Tag Archives: recommendation

The New Fiduciary Rule (50): What is a Best Interest Process?

Key Takeaways

  • The DOL’s new regulation defining fiduciary advice to include one-time recommendations has been stayed, but advisers who make ongoing individualized recommendations to ERISA-governed retirement plans, participants in those plans, and IRA owners continue to be fiduciaries subject to fiduciary standards. Those standards—prudence and loyalty—can be called a best interest standard.
  • However, the SEC’s fiduciary standard for one-time recommendations by investment advisers continues to apply. The SEC position is most recently documented in its Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers. The SEC said that the investment adviser duties of care and loyalty—taken together–are a best interest standard.
  • The best interest standard for both broker-dealers and investment advisers has been further defined by the SEC Staff in its Bulletin entitled Standards of Conduct for Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers Account Recommendations for Retail Investors.
  • In addition, one-time recommendations of insurance products are regulated by state insurance departments and almost all of the states have adopted NAIC Model Regulation #275, “Suitability in Annuity Transactions”, either verbatim or in large part, for recommendations of annuities. The NAIC has referred to this as a best interest standard.
  • This post discusses the basic requirements for a best interest process for making recommendations to ERISA-governed retirement plans, participants in those plans, and IRA owners.
  • Note that Reg BI and the NAIC model rule do not apply to recommendations to retirement plans, but do apply to participants and IRA owners, including rollover recommendations and recommendations to transfer IRAs.

If you study the rules of the various standard-setters, a pattern emerges about their expectations for the process for developing a best interest recommendation. The DOL and SEC are consistent in that regard, while the NAIC model rule is less demanding, as explained later in this article.

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The New Fiduciary Rule (49): Recommendations to Transfer IRAs (NAIC)

Key Takeaways

  • Two Texas Federal District Courts have “stayed” the effective dates of the DOL’s new fiduciary regulation and related exemptions, meaning that the private sector will not have to comply with those rules until the cases are resolved and if the guidance is vacated, those rules will never be effective.
  • As a result, one-time recommendations to plans, participants and IRA owners will not be fiduciary advice for purposes of ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code.
  • However, one-time recommendations of securities (and insurance products that are securities) are regulated by the SEC for broker-dealers and investment advisers.
  • In addition, one-time recommendations of insurance products are regulated by state insurance departments and almost all of the states have adopted NAIC Model Regulation #275, either verbatim or in large part.
  • This post covers NAIC Model Regulation #275’s provisions for recommending exchanges of individual retirement annuities (also referred to as qualified annuities).

The stay of the effective dates of the amended fiduciary regulation and amended exemptions means that the “old” DOL fiduciary regulation (the 5-part test) and the existing exemptions continue in effect indefinitely.

My last post, Fiduciary Rule 48, discussed the DOL’s “old” and continuing definition of fiduciary advice—the 5-part test—and how it might apply to recommendations to transfer IRAs—individual retirement accounts and individual retirement annuities. The post before that, Fiduciary Rule 47, discussed SEC and SEC staff guidance on recommendations to transfer IRAs. This post is about the application of the conduct standards in NAIC Model Regulation #275 to the recommendation of annuities. The Model Regulation has been adopted by substantially all of the states, either verbatim or in large part.

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The New Fiduciary Rule (48): Recommendations to Transfer IRAs (DOL)

Key Takeaways

    • Two Texas Federal District Courts have “stayed” the effective dates of the DOL’s new fiduciary regulation and related exemptions, meaning that the private sector will not have to comply with those rules until the cases are resolved and if the guidance is vacated, those rules will never be effective.
    • As a result, one-time recommendations to plans, participants and IRAs will not be fiduciary advice for purposes of ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code.
    • However, one-time recommendations are regulated by the SEC for broker-dealers and investment advisers and by state insurance departments for insurance producers (primarily under the NAIC Model Regulation #275 which has been adopted by most states).
    • My last post discussed SEC and SEC staff guidance on recommendations to transfer IRAs.
    • This post covers likely DOL interpretations concerning recommendations to transfer or exchange of individual retirement accounts and individual retirement annuities.
    • The third post in this series will cover NAIC Model Regulation #275’s provisions for recommending exchanges of individual retirement annuities (also referred to as qualified annuities).

The stay of the effective dates of the amended fiduciary regulation and amended exemptions means that the “old” DOL fiduciary regulation (the 5-part test) and the existing exemptions continue in effect indefinitely.

My last post, Fiduciary Rule 47, discussed SEC and SEC staff guidance on recommendations to transfer IRAs. This post is about the DOL’s likely interpretation of how the existing 5-part fiduciary definition applies to IRA transfer recommendations.

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The New Fiduciary Rule (47): Recommendations to Transfer IRAs (SEC)

Key Takeaways

  • Two Texas Federal District Courts have “stayed” the effective dates of the DOL’s new fiduciary regulation and related exemptions, meaning that the private sector will not have to comply with those rules until the cases are resolved.
  • As a result, one-time recommendations to plans, participants and IRAs will not be fiduciary advice for purposes of ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code. However, one-time recommendations are regulated by the SEC for broker-dealers and investment advisers and by state insurance departments for insurance producers (primarily under the NAIC Model Regulation #275 which has been adopted by most states).
  • This post discusses SEC and SEC staff guidance on recommendations to transfer IRAs. The next two will cover likely DOL interpretations and NAIC Model Regulation #275’s provisions concerning the transfer or exchange of individual retirement accounts and individual retirement annuities.

The stay of the effective dates of the amended fiduciary regulation and amended exemptions means that the “old” DOL fiduciary regulation (the 5-part test) and the existing exemptions continue in effect indefinitely. As a result, it is unlikely that one-time plan-to-IRA rollover recommendations will be fiduciary recommendations under ERISA or the Internal Revenue Code. However, the standards of conduct for recommendations to transfer IRAs (that is, either individual retirement accounts or individual retirement annuities) are also governed by other regulators (and may still be subject to the DOL’s “old” fiduciary definition). This article and the next two will discuss conduct standards for IRA (including qualified annuities) of  the SEC, NAIC and DOL.

The SEC’s guidance is found in Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI) for broker-dealers and the Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers (IA Interpretation). While Reg BI imposes a “best interest” standard and the IA Interpretation concerns  a fiduciary standard, the SEC staff, in its SEC Staff Bulletin: Standards of Conduct for Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers Account Recommendations for Retail Investors explained: Although the specific application of Reg BI and the IA fiduciary standard may differ in some respects and be triggered at different times, in the staff’s view, they generally yield substantially similar results in terms of the ultimate responsibilities owed to retail investors. [The emphasis is mine.]

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The New Fiduciary Rule (35): The Education Exception

Key Takeaways

  • The DOL’s final regulation defining non-discretionary fiduciary advice will be effective on September 23 of this year.
  • If a conflicted fiduciary recommendation is made, the requirements (called “conditions”) of PTEs 2020-02 and 84-24 will need to be satisfied in order to retain any compensation resulting from the recommendation.
  • However, absent a fiduciary recommendation, the relief afforded by the exemptions will not be needed.
  • There are three ways to engage with retirement investors without making a recommendation. Those are: “hire me”, education and unsolicited. This article discusses the educational approach.

The Department of Labor’s (DOL) final regulation defining fiduciary status for investment advice to retirement investors is effective on September 23, 2024. The related exemptions—PTE 2020-02 and 84-24—are partially effective on the same date. The exemptions provide relief from prohibited conflicts and compensation resulting from fiduciary recommendations to “retirement investors”—private sector retirement plans, participants in those plans (including rollover recommendations), and IRAs (including transfer and exchange recommendations).

However, the relief provided by the PTEs is not needed unless a conflicted fiduciary recommendation is made. In the preamble to the fiduciary regulation, the DOL described a recommendation as follows:

Whether a person has made a ‘‘recommendation’’ is a threshold element in establishing the existence of fiduciary investment advice. For purposes of the final rule, whether a recommendation has been made will turn on the facts and circumstances of the particular situation, including whether the communication reasonably could be viewed as a ‘‘call to action.
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The Department intends that whether a recommendation has been made will be construed in a manner consistent with the SEC’s framework in Regulation Best Interest.

But not every communication with retirement investors is a recommendation. There are three notable exceptions, two of which are discussed in the preamble to the regulation: education and “hire me.”

“Hire me” was discussed in my last post Fiduciary Rule 34.This article discusses the DOL’s position on investment and retirement education.

As background, the DOL has long held that investment education, if properly done, is not a recommendation and therefore does not cause the provider to be a fiduciary. The “bible” in terms of DOL guidance is Interpretive Bulletin (IB) 96-1.

In the preamble to the new final rule, the DOL definitively said:

  • Similarly, the rule makes clear that mere investment information or education, without an investment recommendation, is not treated as fiduciary advice.
  • The Department agrees that it is important that retirement investors continue to have access to information about the options available to them regarding rolling over, transferring or distributing retirement assets and that these discussions can be purely educational.
  • Paragraph (c)(1)(iii) also makes clear that the mere provision of investment information or education, without an investment recommendation, is not advice within the meaning of the final rule.

That was further confirmed in the regulation itself:

  • Similarly, the mere provision of investment information or education, without an investment recommendation, is not advice within the meaning of this rule.

However, it is not enough to just label a communication as education. As you might imagine, the information must be truly educational. My belief is that one test is whether the information is materially complete and unbiased. But let’s see what the DOL said in the preamble:

In general, for purposes of the final rule, the line between an investment recommendation and investment education or information will depend on whether there is a call to action. Thus, many of the types of information cited by commenters as important to retirement investors could be provided under the final rule without the imposition of fiduciary status. For example, like the SEC in Regulation Best Interest, the Department believes that ‘‘a general conversation about retirement planning, such as providing a company’s retirement plan options’’ to a retirement investor, would not rise to the level of a recommendation.

The preamble continues:

In this regard, the Department confirms that providing educational information and materials such as those described in IB 96–1 will not result in the provision of fiduciary investment advice as defined in the final rule absent a recommendation, regardless of the type of retirement investor to whom it is provided. Information on the benefits of plan participation and on the terms or operation of the plan, as described in the first category of investment education in the IB, clearly could include information relating to plan distributions and distribution options. Additionally, an analysis of the plan information category of investment education applied in the context of IRAs would allow such a plan sponsor or service provider to also provide a wide range non-fiduciary information about IRAs, such as tax benefits associated with rollovers into IRAs.

So, investment and retirement plan information and education will also work, if properly done, for IRA investing and planning and for rollover education.

The preamble goes on to say:

Likewise, the Department confirms that furnishing the categories of investment-related information and materials described in the ‘‘Investment Education’’ provision in the 2016 Final Rule would not result in the provision of fiduciary investment advice under the final rule. The provision in the 2016 Final Rule included, for example, information on ‘‘[g]eneral methods and strategies for managing assets in retirement (e.g., systemic withdrawal payments, annuitization, guaranteed minimum withdrawal benefits).’’

Keep in mind that the DOL is talking about education which, by definition, is somewhat generic and not individualized. The more individualized the communication, the greater the risk that it could be a recommendation subject to the fiduciary and prohibited transaction rules.

The DOL admonishes:

The Department emphasizes that the inquiry in this respect will focus on whether there is a call to action. Thus, the Department cautions providers against steering retirement investors towards certain courses of action under the guise of education. The SEC similarly stated in Regulation Best Interest that while certain descriptive information about employer sponsored plans would be treated as education, rather than as a recommendation, broker-dealers should ‘‘ensure that communications by their associated persons intended as ‘education’ do not cross the line into ‘recommendations.’ ”

As I said earlier, a key to knowing where the line is between education and recommendation is the individualization of the information. The more individualized the communication, the more likely it is a recommendation.

Concluding Thoughts

Yes, “education” still works as an alternative to a fiduciary recommendation. But it must be neutral education and information.

As FINRA pointed out in Regulatory Notice 13-45 (and I believe that the DOL would concur):

Some firms and their associated persons provide educational information to plan participants concerning their retirement choices. Firms that permit educational information only should adopt measures reasonably designed to ensure that the firm and its associated persons do not make recommendations for purposes of Rule 2111 to plan participants. These measures should include training concerning what statements may trigger application of Rule 2111, and consideration of the compensation arrangements that could cause an associated person to make a recommendation. To the extent that a firm prohibits recommendations to plan participants, supervisory personnel of the firm should reasonably monitor the communications to ensure that the prohibition is not compromised.   

To avoid the potential of “education” becoming recommendations, firms should have training and supervision (and hopefully supporting documentation) for the education that they will be delivering.

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The New Fiduciary Rule (34): The “Hire Me” Exception

Key Takeaways

  • The DOL’s final regulation defining non-discretionary fiduciary advice will be effective on September 23 of this year.
  • If a conflicted fiduciary recommendation is made, the requirements (called “conditions”) of PTEs 2020-02 and 84-24 will need to be satisfied in order to retain any compensation resulting from the recommendation.
  • However, absent a fiduciary recommendation, the relief afforded by the exemptions will not be needed.
  • There are three ways to engage with retirement investors without making a recommendation. Those are: “hire me”, education and unsolicited. This article discusses the “hire me” approach.

The Department of Labor’s (DOL) final regulation defining fiduciary status for investment advice to retirement investors is effective on September 23, 2024. The related exemptions—PTE 2020-02 and 84-24—are partially effective on the same date. The exemptions provide relief from prohibited conflicts and compensation resulting from fiduciary recommendations to “retirement investors”–private sector retirement plans, participants in those plans (including rollover recommendations), and IRAs (including transfer and exchange recommendations).

However, the relief provided by the PTEs is not needed unless a conflicted fiduciary recommendation is made. In the preamble to the fiduciary regulation, the DOL described a recommendation as follows:

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The New Fiduciary Rule (25): Robo Advice and Robo Conflicts

In November 2023, the U.S. Department of Labor released its package of proposed changes to the regulation defining fiduciary advice and to the exemptions for conflicts and compensation for investment recommendations to retirement plans, participants (including rollovers), and IRAs (including transfers). On March 8, 2024, the DOL sent the final rule to the Office of Management and Budget in the White House.

Key Takeaways

  • The DOL’s proposals make it clear that robo advice, both “hybrid” and “pure”, can be fiduciary advice, subject to the provisions of ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code.
  • When pure robo advice (no human directly involved) or hybrid robo advice is given, if it satisfies the regulatory definition of fiduciary advice, the financial institution will be a fiduciary under ERISA (if to an ERISA plan or a participant in such a plan) and subject to ERISA’s duties of prudence and loyalty.
  • If robo advice generates a fiduciary recommendation that is conflicted, the conflicted amount (e.g., commissions, management fees) will be a prohibited transaction under ERISA and the Code, which would necessitate compliance with the conditions of a prohibited transaction exemption (PTE).
  • This article discusses robo advice under PTE 2020-02.

Under the current PTE 2020-02, the exemptive relief is not extended to “pure” robo-advisers. Instead, only “hybrid” robo-advisers can provide nondiscretionary fiduciary advice to retirement investors where the advice is conflicted (e.g., proprietary investments, revenue sharing, commissions). However, when the proposed amendments to the PTE become final and applicable, compensation resulting from conflicted nondiscretionary advice will be permitted if the conditions of the exemption are satisfied.

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The New Fiduciary Rule (24): The DOL Fiduciary Rule Requires a Recommendation. What is That?

In November 2023, the U.S. Department of Labor released its package of proposed changes to the regulation defining fiduciary advice and to the exemptions for conflicts and compensation for investment recommendations to retirement plans, participants (including rollovers), and IRAs (including transfers). On March 8, 2024, the DOL sent the final rule to the Office of Management and Budget in the White House.

Key Takeaways

    • The DOL’s proposed fiduciary regulation includes a new and expanded definition of when a representative of a broker-dealer, investment adviser, bank or insurance company will become a fiduciary under ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code.
    • The new definition starts with whether a “recommendation” has been made. If a recommendation results in fiduciary status, but does not include a conflict of interest, the only purpose of the definition is to determine whether ERISA’s fiduciary standards apply to advice to ERISA-governed retirement plans (including participants in those plans). It would have no effect under the Code (e.g., IRAs) in that case.
    • However, if a fiduciary recommendation is conflicted, it will be a prohibited transaction under ERISA and the Code, which would necessitate compliance with the conditions of a prohibited transaction exemption (PTE).
    • This article discusses the definition of “recommendation.”

The preamble to the proposed fiduciary regulation describes the significance of a recommendation as follows:

Whether a person has made a ‘‘recommendation’’ is a threshold element in establishing the existence of fiduciary investment advice.

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The New Fiduciary Rule (22): Can Wholesalers Become Fiduciaries

The U.S. Department of Labor has released its package of proposed changes to the regulation defining fiduciary advice and to the exemptions for conflicts and compensation for investment recommendations to retirement plans, participants (including rollovers), and IRAs (including transfers).

Key Takeaways

  • It is, by now, well known that the expansive definition of fiduciary in the DOL’s proposed regulation will cause many more advisors and insurance agents to be fiduciaries for their recommendations to retirement investors. However, it is less known that the same rules can apply to wholesalers of securities and insurance products.
  • When a wholesaler becomes a fiduciary to a plan or an IRA, and the recommendation is made by the advisor or agent to and accepted by the IRA investor or plan fiduciary, there will likely be a prohibited transaction due to the wholesaler’s firm making money on the investment or insurance product.
  • Where a wholesaler prohibited transaction occurs, an exemption (PTE) will be needed, most likely PTE 2020-02.

When a person makes a “covered” fiduciary recommendation to a “retirement investor” and the recommendation, when implemented, results in the person (or his or her firm or an affiliate) receiving additional compensation, a prohibited transaction (under the Code and/or ERISA) will occur.

The proposed regulation defines a “retirement investor” as a: …plan, plan fiduciary, plan participant or beneficiary, IRA, IRA owner or beneficiary or IRA fiduciary (retirement investor). (The emphasis is mine.)

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The New Fiduciary Rule (17): Permissible Compensation under PTE 84-24

The U.S. Department of Labor has released its package of proposed changes to the regulation defining fiduciary advice and to the exemptions for conflicts and compensation for investment recommendations to retirement plans, participants (including rollovers), and IRAs.

Key Takeaways

  • ERISA’s fiduciary and prohibited transaction rules require consideration of costs and compensation when fiduciary recommendations are made to “retirement investors,” that is, to private sector retirement plans, participants in those plans, and IRA owners.
  • Where the Internal Revenue Code’s prohibited transaction rules would be violated, the protection of an exemption is needed. In that case, the protections of PTEs 84-24 and 2020-02 will require that costs and compensation be considered.
  • This article focuses on limitations on compensation under PTE 84-24.
  • While the general rule in ERISA and the Code is that compensation cannot be more than a reasonable amount, the PTE has additional limitations.

ERISA’s fiduciary responsibility rules require that costs, for investments, insurance products and services, be no more than a reasonable amount. In other words, a prudent process will consider the costs of products and services relative to their value to the retirement investor and relative to reasonably available alternatives. ERISA’s prohibited transaction rules, and the exemptions to the prohibitions, impose a similar limit on compensation when a fiduciary recommendation is conflicted, that is, the compensation cannot be more than a reasonable amount when compared to the value of services being offered. These rules apply to all ERISA-governed retirement plans and participant accounts in those plans (including rollover recommendations).

The Code has prohibited transaction provisions with similar limitations on compensation, that is, compensation cannot exceed a reasonable amount relative to the services provided. The Code limits apply to both tax-qualified retirement plans and IRAs (including individual retirement annuities). However, the Code does not have a standard of care for recommendations to IRA owners. Instead, the applicable standard of care is imposed by other laws and regulations (for example, the best interest standard for insurance agents in NAIC model rule 275).

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