Tag Archives: costs

The SECURE Act 2.0: The Most Impactful Provisions #7—Tax Credits for Administrative and Contribution Costs for New Plans for Small Employers (Part 2)

Key Takeaways

  • The SECURE Act 2.0 provides significant tax credits for startup plan costs—for both administration and contribution costs.
  • The credits are fully available for employers with 50 or fewer employees and partially available up to 100 employees.
  • This provision is effective now, that is, it is effective for tax years beginning after December 31, 2022 (in 2023 for calendar year taxpayers).

The President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, which included SECURE Act 2.0, on December 29, 2022.

SECURE Act 2.0 has over 90 provisions, some major and some minor; some mandatory and some optional; some retroactively effective and some that won’t be effective for years to come. One difference between the SECURE Act 2.0 and previous retirement plan laws is that many of 2.0’s provisions are optional…that is, plan sponsors are not required to adopt the provisions, but can if they decide that the change will help their plans and participants. This series discusses the provisions that are likely to be the most impactful, either as options or as required changes.

This article and the next one discusses the “optional” provisions that provide significant tax credits for startup plans for small employers. The Senate Finance Committee’s summary of the provision explains:

Section 102, Modification of credit for small employer pension plan startup costs. The 3-year small business startup credit is currently 50 percent of administrative costs, up to an annual cap of $5,000. Section 102 [of the Act] makes changes to the credit by increasing the startup credit from 50 percent to 100 percent for employers with up to 50 employees. Except in the case of defined benefit plans, an additional credit is provided. The amount of the additional credit generally will be a percentage of the amount contributed by the employer on behalf of employees, up to a per-employee cap of $1,000. This full additional credit is limited to employers with 50 or fewer employees and phased out for employers with between 51 and 100 employees. The applicable percentage is 100 percent in the first and second years, 75 percent in the third year, 50 percent in the fourth year, 25 percent in the fifth year – and no credit for tax years thereafter. Section 102 is effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2022.

My last post (SECURE Act 2.0 #6 (Part 1)) covered the expanded tax credit for start-up  costs; this one covers the tax credit for employer contributions.

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The SECURE Act 2.0: The Most Impactful Provisions #6 – Tax Credits for Administrative and Contribution Costs for New Plans for Small Employers (Part 1)

Key Takeaways

  • The SECURE Act 2.0 provides significant tax credits for startup plan costs—for both administration and contribution costs.
  • The credits are fully available for employers with 50 or fewer employees and partially available up to 100 employees.
  • This provision is effective now, that is, it is effective for tax years beginning after December 31, 2022 (in 2023 for calendar year taxpayers).

The President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, which included SECURE Act 2.0, on December 29, 2022.

SECURE Act 2.0 has over 90 provisions, some major and some minor; some mandatory and some optional; some retroactively effective and some that won’t be effective for years to come. One difference between the SECURE Act 2.0 and previous retirement plan laws is that so many of 2.0’s provisions are optional…that is, plan sponsors are not required to adopt the provisions, but can if they decide that the change will help their plans and participants. This series discusses the provisions that are likely to be the most impactful, either as options or as required changes.

This article and the next one discusses the “optional” provisions that provide significant tax credits for startup plans for small employers. The Senate Finance Committee’s summary of the provision explains:

Continue reading The SECURE Act 2.0: The Most Impactful Provisions #6 – Tax Credits for Administrative and Contribution Costs for New Plans for Small Employers (Part 1)

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Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #49

The Department of Labor’s “Fiduciary Rule,” PTE 2020-02 (Part 14): The Two Compensation Requirements: Reasonable Compensation and Mitigation


This series focused on the DOL’s new fiduciary “rule”. This post is the 14th in a subseries discussing special or unique compliance issues related to the rule. This article looks at the issues related to complying with the rule’s reasonable compensation and mitigation requirements, with particular emphasis on broker-dealers and investment advisers.


On February 16, 2021, the DOL’s prohibited transaction exemption (PTE) 2020-02 became effective. (Improving Investment Advice for Workers & Retirees) It allows investment advisers, broker-dealers, banks, and insurance companies (“financial institutions”), and their representatives (“investment professionals”), to receive conflicted compensation resulting from non-discretionary fiduciary investment advice to retirement plans, participants and IRA owners (“retirement investors”).

In the preamble to the PTE, the DOL announced an expanded definition of fiduciary advice, meaning that many more financial institutions and investment professionals will be fiduciaries and therefore will need the protections afforded by the exemption. They will also need to satisfy the best interest standard of care. The relief provided by the exemption is conditional, that is, the “conditions” in the exemption must be satisfied to obtain relief from the prohibited transaction rules in ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code. For the period from February 16 until December 20, a DOL and IRS non-enforcement policy based on the Impartial Conduct Standards will be available.

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Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #48

The Department of Labor’s “Fiduciary Rule,” PTE 2020-02 (Part 13): The Two Compensation Requirements: Reasonable Compensation and Mitigation


On February 16, 2021, the DOL’s prohibited transaction exemption (PTE) 2020-02 became effective. (Improving Investment Advice for Workers & Retirees) It allows investment advisers, broker-dealers, banks, and insurance companies (“financial institutions”), and their representatives (“investment professionals”), to receive conflicted compensation resulting from non-discretionary fiduciary investment advice to retirement plans, participants and IRA owners (“retirement investors”).

In the preamble to the PTE, the DOL announced an expanded definition of fiduciary advice, meaning that many more financial institutions and investment professionals will be fiduciaries and therefore will need the protections afforded by the exemption. They will also need to satisfy the best interest standard of care. The relief provided by the exemption is conditional. That is, the “conditions” in the exemption must be satisfied. For the period from February 16 until December 20, a DOL and IRS non-enforcement policy based on the Impartial Conduct Standards will be available.

This article builds on my earlier posts: Part 11, Mitigation, and Part 12, Reasonable Compensation. They are connected in the sense that unreasonably high compensation would be difficult to mitigate.

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Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #47

The Department of Labor’s “Fiduciary Rule,” PTE 2020-02 (Part 12): The Requirement that Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers to Receive No More Than Reasonable Compensation


On February 16, 2021, the DOL’s prohibited transaction exemption (PTE) 2020-02 became effective. The PTE is titled “Improving Investment Advice for Workers & Retirees.” It allows investment advisers, broker-dealers, banks, and insurance companies (“financial institutions”), and their representatives (“investment professionals”), to receive conflicted compensation resulting from non-discretionary fiduciary investment advice to retirement plans, participants and IRA owners (“retirement investors”).

In the preamble to the PTE, the DOL announced an expanded definition of fiduciary advice, meaning that many more financial institutions and investment professionals will be fiduciaries and therefore will need the protections afforded by the exemption. In addition, they will need prudent, or best practice, processes to satisfy the fiduciary and best interest standards of care.

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Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #34

Regulation Best Interest: Best Interest and Suitability—How They Differ (Part 5)

Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI) imposes a “best interest” standard of care on broker-dealers for their recommendations of securities and investment strategies to retail customers. That raises the question, what does best interest mean and how does it differ from suitability?

Parts 1, 2 and 3 of this series (Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #30, #31 and #32) explain that the difference between best interest and suitability is not easily defined. However, based on the SEC’s discussion in the Adopting Release for Reg BI, I provided five examples of where best interest appears to impose a more demanding standard than suitability. These examples focus on the Reg BI requirement that broker-dealers (and their registered representatives) consider costs in the development of recommendations. While costs are not the only factor to be considered, the SEC says that “best interest” makes cost a more important factor than it was under the suitability standard.

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Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #33

Regulation Best Interest: Best Interest and Suitability—How They Differ (Part 4)

Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI) imposes a “best interest” standard of care on broker-dealers for their recommendations of securities and investment strategies to retail customers. That raises the question, what does best interest mean and how does it differ from suitability?

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Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #32

Regulation Best Interest: Best Interest and Suitability—How They Differ (Part 3)

Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI) imposes a “best interest” standard of care on broker-dealers for their recommendations of securities and investment strategies to retail customers. That raises the question, what does best interest mean and how does it differ from suitability?

(Note:  While the discussion in this article is based on Reg BI’s best interest requirements for broker-dealers, the SEC has also imposed a best interest standard on investment advisers. As a result, investment advisers should also be attentive to these issues.)

As I explained in Parts 1 and 2 of this article (Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #30 and #31), the difference between best interest and suitability is a hard question without an easy answer. However, based on the SEC’s discussion in the Adopting Release, I have developed examples of where best interest appears to impose a more demanding standard than suitability. These examples focus on the Reg BI requirement that broker-dealers (and their registered representatives) consider costs in the development of recommendations. While costs are not the only factor to be considered, the SEC says that the best interest rule makes cost a more important factor than it was under the suitability standard.

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Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #31

Regulation Best Interest: Best Interest and Suitability—How They Differ (Part 2)

Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI) imposes a “best interest” standard of care on broker-dealers for their recommendations of securities and investment strategies to retail customers. That raises the question, what does best interest mean and how does it differ from suitability?

While the discussion in this article is based on the Reg BI best interest requirements for broker-dealers, the SEC has also imposed a best interest standard on investment advisers.  As a result, investment advisers should also be attentive to these issues.

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Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #30

Regulation Best Interest: Best Interest and Suitability-How They Differ (Part 1)

Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI) imposes a “best interest” standard of care on broker-dealers for their recommendations of securities and investment strategies to retail customer. That raises the question, what does best interest mean and how does it differ from suitability? That’s a hard question without an easy answer. Even the SEC acknowledges in the adopting release for Reg BI that:
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