Tag Archives: insurance

The New Fiduciary Rule (40): Rollovers and the Insurance License Issue

Key Takeaways

  • The DOL’s fiduciary regulation will be effective on September 23 of this year. As a result, beginning on September 23 one-time recommendations to retirement investors can be fiduciary advice and, where the advice is conflicted, the protection afforded by a prohibited transaction exemption will be needed.
  • A “one-time” rollover recommendation is a fiduciary act under the new rules.
  • The definition of investment advice in the regulation includes recommendations about “securities or other investment properly” which includes life insurance with an investment component and annuities.
  • Under both PTE 84-24 and PTE 2020-02, a compliant rollover recommendation generally requires the consideration of the investments, services and expenses in the retirement plan.
  • As a result, the question has been raised about whether an insurance-licensed only insurance agent can legally “consider” a plan’s investments, as is required by the PTEs.

The Department of Labor’s final regulation defining fiduciary status for investment advice to retirement investors will be effective this September 23. Where a fiduciary recommendation results in additional compensation for the fiduciary, that conflicted compensation is prohibited under ERISA, the Internal Revenue Code, or both. As a result, the relief provided by an exemption from the prohibited transaction rules will be needed.

Parts of the two applicable exemptions, Prohibited Transaction Exemptions (PTEs) 2020-02 and 84-24 will also be effective on September 23, 2024, but other parts will not be effective until a year later—September 23, 2025. The split effective dates for the PTEs are as follows. The Impartial Conduct Standards and the Fiduciary Acknowledgment disclosure are effective September 23, 2024—this year. The remaining conditions in the PTEs are effective on September 23, 2025. That includes all of the remaining disclosures, the policies and procedures, and the annual retrospective review.

Both PTEs require that, to obtain their relief, the Care Obligation—which is part of the Impartial Conduct Standards– must be satisfied. The requirements for satisfying the Care Obligation for recommendations to rollover from an ERISA retirement plan to an IRA (individual retirement account or individual retirement annuity) are virtually identical. Here’s what PTE 84-24 says in the context of independent insurance agents (called “independent producers” by the DOL):

Rollover disclosure. Before engaging in or recommending that a Retirement Investor engage in a rollover from a Plan that is covered by Title I of ERISA or making a recommendation to a Plan participant or beneficiary as to the post-rollover investment of assets currently held in a Plan that is covered by Title I of ERISA, the Independent Producer must consider and document the bases for its recommendation to engage in the rollover, and must provide that documentation to both the Retirement Investor and to the Insurer. Relevant factors to consider must include to the extent applicable, but in any event are not limited to: 

  1. the alternatives to a rollover, including leaving the money in the Plan, if applicable; 
  2. the fees and expenses associated with the Plan and the recommended investment; 
  3. whether an employer or other party pays for some or all of the Plan’s administrative expenses; and 
  4. the different levels of fiduciary protection, services, and investments available. (The emphasis is mine.)

The reference to considering the available investments has caused some observers to question whether an agent who is only licensed to sell non-securities insurance products can legally perform that task. That question was asked of the DOL in comments to the proposed exemption, and answered by the DOL in the preamble to the final PTE:

Another commenter characterized the condition as potentially requiring Independent Producers to violate the law, because as described by the commenter Federal securities laws prohibit individuals from recommending or providing detailed information or advice about securities unless they have a securities license. Thus, according to the commenter, Independent Producers who do not have a securities license (as most do not) would be forced to either break the law to comply with this condition or undertake the expense and burden of obtaining the appropriate securities licenses.

The Department of Labor responded in the preamble and disagreed with the commenter’s description of what was required for the “consideration:”

The Department disagrees with this characterization of the exemption condition. While Independent Producers are required to consider alternatives to the rollover from the Title I Plan into an annuity, they are not required to recommend or provide detailed information or advice about securities. Nothing in the exemption requires or suggests that Independent Producers are obligated to make advice recommendations as to investment products they are not qualified or legally permitted to recommend. The Department notes that nothing in the exemption or the Impartial Conduct Standards prohibits investment advice by “insurance-only” agents or requires such insurance specialists to render advice with respect to other categories of assets outside their specialty or expertise. There may be circumstances when the best advice an Independent Producer can give an investor is to bring in or work with another Investment Professional who can make a recommendation that is consistent with the Impartial Conduct Standards. A rollover recommendation should not be based solely on the Retirement Investor’s existing investment allocation without any consideration of other investment options in the Retirement Investor’s Title I Plan. The Independent Producer must carefully consider the options available to the investor, including options other than the Retirement Investor’s existing Plan investments, before recommending that the participant roll assets out of the Title I Plan. (The emphasis is mine.)

I don’t claim to have expertise on securities licensing/registration requirements or limits. However, this does raise the issue of how far can an agent go in the consideration of the securities (e.g., mutual funds) in a retirement plan generally and in a participant’s account specifically. If these rules are upheld by the courts, insurance companies and intermediaries (perhaps with additional guidance from the DOL) will need to educate independent producers on how to “consider” “the different… investments available” to the participant.

In one sense, there could be general considerations, such as liquidity, volatility, possible growth, and so on, that I would imagine could be done without a securities license. That could then be compared to the guaranteed income, and other features, of an annuity and a recommendation in the best interest of the participant could be made based on his or her needs and circumstances. The key is that the recommendation be personalized to the particular participant and the participant’s circumstances.

One part of the preamble language has been difficult for practitioners to interpret. It is the language: “There may be circumstances when the best advice an Independent Producer can give an investor is to bring in or work with another Investment Professional who can make a recommendation that is consistent with the Impartial Conduct Standards.” Some observers are concerned that the language might mean that an insurance producer should bring in a securities-licensed professional to help with the analysis. If it does mean that, it may be unrealistic. On the other hand, if it instead suggests that a best interest recommendation could, in some cases, be that part of the rollover could prudently be invested in an annuity and the remaining part could prudently be invested in a securities-based IRA (e.g., to provide some guaranteed income and some liquidity) that could be viewed as more possible.

Concluding Thoughts

As I advise clients, including insurance companies, on compliance with the new rules, and as the rules are applied to real world scenarios, there are questions without answers…or, perhaps better put, there are questions that the rules don’t directly address and therefore reasonable answers have to be developed. One example of that is the process for recommending guaranteed income products (e.g., individual retirement annuities) where the source of funds is in mutual funds and collective investment trusts in retirement plans. Hopefully, the DOL will provide helpful guidance in the future. However, that is unlikely until the current litigation against the rules is resolved.

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The New Fiduciary Rule (33): The DOL’s Final PTE 84-24

Key Takeaways

  • The DOL’s fiduciary regulation will be effective on September 23 of this year. As a result, beginning on September 23, one-time recommendations to retirement investors can be fiduciary advice and, where the advice is conflicted, the investment professional and financial institution will need the protection afforded by a PTE.
  • While some of the requirements (called “conditions”) of PTEs 2020-02 and 84-24 also become effective on September 23, others will not be effective until a full year later…September 23, 2025.
  • While PTE 2020-02 can be used for banks, investment advisers, broker-dealers, and insurance companies (“financial institutions”), there is an alternative exemption, PTE 84-24, that can be used by independent insurance agents who recommend annuities and life insurance policies that only require an insurance license (“independent producers”).
  • This article covers the final PTE 84-24 and its effective dates, with a focus on compliance issues for September 23 of this year.

On April 25, 2024, the Department of Labor published its final regulation defining fiduciary status for investment advice and the related exemptions—PTE 2020-02 and 84-24. The exemptions provide relief from prohibited conflicts and compensation resulting from fiduciary recommendations to “retirement investors”–private sector retirement plans, participants (including rollovers), and IRAs (including transfers and exchanges). The fiduciary regulation and exemptions will be effective on September 23, 2024, although compliance with some of the conditions in the exemptions will be further delayed.

For context, all financial institutions—broker-dealers, investment advisory firms, banks and insurance companies–can use PTE 2020-02 for the protection it affords. However, broker-dealers, investment advisers, and banks must use PTE 2020-02 for relief for their conflicted fiduciary recommendations. In addition, relief for insurance products that are treated as securities (e.g., variable and registered annuities) can only be found under 2020-02. Finally, if an insurance product is sold by an employee or statutory employee of an insurance company, PTE 2020-02 must be used for relief.

Continue reading The New Fiduciary Rule (33): The DOL’s Final PTE 84-24

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The New Fiduciary Rule (17): Permissible Compensation under PTE 84-24

The U.S. Department of Labor has released its package of proposed changes to the regulation defining fiduciary advice and to the exemptions for conflicts and compensation for investment recommendations to retirement plans, participants (including rollovers), and IRAs.

Key Takeaways

  • ERISA’s fiduciary and prohibited transaction rules require consideration of costs and compensation when fiduciary recommendations are made to “retirement investors,” that is, to private sector retirement plans, participants in those plans, and IRA owners.
  • Where the Internal Revenue Code’s prohibited transaction rules would be violated, the protection of an exemption is needed. In that case, the protections of PTEs 84-24 and 2020-02 will require that costs and compensation be considered.
  • This article focuses on limitations on compensation under PTE 84-24.
  • While the general rule in ERISA and the Code is that compensation cannot be more than a reasonable amount, the PTE has additional limitations.

ERISA’s fiduciary responsibility rules require that costs, for investments, insurance products and services, be no more than a reasonable amount. In other words, a prudent process will consider the costs of products and services relative to their value to the retirement investor and relative to reasonably available alternatives. ERISA’s prohibited transaction rules, and the exemptions to the prohibitions, impose a similar limit on compensation when a fiduciary recommendation is conflicted, that is, the compensation cannot be more than a reasonable amount when compared to the value of services being offered. These rules apply to all ERISA-governed retirement plans and participant accounts in those plans (including rollover recommendations).

The Code has prohibited transaction provisions with similar limitations on compensation, that is, compensation cannot exceed a reasonable amount relative to the services provided. The Code limits apply to both tax-qualified retirement plans and IRAs (including individual retirement annuities). However, the Code does not have a standard of care for recommendations to IRA owners. Instead, the applicable standard of care is imposed by other laws and regulations (for example, the best interest standard for insurance agents in NAIC model rule 275).

Continue reading The New Fiduciary Rule (17): Permissible Compensation under PTE 84-24

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The New Fiduciary Rule (9): What is An Investment? (Part 1)

The US Department of Labor has released its package of proposed changes to the regulation defining nondiscretionary fiduciary advice and to the exemptions for conflicts and compensation for investment recommendations to retirement plans, participants (including rollovers), and IRAs.

The proposed regulation redefines fiduciary status for “investment” recommendations. But what is an investment recommendation? The answer: More than you think.

Key Takeaways

  • The Department of Labor’s proposed fiduciary “package” includes new definitions of nondiscretionary fiduciary investment advice.
  • Of course, fiduciary status depends on a recommendation to a retirement investor about “investments”. The proposed regulation has an expansive definition of an investment recommendation.
  • Broker-dealers, investment advisers, and insurance companies, and their representatives, need to understand the range of recommendations that are covered by the fiduciary standards.
  • That is particularly true (i) since one-time recommendations can result in fiduciary status and (ii) where the fiduciary investment recommendation involves a conflict of interest (e.g., a new fee or a commission), the firms and their representatives and agents will need to satisfy the conditions of either PTE 84-24 or PTE 2020-02.

This article begins a discussion of the definitions of “investments” that, if recommended to a retirement investor (that is, a private sector qualified plan, participants in those plans, or IRA owners), will require satisfaction of the fiduciary standards and, in many cases, of the conditions of a prohibited transaction exemption.

Continue reading The New Fiduciary Rule (9): What is An Investment? (Part 1)

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The New Fiduciary Rule (3): Fixed Indexed Annuities

The US Department of Labor has released its package of proposed changes to the regulation defining nondiscretionary fiduciary advice and to the exemptions for conflicts and compensation for investment recommendations to retirement plans, participants (including rollovers), and IRAs.

Key Takeaways

    • Statements from the White House indicate that the DOL and the White House are concerned that fixed indexed annuities may be inappropriately sold to participants and IRA owners (“retirement investors”) in connection with recommendations to roll over benefits from plans and to transfer money from IRAs. Some of the political rhetoric accompanying the release of the proposals was unusually harsh.
    • The reaction from the insurance industry and state insurance commissioners has been immediate and strong.
    • If the proposals become final as written, the greatest impact of the changes will likely be on insurance agents, particularly independent producers.
    • The greatest impact on products will likely be on fixed indexed annuities.
    • This and several following articles will cover the impact on independent insurance agents, insurance companies, and annuities.

This article discusses the DOL’s thoughts on prudent processes for evaluating fixed indexed annuities, which dates back to the Obama-era Best Interest Contract Exemption (which was vacated in 2018 by the 5th Circuit of Appeals).

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The New Fiduciary Rule (2): The Impact

The US Department of Labor has released its package of proposed changes to the regulation defining fiduciary advice and to the exemptions for conflicts and compensation for investment advice to plans, participants (including rollovers), and IRAs.

Key Takeaways

  • The Department of Labor’s proposed fiduciary “package” will have different impacts on different types of service providers to retirement plans, participants, and IRA owners (collectively, “retirement investors”) . . . .investment advisers, broker-dealers, banks and trust companies, and insurance agents (and companies) (“financial professionals”).
  • The greatest impact of the changes, if finalized as is, will be on insurance agents, particularly independent producers. Insurance companies issuing the life insurance policies and annuity contracts will also see increased compliance burdens.
  • For all of the types of financial professionals, the most impactful change will likely be that one-time investment recommendations to private sector retirement plans and their participants, and to IRA owners, will be fiduciary advice. That includes rollover recommendations.

This post discusses the likely impact of the new proposals. Future posts will go into more detail about the proposals and compliance issues:

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Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #96: Annuity Recommendations, PTE 84-24, and Fiduciary Misunderstandings

Key Takeaways

The DOL’s expanded interpretation of fiduciary advice is described in the preamble to Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) 2020-02. The expanded interpretation applies to all rollover recommendations, including recommendations to rollover into annuities.

A fiduciary rollover recommendation to rollover from an ERISA-governed retirement plan results in a conflict of interest, which is the compensation from the individual retirement account or annuity.

That conflict is a prohibited transaction under the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA. PTE 2020-02 provides relief from the prohibitions if its conditions are satisfied.

One of the conditions for an insurance company to use PTE 2020-02 is that the insurance company and the investment professionals (including insurance agents) both be fiduciaries for the recommendations. However, most insurance companies have determined that they do not have the close relationships with agents, and particularly independent agents, to satisfy the fiduciary requirements in the PTE. As a result, most insurance companies have decided that they will not use PTE 2020-02 for relief for themselves and their agents from the prohibitions of the Code and ERISA.

But, when agents make rollover recommendations covered by the DOL’s expanded fiduciary interpretation, they will engage in prohibited transactions and need relief from the resulting prohibited transactions. The alternative to 2020-02 is PTE 84-24.

However, PTE 84-24 has conditions that agents must satisfy, and there are emerging stories that many agents do not know that they can be fiduciaries and do not know about the relief provided by 84-24.

Background

The DOL’s prohibited transaction exemption (PTE) 2020-02 (Improving Investment Advice for Workers & Retirees), allows investment advisers, broker-dealers, banks, and insurance companies (“financial institu­tions”), and their representatives (“investment professionals”), to receive conflicted compensation resulting from non-discretionary fiduciary investment advice to ERISA retirement plans, participants (including rollover recommendations), and IRA owners (including transfer recommendations)–all of whom are referred to as “retirement investors.” With regard to IRAs, the term includes both individual retirement accounts and individual retirement annuities. In addition, in the preamble to the PTE, the DOL announced an expanded interpretation of fiduciary advice, meaning that many more financial institutions and investment professionals are fiduciaries for their recommendations to retirement investors and, therefore, will need the protection provided by the exemption.

While it appears that most broker-dealers, investment advisers, and banks and trust companies will be relying on, and complying with, the conditions in PTE 2020-02, the same cannot be said of most insurance companies. As a result, when insurance agents recommend rollovers to annuities, they need to consider whether they are fiduciaries under the DOL’s expanded interpretation and, if so, how to comply with PTE 84-24 in order to avoid a prohibited transaction for their compensation, i.e., the commission and any trailing payments.

Continue reading Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #96: Annuity Recommendations, PTE 84-24, and Fiduciary Misunderstandings

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Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #80: Compliance with PTE 2020-02: Insurance Distribution Issues (Part 2)

The Department of Labor’s “Fiduciary Rule,” PTE 2020-02: The FAQs

Key Takeaways

    • The DOL has issued FAQs that generally explain PTE 2020-02 and the expanded definition of fiduciary advice.
    • In FAQ 18, the DOL discusses the application of the requirements to the distribution of insurance products and the impact on insurance companies.
    • However, many insurance companies have decided against using PTE 2020-02 primarily because of the requirement that the insurance companies accept fiduciary status for the recommendations.
    • Instead, most insurance companies are relying on agents using PTE 84-24, and some are providing forms and educational materials to support that usage.
    • Meanwhile, the DOL is working on a further expanded fiduciary definition and a more demanding PTE 84-24 that will increase the oversight responsibilities for covered recommendations by insurance agents.
    • There may be a role for IMOs, FMOs and BGAs in the anticipated revised 84-24 in terms of the oversight of the recommendations by independent agents.

Background

The DOL’s prohibited transaction exemption (PTE) 2020-02 (Improving Investment Advice for Workers & Retirees), allows investment advisers, broker-dealers, banks, and insurance companies (“financial institu­tions”), and their representatives (“investment professionals”), to receive conflicted compensation resulting from non-discretionary fiduciary investment advice to ERISA retirement plans, participants (including rollover recommendations), and IRA owners (“retirement investors”). In addition, in the preamble to the PTE the DOL announced an expanded definition of fiduciary advice, meaning that many more financial institutions and investment professionals are fiduciaries for their recommendations to retirement investors and, therefore, will need the protection provided by the exemption.

Continue reading Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #80: Compliance with PTE 2020-02: Insurance Distribution Issues (Part 2)

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Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #79: Compliance with PTE 2020-02: Insurance Distribution Issues (Part 1)

The Department of Labor’s “Fiduciary Rule,” PTE 2020-02: The FAQs

Key Takeaways

  • The DOL has issued FAQs that generally explain PTE 2020-02 and the expanded definition of fiduciary advice.
  • In FAQ 18, the DOL discusses the application of the requirements to the distribution of insurance products and the impact on insurance companies.
  • However, many insurance companies have decided against using PTE 2020-02 primarily because of the requirement that the insurance companies accept fiduciary status for the recommendations.
  • Instead, most insurance companies are relying on agents using PTE 84-24, and some are providing forms and educational materials to support that usage.
  • Meanwhile, the DOL is working on a further expanded fiduciary definition and a more demanding PTE 84-24 that will increase the oversight responsibilities for covered recommendations by insurance agents.

Background

The DOL’s prohibited transaction exemption (PTE) 2020-02 (Improving Investment Advice for Workers & Retirees), allows investment advisers, broker-dealers, banks, and insurance companies (“financial institu­tions”), and their representatives (“investment professionals”), to receive conflicted compensation resulting from non-discretionary fiduciary investment advice to ERISA retirement plans, participants (including rollover recommendations), and IRA owners (“retirement investors”). In addition, in the preamble to the PTE the DOL announced an expanded definition of fiduciary advice, meaning that many more financial institutions and investment professionals are fiduciaries for their recommendations to retirement investors and, therefore, will need the protection provided by the exemption.

Continue reading Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #79: Compliance with PTE 2020-02: Insurance Distribution Issues (Part 1)

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