Tag Archives: advisor

Investment Advisers: The Independent Duties of Care and Loyalty


best interest, DOL, fiduciary, prohibited transaction, SEC
, , , , , , ,

Key Takeaways

  • Recent SEC guidance has clarified that the investment adviser duties of care and loyalty are separate, independent duties.
  • A reasonable interpretation of the SEC and Staff guidance is that the satisfaction of one will not satisfy the other–both must be individually satisfied.
  • As a result, the SEC appears to be saying that, even if a conflict is disclosed, that does not, in and of itself, satisfy the duty of care. For example, if an adviser discloses that the adviser will receive compensation related to an investment decision or recommendation, e.g., revenue sharing, but the revenue sharing share class of a mutual fund is more expensive for the investor, the duty of care may be violated even though the duty of loyalty was satisfied.

There appear to be conflicting views of whether an investment adviser’s duty of care can be satisfied by disclosures that satisfy the duty of loyalty. That is, if an adviser discloses the receipt of additional compensation from investments or service providers, can the adviser then recommend or select that investment even though it may be more expensive for the client?  In recent years, the SEC has issued guidance that seems to answer that question…and the answer appears to be “no.” Based on its 2019 Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers, and the two 2022 SEC Staff Bulletins, the position of the SEC (and of the Staff) is that the duties of care and loyalty (together referred to as the duty to act in the best interest of investors) are separate and distinct, and that they each must be independently satisfied.

Continue reading Investment Advisers: The Independent Duties of Care and Loyalty →

Share

Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #17


best interest, broker-dealers, SEC
, , ,

Regulation Best Interest: Education vs. Recommendation (Rollovers Part 3)

The SEC has issued its final Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI), Form CRS Regulation, RIA Interpretation and Solely Incidental Interpretation. I am discussing the SEC’s guidance in a series of articles entitled “Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors.”

In my last post, Best Interest for Advisors #16, I pointed out that, if a broker-dealer’s advisor recommended that a participant rollover his or her benefits in a workplace retirement plan to an IRA, it would be subject to the best interest standard of care (when Reg BI applies on June 30, 2020). (Best Interest for Advisors #15 discussed the process and factors to be considered to make a best interest rollover recommendation.)

My last post then went on to discuss rollover education and information . . . as opposed to a rollover recommendation. If properly done, the education and information approach can be used by broker-dealers if they are concerned about the difficulty of gathering the information for a rollover recommendation and the process for evaluating that information.

Continue reading Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #17 →

Share

Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #16


best interest, broker-dealers, SEC
, , ,

Regulation Best Interest: Education vs. Recommendation (Rollovers Part 2)

The SEC has issued its final Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI), Form CRS Regulation, RIA Interpretation and Solely Incidental Interpretation. I am discussing the SEC’s guidance in a series of articles entitled “Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors.”

In my last post, Best Interest for Advisors #15, I discussed the “best interest” standard for broker-dealers and their advisors and how it applies to rollover recommendations. (Keep in mind that Reg BI doesn’t apply until June 30, 2020.)

Until then the suitability standard applies and it only covers recommendations that involve securities transactions, for example, recommendations to rollover from a 401(k) plan, which requires that a participant liquidate the securities in his 401(k) account. When Reg BI applies, all rollover recommendations from all plans (e.g., including pension plans—where the participant doesn’t liquidate investments in order to rollover and non-ERISA plans, such as government plans).

Continue reading Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #16 →

Share

Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #10


best interest, broker-dealers
, , ,

Regulation Best Interest: The Focus on Costs (Part 2)

The SEC has issued its final Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI), Form CRS Regulation, RIA Interpretation and Solely Incidental Interpretation. I am discussing the SEC’s guidance in a series of articles entitled “Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors.”

______________________________________________________________________

The SEC’s Reg BI establishes a best interest standard of care for investment recommendations to retail customers by broker-dealers and their registered representatives. In addition, Reg BI requires new disclosures and mitigation of advisor’s financial conflicts of interest. The SEC also issued an Interpretation of the Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers, which clarified the SEC’s position on a number of issues related to the fiduciary standard and conflicts of interest for RIAs. There were two other pieces of guidance: the Form CRS Regulation (which requires a simplified front-end disclosure by broker-dealers and investment advisers); and the Solely Incidental Interpretation for limited discretion and monitoring of accounts by broker-dealers.

In my last article in this series, I pointed out that the SEC has explicitly included the consideration of costs in the text of Reg BI and stated that broker-dealers must consider costs for every recommendation (beginning on Reg BI’s compliance date of June 30, 2020). That doesn’t mean that the lowest-cost investment or investment strategy must be recommended (e.g., where the customer’s investment profile indicates that a more expensive alternative would be better serve the investor), but it does mean that costs must be part of that analysis, and that higher-cost alternatives must be justified by the retail customer’s investment profile. Picking up with where the last article left off, here is the SEC’s thinking:

Continue reading Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #10 →

Share