing, participants benefit on a pro rata basis. (“Pro rata” means that amounts are allocated among the participant’s account balances in proportion to the value of the account balances.)

A consequence of the 408(b)(2) disclosures and the DOL’s guidance on revenue sharing is that fiduciaries need to pay more attention to revenue sharing. For example, do fiduciaries want the recordkeepers to keep the revenue sharing or do they want to allocate the revenue sharing to participants (along with the charges for recordkeeping)? Should part of the cost of recordkeeping be allocated to participants who are invested in individual brokerage accounts or who hold company stock . . . or should the participants who invest in mutual funds bear the full cost of the recordkeeping for the plan? Those are fiduciary decisions. In the past, most plan fiduciaries have simply accepted the method used by the recordkeeper. However, even then, that was a fiduciary decision. It’s just that the fiduciaries didn’t, in many cases, know that they were making it. Going forward, there undoubtedly will be greater accountability for these fiduciary “decisions”. . . since fiduciaries have been provided with information about revenue sharing as a part of the 408(b)(2) disclosures. Forewarned is forearmed.

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408(b)(2) Guide and More

The DOL recently issued a proposal to require a 408(b)(2) “guide.” The guide has also been referred to as a roadmap. But I think of it as an index to the disclosures.

This is the DOL’s response to their review of provider disclosures and problems the DOL has seen. The DOL has at least two more significant concerns.

The proposal is that plan sponsors be given a stand-alone guide or index to provide directions to where each of the 408(b)(2) disclosures is found in the disclosure documents. It will only apply where covered service providers use multiple or lengthy documents. As a result, it will primarily impact recordkeepers and broker-dealers (as opposed to other covered service providers, such as RIAs and TPAs).

There is time to comment on the proposal. Hopefully, the comments will enable the DOL to find the “fine line” between meaningful disclosure, on the one hand, and overly burdensome requirements on the other.

But, that’s not the end of the story. I have heard of two other DOL concerns. The first is that some covered service providers are not giving fiduciaries information that specifically applies to their plan. For example, the disclosures might instead provide a list of services or compensation amounts that might or might not apply to a particular plan. The Department’s view is that the disclosures should include only the services and compensation for the plan receiving the disclosures. The second concern is that service providers are using overly-broad ranges to make disclosures. For example, if a service provider were to disclose that the fees will be somewhere between 0% and 5%, the Department would likely take the position that the information was not specific enough to enable the responsible plan fiduciaries to evaluate the compensation of the adviser relative to the services being provided.

That’s it for now. But, be forewarned, there is more to come.

As a footnote to these comments, we anticipate that the DOL will begin their first wave of 408(b)(2) investigations in the second half of this year.

To read the Client Alert I co-wrote on this subject in March 2014, visit the Drinker Biddle website here: DOL Proposed Regulation on 408(b)(2) “Guide” – Impact on Service Providers.

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Capturing Rollovers: A Changing Environment

Recent developments suggest that FINRA, the SEC and the DOL are working together…or, perhaps, have independently reached the same conclusions.

In the past few months, FINRA has discussed rollover IRAs in five publications. The most important of those being Regulatory Notice 13-45, which creates a fiduciary-like process for recommendations about distributions and IRA rollovers. (By the way, I believe FINRA’s Investor Alert on rollovers is helpful and should be given to prospective rollover customers.) Then, to put an exclamation point on that guidance, both FINRA and the SEC listed rollovers to IRAs as one of its 2014 Examination Priorities for broker-dealers.

Finally, it is commonly expected that the DOL will issue its proposed regulation on the definition later this year…and that the proposal will expand its prior guidance on “capturing” rollovers. Fiduciary status alone increases the scope of the DOL’s jurisdiction and implicates it’s prior guidance (see Advisory Opinion 2005-23A). As a result, a broader definition of fiduciary advice will subject more advisers and providers to that guidance. In addition, it is possible that the Department will try to label any recommendation to take distribution as fiduciary advice (by saying, e.g., that a recommendation to take a distribution is inherently also a recommendation to liquidate a participant’s 401(k) investments – similar to what FINRA has done).

To make this even more “interesting,” we are seeing SEC examinations of RIAs where the SEC is finding ERISA prohibited transactions and asserting compliance violations by RIAs. The question is, will that theme carry over into IRA rollovers?

These changes impact broker-dealers, RIAs and their representatives. Less obviously, they also impact the rollover services of recordkeepers.

Bottom line… the rules are changing. Much more attention must be given to practices and disclosures in the distribution and rollover process.

For those of you who are interested in following me on Twitter, I can be found @fredreish, or copy and paste this URL into your browser: https://twitter.com/fredreish

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Investment Policy Statement: Friend or Enemy

The ABB case has been thoroughly analyzed and widely discussed. Most of that analysis and discussion, though, has been about expenses and revenue sharing. This email focuses on the duty to follow the terms of investment policy statements (IPS). More technically, section 404(a)(1)(D) of ERISA requires that fiduciaries follow the terms of the documents governing the operation of the plan, unless it would be imprudent to do so. The IPS is one of the documents governing the operation of the plan.

As background, the trial court found that the ABB plan committee violated several of its fiduciary duties. One of those was the duty to follow the terms of the IPS. In the IPS, the committee was obligated to follow certain procedures concerning the removal and replacement of a fund, including placing a fund on the watch list before removing it. The court found that the committee failed to follow the procedures in its IPS and, as a result, breached its fiduciary duties. That was unfortunate, since the committee could have amended the IPS to change the procedure. However, it failed to do so… perhaps because the committee had forgotten the terms of the IPS or perhaps because it believed its exercise of discretion would override the terms of the IPS.

So, is the IPS a friend or an enemy of plan committees? The answer is, depending on how it is done, it can be either.

Unfortunately, we see too many IPS’ that contain absolute and/or unnecessarily restrictive provisions. Those provisions can mandate a certain number of meetings, require a specified investment removal process, insist on a particular series of steps for some decisions, and so on. None of that is required by law… nor, in my opinion, by good judgment. Instead, an IPS should be a set of guidelines, and the plan committee members should be expected to exercise discretion and good judgment for the benefit of the participants.

Is there an alternative to the IPS being an “enemy?” Yes, of course.

If an IPS is properly drafted, it can serve as an educational tool for the committee and as a set of non-binding guidelines. In that way, the focus can be kept on the real job of the committee… to exercise its discretion. But the nonbinding guidelines in the IPS will be a helpful “map” for consistent and thoughtful decisions.

The moral to this story is that, if an IPS is going to be rigidly drafted as a series of requirements, then the committee should review the IPS before it acts and amend the IPS, if need be. On the other hand, and a better solution, the IPS could be better drafted. My experience is that, while the investment community is good at determining the criteria and other information to be included in an IPS, the investment community does not have the same risk management skills as attorneys. It is probably best if each does its “day job,” and the investment consultants focus on IPS’ as an investment tool, while the lawyers view them as risk management documents.

IMPORTANT NOTE: This case was heavily disputed and there may be disagreement about the facts. This article uses the facts as laid out in the court’s opinion and, based on my experience in other cases, the actual facts can be different.

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Target Date Retirement Funds–Tips for ERISA Plan Fiduciaries

In my last post—about the selection and monitoring of target date funds (TDFs), I said that I would also discuss the DOL’s recent guidance on that subject… here it is.

Earlier this year, the DOL published “Target Date Retirement Funds—Tips for ERISA Plan Fiduciaries.” You should read the full Tips (at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/fsTDF.pdf), but here are a few key points:

  • It is important that fiduciaries understand the asset allocations, glidepaths and expenses—and compare them to other TDFs. How many fiduciaries do that?
  • In selecting a TDF suite, fiduciaries should consider their participant demographics and other factors, for example, participation in other plans (e.g., pension plans or ESOPs), salary levels, turnover rates, contribution rates and withdrawal patterns. In other words, there is no such thing as a “one-size-fits-all” TDF. How many fiduciaries do that?
  • Plan sponsors are encouraged to consider “custom” TDFs. That would include managed accounts and asset allocation models. These vehicles have the advantage of being designed to consider the particular needs and demographics of the covered workforce.

The point of my italicized questions is that there is a significant gap between what the DOL expects plan fiduciaries (eg, plan committees) to do… and what they are actually doing. As a general premise, these kinds of “gaps” are usually red flags, and those flags are signaling changes to plan sponsors.

Of course, the DOL says more than that—and explains it in more detail. This post is just an “appetizer.” Read the Tips.

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Selection and Monitoring of Target Date Funds

As I review investment policy statements for participant-directed plans, I see a number of common deficiencies. This email is about one of those—the selection and monitoring of target date funds (“TDFs”).

In my experience, most IPS’ say little or nothing about the criteria to be applied to TDFs. For example, an IPS might be completely silent on the issue or may simply say that they will be selected and monitored. But, in neither case is there a robust set of criteria. That is problematic.

One reason is that TDFs are capturing an increasingly large percentage of 401(k) assets. As more plans automatically enroll, that percentage will continue to grow. I can imagine a day, in the not-so-distant future, where over half of the assets in 401(k) plans will be in TDFs. That leads to the unfortunate conclusion that, based on the current practices of many advisers and committees, over one-half of the assets in the plan will be in a suite of investments that has not been subjected to close scrutiny, while the other investments – that hold less than half of the assets — will be subject to a rigorous evaluation process. That just doesn’t make sense. And, where a situation doesn’t make sense, it can lead to problems.

With that in mind, I recommend that you take a look at the evaluation criteria in DOL comments filed by the Investment Company Institute and the American Benefits Council. It is the most robust set of TDF criteria that I have seen. The ABC/ICI comments can be found at: http://www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/documents/tdf_abc-ici_letter-submission033010.pdf.

The criteria in those comments set a much higher standard than the common practices of advisers and plan committees. However, I think those comments may suggest the future — rather than reflecting the past.

For example, the comments suggest considering, among other things:

  • The performance of each of the mutual funds inside the TDF,
  • Appropriate benchmarks to evaluate TDF performance,
  • Participant demographics, and
  • Whether the plan sponsor also offers a pension plan.

In next month’s post, I will discuss the recent DOL guidance on the selection and monitoring of TDFs.

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Responsible Plan Fiduciaries and Disclosure Issues

The 408(b)(2) regulation requires that its service, status and compensation disclosures be made to “responsible plan fiduciaries” or “RPFs.” In the rush to make the 408(b)(2) disclosures, most recordkeepers, broker-dealers and RIAs sent their disclosure documents to their primary contact at the plan sponsor. In at least some of those cases, the primary contact was not the RPF. As a result, we added language to our clients’ disclosures to the effect that, if the recipient was not the RPF, the written disclosure should immediately be forwarded to the RPF.

The regulation defines RPF as “a fiduciary with authority to cause the covered plan to enter into, or extend or renew, the contract or arrangement.” In other words, it is the person or committee who has the power to hire and fire the particular service provider, e.g., the broker-dealer, recordkeeper or RIA.

Because of the work involved in making mass disclosures, any inadvertent errors in properly identifying the RFPs may be excusable. However, going forward, it may not be. Because of that, all future agreements, account opening forms, and so on, with ERISA plans should specify that the person signing on behalf of the plan is the RPF. Furthermore, we recommend that service providers obtain the email address and other contact information for the RPFs (and that they contractually require plan fiduciaries to inform them of any changes of the RPFs).

We do that for two reasons. First, as covered service providers bring in new plan clients, the documents need to be executed by the RPFs and the disclosures need to be delivered to the RPFs. Second, the information is also needed for existing clients. Fiduciaries who have already received disclosures, they will need to be provided “change” disclosures in the future within 60 days of any changes. And, it is likely that more requirements will be imposed on service providers in the future and, therefore, providers will need to have an efficient and effective way of communicating with the RPFs.

Now is the time to put these new procedures in place.

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