Tag Archives: investment

The New Fiduciary Rule (9): What is An Investment? (Part 1)


DOL, fiduciary, prohibited transaction, rollovers
, , , , , , ,

The US Department of Labor has released its package of proposed changes to the regulation defining nondiscretionary fiduciary advice and to the exemptions for conflicts and compensation for investment recommendations to retirement plans, participants (including rollovers), and IRAs.

The proposed regulation redefines fiduciary status for “investment” recommendations. But what is an investment recommendation? The answer: More than you think.

Key Takeaways

  • The Department of Labor’s proposed fiduciary “package” includes new definitions of nondiscretionary fiduciary investment advice.
  • Of course, fiduciary status depends on a recommendation to a retirement investor about “investments”. The proposed regulation has an expansive definition of an investment recommendation.
  • Broker-dealers, investment advisers, and insurance companies, and their representatives, need to understand the range of recommendations that are covered by the fiduciary standards.
  • That is particularly true (i) since one-time recommendations can result in fiduciary status and (ii) where the fiduciary investment recommendation involves a conflict of interest (e.g., a new fee or a commission), the firms and their representatives and agents will need to satisfy the conditions of either PTE 84-24 or PTE 2020-02.

This article begins a discussion of the definitions of “investments” that, if recommended to a retirement investor (that is, a private sector qualified plan, participants in those plans, or IRA owners), will require satisfaction of the fiduciary standards and, in many cases, of the conditions of a prohibited transaction exemption.

Continue reading The New Fiduciary Rule (9): What is An Investment? (Part 1) →

Share

The New Fiduciary Rule (8): Special Issues—Robo Advice and Investment Education


DOL, fiduciary, IRA
, , , , , , , , , , , ,

The U.S. Department of Labor has released its package of proposed changes to the regulation defining fiduciary advice and to the exemptions for conflicts and compensation for investment advice to plans, participants (including rollovers), and IRAs (including transfers).

Key Takeaways

  • The Department of Labor’s proposed regulation defining fiduciary investment and insurance advice to private sector retirement plans, participants in those plans, and IRA owners (collectively, “retirement investors”) includes three distinct definitions.
  • While the current version of PTE 2020-02 does not extend relief for prohibited transactions resulting from robo advice (that is, it requires a human intermediary), the proposal would extend the PTE’s protections to conflicts of interest (that is, prohibited transactions) so long as the conditions of the exemption are satisfied.
  • Some commenters have suggested that the new definitions of fiduciary status and of covered transactions are so broad that investment education would be considered fiduciary advice. To be polite, that is an exaggeration.

My last post, The New Fiduciary Rule (7), discuss the “non-discretionary” definition of fiduciary investment advice in the DOL’s proposed fiduciary regulation. The other two definitions of fiduciary status are covered by my posts The New Fiduciary Rule (5) and The New Fiduciary Rule (6).

The proposed definition of non-discretionary fiduciary advice is a material change from the current regulation because it eliminates the 5-part test, including the requirement that advice be given to the particular retirement investor on a “regular basis.” In other words, a one-time recommendation can be fiduciary advice under this definition. (The definition is somewhat more demanding that just “one-time advice,” but I will refer to it as one-time advice for purposes of this article. If you want to know more about the detailed definition, look at my last post.)

Continue reading The New Fiduciary Rule (8): Special Issues—Robo Advice and Investment Education →

Share

The New Fiduciary Rule (7): Non-Discretionary Investment Advice


2020-02, best interest, DOL, fiduciary
, , , , , , , , , , , , ,

The U.S. Department of Labor has released its package of proposed changes to the regulation defining fiduciary advice and to the exemptions for conflicts and compensation for investment advice to plans, participants (including rollovers), and IRAs (including transfers).

Key Takeaways

  • The Department of Labor’s proposed regulation defining fiduciary investment and insurance advice to private sector retirement plans, participants in those plans, and IRA owners (collectively, “retirement investors”) includes three distinct definitions.
  • Those definitions are discretionary investment management, non-discretionary investment advice, and acknowledgement of fiduciary status.
  • The most controversial of these proposals is the new definition of non-discretionary investment advice. If an investment adviser, broker-dealer, or insurance agent (“investment professional”) satisfies that definition, the investment professional will be a fiduciary under ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code.

This post discusses the “non-discretionary” definition of fiduciary investment advice in the DOL’s proposed fiduciary regulation. The other two definitions of fiduciary status are covered by my posts The New Fiduciary Rule (5) and The New Fiduciary Rule (6).

Continue reading The New Fiduciary Rule (7): Non-Discretionary Investment Advice →

Share

The New Fiduciary Rule (6): The Fiduciary Definition of Fiduciary


DOL, fiduciary, investment adviser, IRA
, , , , , , ,

The US Department of Labor has released its package of proposed changes to the regulation defining fiduciary advice and to the exemptions for conflicts and compensation for investment advice to plans, participants (including rollovers), and IRAs (including transfers of IRAs).

Key Takeaways

  • The Department of Labor’s proposed regulation defining fiduciary investment and insurance/annuity advice to private sector retirement plans, participants in those plans, and IRA owners (collectively, “retirement investors”) includes three distinct definitions.
  • Those definitions are: discretionary investment management, non-discretionary investment advice, and acknowledgement of fiduciary status. In each of those cases, the person and the firm will be fiduciaries under ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code for purposes of their investment recommendations and services to retirement investors.
  • A new definition in the proposal, and one that is not likely to be controversial, is the third one….a person will be a fiduciary for investment recommendations if that person says that the person and/or the firm are acting as fiduciaries for the recommendation.

This post discusses the “fiduciary acknowledgement” definition of fiduciary investment advice in the DOL’s proposed fiduciary regulation. More specifically, the proposed regulation says that a person will be an ERISA and Code fiduciary if “The person making the recommendation represents or acknowledges that they are acting as a fiduciary when making investment recommendations.” (There will be future articles discussing “investment recommendations”, but for the moment, consider it to be a recommendation for a retirement investor to invest in securities, insurance or other property.)

Continue reading The New Fiduciary Rule (6): The Fiduciary Definition of Fiduciary →

Share

The New Fiduciary Rule (5): Discretionary Investment Management


2020-02, DOL, fiduciary, investment adviser, IRA
, , , , , , , , , , ,

The US Department of Labor has released its package of proposed changes to the regulation defining nondiscretionary fiduciary advice and to the exemptions for conflicts and compensation for investment recommendations to retirement plans, participants (including rollovers), and IRAs.

Key Takeaways

  • The Department of Labor’s proposed regulation defining fiduciary investment and insurance advice to private sector retirement plans, participants in those plans, and IRA owners (collectively, “retirement investors”) includes three distinct definitions.
  • Those definitions are discretionary investment management, nondiscretionary investment advice, and acknowledgement of fiduciary status.
  • The least controversial definition is that, when an investment professional provides investment management, or discretionary, services to retirement investors, the investment professional will be a fiduciary under ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code.

This post discusses the “discretionary” definition of fiduciary investment advice in the DOL’s proposed fiduciary regulation.

Continue reading The New Fiduciary Rule (5): Discretionary Investment Management →

Share

Discretionary Management of IRAs: Conflicts and Prohibited Transactions


DOL, IRA, prohibited transaction
, , , , , , ,

Key Takeaways

  • Where an investment adviser charges different fees for managing fixed income in a portfolio than for managing equities, and has discretion to determine the allocation between the two in an IRA, the investment adviser has control over its fees, which appears to violate a prohibited transaction provision in the Internal Revenue Code.
  • The inadvertent violation can be corrected, going forward, by using a blended rate where both allocations are charged the same fee. In other words, there would just be an account fee and not a fee that varied by allocations that are within the control of the investment adviser.
  • There are other potential solutions, including transitioning the allocations to nondiscretionary advice.

Discussion

Both the Internal Revenue Code (Code) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) include prohibited transaction provisions that literally prohibit certain transactions (unless exempted by statute or by a prohibited transaction exemption). ERISA-governed qualified retirement plans are subject to both ERISA and Code prohibitions. However, standalone IRAs are only subject to the Code prohibitions. In that regard, Code sections 4975(c)(1)(E) and (F) provide:

(c) Prohibited transaction

(1) General rule

For purposes of this section, the term “prohibited transaction” means any direct or indirect—

*****

(E) act by a disqualified person who is a fiduciary whereby he deals with the income or assets of a plan in his own interest or for his own account; or

(F) receipt of any consideration for his own personal account by any disqualified person who is a fiduciary from any party dealing with the plan in connection with a transaction involving the income or assets of the plan.

Continue reading Discretionary Management of IRAs: Conflicts and Prohibited Transactions →

Share

Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #85: Compliance with PTE 2020-02: Special Issues: Monitoring (2)


best interest, DOL, fiduciary, IRA
, , , , , ,

Key Takeaways

The DOL has issued FAQs that generally explain PTE 2020-02 and the expanded definition of fiduciary advice.

The DOL’s expanded definition of fiduciary advice was described in the preamble to PTE 2020-02.

The PTE then provides conditional relief for conflicted non-discretionary recommendations, if its conditions are satisfied.

My last article, Best Interest #84, discussed the requirement in the preamble to PTE 2020-02 that, where products of “unusual complexity and risk” are recommended, there are best interest issues if monitoring services are not provided.

This article discusses products of unusual complexity and risk.

Background

The DOL’s prohibited transaction exemption (PTE) 2020-02 (Improving Investment Advice for Workers & Retirees), allows investment advisers, broker-dealers, banks, and insurance companies (“financial institu­tions”), and their representatives (“investment professionals”), to receive conflicted compensation resulting from non-discretionary fiduciary investment advice to ERISA retirement plans, participants (including rollover recommendations), and IRA owners (“retirement investors”). In addition, in the preamble to the PTE the DOL announced an expanded definition of fiduciary advice, meaning that many more financial institutions and investment professionals are fiduciaries for their recommendations to retirement investors and, therefore, will need the protection provided by the exemption.

In the preamble to the PTE, the DOL described its expanded definition of fiduciary advice. The fiduciary regulations in ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code have two definitions of fiduciary advice. The first is the obvious—where the investment professional and financial institution have discretion over retirement accounts (ERISA or tax qualified plans, participant accounts in those plans, and IRAs). In effect, that is a one-part test—“discretion”. In addition, there is a 5-part test for non-discretionary fiduciary advice. The DOL did not amend the regulation to modify any of the “parts,” but instead reinterpreted some of the parts, and particularly the “regular basis” part, to significantly increase the number of investment professionals and financial institutions who are fiduciaries. This article is not about the expanded definition, but instead about a circumstance in which a fiduciary could have more responsibility than anticipated.

Continue reading Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #85: Compliance with PTE 2020-02: Special Issues: Monitoring (2) →

Share

Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #10


best interest, broker-dealers
, , ,

Regulation Best Interest: The Focus on Costs (Part 2)

The SEC has issued its final Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI), Form CRS Regulation, RIA Interpretation and Solely Incidental Interpretation. I am discussing the SEC’s guidance in a series of articles entitled “Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors.”

______________________________________________________________________

The SEC’s Reg BI establishes a best interest standard of care for investment recommendations to retail customers by broker-dealers and their registered representatives. In addition, Reg BI requires new disclosures and mitigation of advisor’s financial conflicts of interest. The SEC also issued an Interpretation of the Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers, which clarified the SEC’s position on a number of issues related to the fiduciary standard and conflicts of interest for RIAs. There were two other pieces of guidance: the Form CRS Regulation (which requires a simplified front-end disclosure by broker-dealers and investment advisers); and the Solely Incidental Interpretation for limited discretion and monitoring of accounts by broker-dealers.

In my last article in this series, I pointed out that the SEC has explicitly included the consideration of costs in the text of Reg BI and stated that broker-dealers must consider costs for every recommendation (beginning on Reg BI’s compliance date of June 30, 2020). That doesn’t mean that the lowest-cost investment or investment strategy must be recommended (e.g., where the customer’s investment profile indicates that a more expensive alternative would be better serve the investor), but it does mean that costs must be part of that analysis, and that higher-cost alternatives must be justified by the retail customer’s investment profile. Picking up with where the last article left off, here is the SEC’s thinking:

Continue reading Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #10 →

Share