Tag Archives: retirement plan

The New Fiduciary Rule (46): The Regulation and Exemptions are Stayed—What Remains? (6)


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Key Takeaways

  • Two Texas Federal District Courts have “stayed” the effective dates of the DOL’s new fiduciary regulation and related exemptions, meaning that the private sector will not have to comply with those rules until the cases are resolved.
  • The next step will be for those courts to determine if the regulation and exemptions are valid or should be vacated. After that there will likely be appeals. As a result, the “old” regulation and exemptions will continue to be in effect.
  • In addition to the DOL’s guidance, the securities and insurance industries are subject to regulators that focus on the distribution of their products and services. My last post, Fiduciary Rule 45, discussed NAIC Model Regulation #275, which addresses recommendations of annuities generally and, as a result, covers recommendations of annuities in connection with rollover recommendations.
  • This post contrasts the SEC and SEC staff guidance on rollover recommendations—which would cover annuities that are securities, and the NAIC Model Regulation #275’s provisions concerning rollovers into annuities that are not securities.

The stay of the effective dates of the amended fiduciary regulation and amended exemptions means that the “old” DOL fiduciary regulation (the 5-part test) and the existing exemptions continue in effect indefinitely. As a result, it is unlikely that an insurance producer will be a fiduciary under ERISA or the Internal Revenue Code  when making a recommendation to a participant to take his or her money out of a retirement  plan and roll over into a “qualified” annuity (or, more technically, an Individual Retirement Annuity).

Since the probability is that an insurance producer will not be an ERISA or Code  fiduciary, the applicable standard of conduct for a rollover recommendation will either be NAIC Model Rule #275 (“Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model Regulation”, as adopted by almost all of the states MDL-275.pdf (naic.org)) for insurance-only annuities or, for annuities that are securities (e.g., variable annuities or registered index-linked annuities, or RILAs), the SEC’s Regulation Best Interest for broker-dealers or its  “Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers”.

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The New Fiduciary Rule (45): The Regulation and Exemptions are Stayed (5)—What Remains?


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Key Takeaways

  • Two Texas Federal District Courts have “stayed” the effective dates of the DOL’s new fiduciary regulation and related exemptions, meaning that the private sector will not have to comply with those rules until the cases are resolved.
  • The next step will be for those courts to determine if the regulation and exemptions are valid or should be vacated. After that there will likely be appeals. As a result, the “old” regulation and exemptions will continue to be in effect.
  • In addition to the DOL’s guidance, the securities and insurance industry are subject to regulators that focus on their industries. My three prior posts, Fiduciary Rule 42, Fiduciary Rule 43 and Fiduciary Rule 44 discussed SEC and SEC staff guidance about rollover recommendations.
  • This post discusses the NAIC Model Regulation #275 for the insurance industry.

The stay of the effective dates of the amended fiduciary regulation and amended exemptions means that the “old” fiduciary regulation (the 5-part test) and the amended exemptions continue in effect indefinitely. As a result, it is unlikely that an insurance producer will be a fiduciary when making a recommendation to a participant to take his or her money out of the plan and roll over into a “qualified” annuity (or, more accurately, an Individual Retirement Annuity). And, if an insurance producer happened to be a fiduciary, the recommendation would need to satisfy ERISA’s prudent person rule and duty of loyalty and the conditions of the existing PTE 84-24, which are much less demanding than PTE 2020-02, which applies to other rollover recommendations.

However, as I said above, it is unlikely that an insurance producer would be a fiduciary. As a result, the standard of conduct would be established by state laws and regulations. By and large, those rules are based on NAIC Model Regulation #275.

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The New Fiduciary Rule (15): Reasonable Costs and Reasonable Compensation


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The U.S. Department of Labor has released its package of proposed changes to the regulation defining fiduciary advice and to the exemptions for conflicts and compensation for investment recommendations to retirement plans, participants (including rollovers), and IRAs.

Key Takeaways

    • ERISA’s fiduciary and prohibited transaction rules require consideration of costs and compensation when fiduciary recommendations are made to “retirement investors,” that is, to private sector retirement plans, participants in those plans, and IRA owners.
    • Where the Internal Revenue Code’s prohibited transaction rules are violated, the protection of an exemption will be needed. In that case, the protections of PTEs 84-24 and 2020-02 will require that costs and compensation be considered.
    • The consideration is that the costs and/or compensation cannot be more than a reasonable amount.
    • However, the determination of what is reasonable is largely left to industry practices—that is, what would the costs for a product or service, or the compensation of an advisor or agent, be in a transparent and competitive market.

The ERISA fiduciary responsibility rules require that plan costs, for both investments and services, be no more than a reasonable amount. In other words, a prudent process will consider the costs of investments and services relative to the value of those investments or services to the retirement investor. The ERISA prohibited transaction rules impose a similar limit on compensation where there is a fiduciary recommendation that results in a conflict of interest, that is, the compensation cannot be more than a reasonable amount when compared to the value of services being offered (and, in most cases, that would be the compensation paid for those services in a transparent and competitive marketplace). These rules apply to all ERISA-governed retirement plans and participant accounts in those plans.

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The New Fiduciary Rule (8): Special Issues—Robo Advice and Investment Education


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The U.S. Department of Labor has released its package of proposed changes to the regulation defining fiduciary advice and to the exemptions for conflicts and compensation for investment advice to plans, participants (including rollovers), and IRAs (including transfers).

Key Takeaways

  • The Department of Labor’s proposed regulation defining fiduciary investment and insurance advice to private sector retirement plans, participants in those plans, and IRA owners (collectively, “retirement investors”) includes three distinct definitions.
  • While the current version of PTE 2020-02 does not extend relief for prohibited transactions resulting from robo advice (that is, it requires a human intermediary), the proposal would extend the PTE’s protections to conflicts of interest (that is, prohibited transactions) so long as the conditions of the exemption are satisfied.
  • Some commenters have suggested that the new definitions of fiduciary status and of covered transactions are so broad that investment education would be considered fiduciary advice. To be polite, that is an exaggeration.

My last post, The New Fiduciary Rule (7), discuss the “non-discretionary” definition of fiduciary investment advice in the DOL’s proposed fiduciary regulation. The other two definitions of fiduciary status are covered by my posts The New Fiduciary Rule (5) and The New Fiduciary Rule (6).

The proposed definition of non-discretionary fiduciary advice is a material change from the current regulation because it eliminates the 5-part test, including the requirement that advice be given to the particular retirement investor on a “regular basis.” In other words, a one-time recommendation can be fiduciary advice under this definition. (The definition is somewhat more demanding that just “one-time advice,” but I will refer to it as one-time advice for purposes of this article. If you want to know more about the detailed definition, look at my last post.)

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The New Fiduciary Rule (7): Non-Discretionary Investment Advice


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The U.S. Department of Labor has released its package of proposed changes to the regulation defining fiduciary advice and to the exemptions for conflicts and compensation for investment advice to plans, participants (including rollovers), and IRAs (including transfers).

Key Takeaways

  • The Department of Labor’s proposed regulation defining fiduciary investment and insurance advice to private sector retirement plans, participants in those plans, and IRA owners (collectively, “retirement investors”) includes three distinct definitions.
  • Those definitions are discretionary investment management, non-discretionary investment advice, and acknowledgement of fiduciary status.
  • The most controversial of these proposals is the new definition of non-discretionary investment advice. If an investment adviser, broker-dealer, or insurance agent (“investment professional”) satisfies that definition, the investment professional will be a fiduciary under ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code.

This post discusses the “non-discretionary” definition of fiduciary investment advice in the DOL’s proposed fiduciary regulation. The other two definitions of fiduciary status are covered by my posts The New Fiduciary Rule (5) and The New Fiduciary Rule (6).

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The New Fiduciary Rule (5): Discretionary Investment Management


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The US Department of Labor has released its package of proposed changes to the regulation defining nondiscretionary fiduciary advice and to the exemptions for conflicts and compensation for investment recommendations to retirement plans, participants (including rollovers), and IRAs.

Key Takeaways

  • The Department of Labor’s proposed regulation defining fiduciary investment and insurance advice to private sector retirement plans, participants in those plans, and IRA owners (collectively, “retirement investors”) includes three distinct definitions.
  • Those definitions are discretionary investment management, nondiscretionary investment advice, and acknowledgement of fiduciary status.
  • The least controversial definition is that, when an investment professional provides investment management, or discretionary, services to retirement investors, the investment professional will be a fiduciary under ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code.

This post discusses the “discretionary” definition of fiduciary investment advice in the DOL’s proposed fiduciary regulation.

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Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #48


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The Department of Labor’s “Fiduciary Rule,” PTE 2020-02 (Part 13): The Two Compensation Requirements: Reasonable Compensation and Mitigation

On February 16, 2021, the DOL’s prohibited transaction exemption (PTE) 2020-02 became effective. (Improving Investment Advice for Workers & Retirees) It allows investment advisers, broker-dealers, banks, and insurance companies (“financial institutions”), and their representatives (“investment professionals”), to receive conflicted compensation resulting from non-discretionary fiduciary investment advice to retirement plans, participants and IRA owners (“retirement investors”).

In the preamble to the PTE, the DOL announced an expanded definition of fiduciary advice, meaning that many more financial institutions and investment professionals will be fiduciaries and therefore will need the protections afforded by the exemption. They will also need to satisfy the best interest standard of care. The relief provided by the exemption is conditional. That is, the “conditions” in the exemption must be satisfied. For the period from February 16 until December 20, a DOL and IRS non-enforcement policy based on the Impartial Conduct Standards will be available.

This article builds on my earlier posts: Part 11, Mitigation, and Part 12, Reasonable Compensation. They are connected in the sense that unreasonably high compensation would be difficult to mitigate.

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Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #47


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The Department of Labor’s “Fiduciary Rule,” PTE 2020-02 (Part 12): The Requirement that Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers to Receive No More Than Reasonable Compensation

On February 16, 2021, the DOL’s prohibited transaction exemption (PTE) 2020-02 became effective. The PTE is titled “Improving Investment Advice for Workers & Retirees.” It allows investment advisers, broker-dealers, banks, and insurance companies (“financial institutions”), and their representatives (“investment professionals”), to receive conflicted compensation resulting from non-discretionary fiduciary investment advice to retirement plans, participants and IRA owners (“retirement investors”).

In the preamble to the PTE, the DOL announced an expanded definition of fiduciary advice, meaning that many more financial institutions and investment professionals will be fiduciaries and therefore will need the protections afforded by the exemption. In addition, they will need prudent, or best practice, processes to satisfy the fiduciary and best interest standards of care.

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Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #46


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The Department of Labor’s “Fiduciary Rule”, PTE 2020-02 (Part 11): The Requirement that Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers Mitigate Conflicts

On February 16, 2021, the DOL’s prohibited transaction exemption (PTE) 2020-02 became effective. The PTE is titled “Improving Investment Advice for Workers & Retirees.” It allows investment advisers, broker-dealers, banks, and insurance companies (“financial institutions”), and their representatives (“investment professionals”), to receive conflicted compensation resulting from non-discretionary fiduciary investment advice to retirement plans, participants and IRA owners (“retirement investors”).

In the preamble to the PTE, the DOL announced an expanded definition of fiduciary advice, meaning that many more financial institutions and investment professionals will be fiduciaries and therefore will need the protections afforded by the exemption. In addition, they will need prudent, or best practice, processes to satisfy the fiduciary and best interest standards of care.

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Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #44


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The Department of Labor’s Prohibited Transaction Exemption and Its Impact on Recommendations to Plans, Participants and IRAs (Part 9)

On February 16, 2021, the DOL’s prohibited transaction exemption (PTE) 2020-02 became effective. The PTE is titled “Improving Investment Advice for Workers & Retirees.” It allows investment advisers, broker-dealers, banks, and insurance companies (“financial institutions”), and their representatives (“investment professionals”), to receive conflicted compensation resulting from non-discretionary fiduciary investment advice to retirement plans, participants and IRA owners (“retirement investors”).

In the preamble to the PTE, the DOL announced an expanded definition of fiduciary advice, meaning that many more financial institutions and investment professionals will be fiduciaries and therefore will need the protections afforded by the exemption. In addition, they will need prudent, or best practice, processes to satisfy the fiduciary and best interest standards of care.

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