Tag Archives: education

The New Fiduciary Rule (35): The Education Exception

Key Takeaways

  • The DOL’s final regulation defining non-discretionary fiduciary advice will be effective on September 23 of this year.
  • If a conflicted fiduciary recommendation is made, the requirements (called “conditions”) of PTEs 2020-02 and 84-24 will need to be satisfied in order to retain any compensation resulting from the recommendation.
  • However, absent a fiduciary recommendation, the relief afforded by the exemptions will not be needed.
  • There are three ways to engage with retirement investors without making a recommendation. Those are: “hire me”, education and unsolicited. This article discusses the educational approach.

The Department of Labor’s (DOL) final regulation defining fiduciary status for investment advice to retirement investors is effective on September 23, 2024. The related exemptions—PTE 2020-02 and 84-24—are partially effective on the same date. The exemptions provide relief from prohibited conflicts and compensation resulting from fiduciary recommendations to “retirement investors”—private sector retirement plans, participants in those plans (including rollover recommendations), and IRAs (including transfer and exchange recommendations).

However, the relief provided by the PTEs is not needed unless a conflicted fiduciary recommendation is made. In the preamble to the fiduciary regulation, the DOL described a recommendation as follows:

Whether a person has made a ‘‘recommendation’’ is a threshold element in establishing the existence of fiduciary investment advice. For purposes of the final rule, whether a recommendation has been made will turn on the facts and circumstances of the particular situation, including whether the communication reasonably could be viewed as a ‘‘call to action.
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The Department intends that whether a recommendation has been made will be construed in a manner consistent with the SEC’s framework in Regulation Best Interest.

But not every communication with retirement investors is a recommendation. There are three notable exceptions, two of which are discussed in the preamble to the regulation: education and “hire me.”

“Hire me” was discussed in my last post Fiduciary Rule 34.This article discusses the DOL’s position on investment and retirement education.

As background, the DOL has long held that investment education, if properly done, is not a recommendation and therefore does not cause the provider to be a fiduciary. The “bible” in terms of DOL guidance is Interpretive Bulletin (IB) 96-1.

In the preamble to the new final rule, the DOL definitively said:

  • Similarly, the rule makes clear that mere investment information or education, without an investment recommendation, is not treated as fiduciary advice.
  • The Department agrees that it is important that retirement investors continue to have access to information about the options available to them regarding rolling over, transferring or distributing retirement assets and that these discussions can be purely educational.
  • Paragraph (c)(1)(iii) also makes clear that the mere provision of investment information or education, without an investment recommendation, is not advice within the meaning of the final rule.

That was further confirmed in the regulation itself:

  • Similarly, the mere provision of investment information or education, without an investment recommendation, is not advice within the meaning of this rule.

However, it is not enough to just label a communication as education. As you might imagine, the information must be truly educational. My belief is that one test is whether the information is materially complete and unbiased. But let’s see what the DOL said in the preamble:

In general, for purposes of the final rule, the line between an investment recommendation and investment education or information will depend on whether there is a call to action. Thus, many of the types of information cited by commenters as important to retirement investors could be provided under the final rule without the imposition of fiduciary status. For example, like the SEC in Regulation Best Interest, the Department believes that ‘‘a general conversation about retirement planning, such as providing a company’s retirement plan options’’ to a retirement investor, would not rise to the level of a recommendation.

The preamble continues:

In this regard, the Department confirms that providing educational information and materials such as those described in IB 96–1 will not result in the provision of fiduciary investment advice as defined in the final rule absent a recommendation, regardless of the type of retirement investor to whom it is provided. Information on the benefits of plan participation and on the terms or operation of the plan, as described in the first category of investment education in the IB, clearly could include information relating to plan distributions and distribution options. Additionally, an analysis of the plan information category of investment education applied in the context of IRAs would allow such a plan sponsor or service provider to also provide a wide range non-fiduciary information about IRAs, such as tax benefits associated with rollovers into IRAs.

So, investment and retirement plan information and education will also work, if properly done, for IRA investing and planning and for rollover education.

The preamble goes on to say:

Likewise, the Department confirms that furnishing the categories of investment-related information and materials described in the ‘‘Investment Education’’ provision in the 2016 Final Rule would not result in the provision of fiduciary investment advice under the final rule. The provision in the 2016 Final Rule included, for example, information on ‘‘[g]eneral methods and strategies for managing assets in retirement (e.g., systemic withdrawal payments, annuitization, guaranteed minimum withdrawal benefits).’’

Keep in mind that the DOL is talking about education which, by definition, is somewhat generic and not individualized. The more individualized the communication, the greater the risk that it could be a recommendation subject to the fiduciary and prohibited transaction rules.

The DOL admonishes:

The Department emphasizes that the inquiry in this respect will focus on whether there is a call to action. Thus, the Department cautions providers against steering retirement investors towards certain courses of action under the guise of education. The SEC similarly stated in Regulation Best Interest that while certain descriptive information about employer sponsored plans would be treated as education, rather than as a recommendation, broker-dealers should ‘‘ensure that communications by their associated persons intended as ‘education’ do not cross the line into ‘recommendations.’ ”

As I said earlier, a key to knowing where the line is between education and recommendation is the individualization of the information. The more individualized the communication, the more likely it is a recommendation.

Concluding Thoughts

Yes, “education” still works as an alternative to a fiduciary recommendation. But it must be neutral education and information.

As FINRA pointed out in Regulatory Notice 13-45 (and I believe that the DOL would concur):

Some firms and their associated persons provide educational information to plan participants concerning their retirement choices. Firms that permit educational information only should adopt measures reasonably designed to ensure that the firm and its associated persons do not make recommendations for purposes of Rule 2111 to plan participants. These measures should include training concerning what statements may trigger application of Rule 2111, and consideration of the compensation arrangements that could cause an associated person to make a recommendation. To the extent that a firm prohibits recommendations to plan participants, supervisory personnel of the firm should reasonably monitor the communications to ensure that the prohibition is not compromised.   

To avoid the potential of “education” becoming recommendations, firms should have training and supervision (and hopefully supporting documentation) for the education that they will be delivering.

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The New Fiduciary Rule (24): The DOL Fiduciary Rule Requires a Recommendation. What is That?

In November 2023, the U.S. Department of Labor released its package of proposed changes to the regulation defining fiduciary advice and to the exemptions for conflicts and compensation for investment recommendations to retirement plans, participants (including rollovers), and IRAs (including transfers). On March 8, 2024, the DOL sent the final rule to the Office of Management and Budget in the White House.

Key Takeaways

    • The DOL’s proposed fiduciary regulation includes a new and expanded definition of when a representative of a broker-dealer, investment adviser, bank or insurance company will become a fiduciary under ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code.
    • The new definition starts with whether a “recommendation” has been made. If a recommendation results in fiduciary status, but does not include a conflict of interest, the only purpose of the definition is to determine whether ERISA’s fiduciary standards apply to advice to ERISA-governed retirement plans (including participants in those plans). It would have no effect under the Code (e.g., IRAs) in that case.
    • However, if a fiduciary recommendation is conflicted, it will be a prohibited transaction under ERISA and the Code, which would necessitate compliance with the conditions of a prohibited transaction exemption (PTE).
    • This article discusses the definition of “recommendation.”

The preamble to the proposed fiduciary regulation describes the significance of a recommendation as follows:

Whether a person has made a ‘‘recommendation’’ is a threshold element in establishing the existence of fiduciary investment advice.

Continue reading The New Fiduciary Rule (24): The DOL Fiduciary Rule Requires a Recommendation. What is That?

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The New Fiduciary Rule (8): Special Issues—Robo Advice and Investment Education

The U.S. Department of Labor has released its package of proposed changes to the regulation defining fiduciary advice and to the exemptions for conflicts and compensation for investment advice to plans, participants (including rollovers), and IRAs (including transfers).

Key Takeaways

  • The Department of Labor’s proposed regulation defining fiduciary investment and insurance advice to private sector retirement plans, participants in those plans, and IRA owners (collectively, “retirement investors”) includes three distinct definitions.
  • While the current version of PTE 2020-02 does not extend relief for prohibited transactions resulting from robo advice (that is, it requires a human intermediary), the proposal would extend the PTE’s protections to conflicts of interest (that is, prohibited transactions) so long as the conditions of the exemption are satisfied.
  • Some commenters have suggested that the new definitions of fiduciary status and of covered transactions are so broad that investment education would be considered fiduciary advice. To be polite, that is an exaggeration.

My last post, The New Fiduciary Rule (7), discuss the “non-discretionary” definition of fiduciary investment advice in the DOL’s proposed fiduciary regulation. The other two definitions of fiduciary status are covered by my posts The New Fiduciary Rule (5) and The New Fiduciary Rule (6).

The proposed definition of non-discretionary fiduciary advice is a material change from the current regulation because it eliminates the 5-part test, including the requirement that advice be given to the particular retirement investor on a “regular basis.” In other words, a one-time recommendation can be fiduciary advice under this definition. (The definition is somewhat more demanding that just “one-time advice,” but I will refer to it as one-time advice for purposes of this article. If you want to know more about the detailed definition, look at my last post.)

Continue reading The New Fiduciary Rule (8): Special Issues—Robo Advice and Investment Education

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The SECURE Act 2.0: The Most Impactful Provisions #10 — Moving 529 Assets to a Roth IRA

Key Takeaways

  • Prior to the SECURE Act 2.0, if a 529 plan beneficiary did not use all of the funds for qualified education expenses (for example, the beneficiary graduated without using all of the funds in the 529), the options for withdrawal were not particularly attractive.
  • However, under the new law, those “excess’ funds can be transferred to a Roth IRA for the 529 beneficiary, subject to certain limitations.
  • As a result, contributions can now be made to 529 plans with the knowledge that, if not all of the funds are used for the education of the beneficiary, the excess funds can be transferred to a Roth IRA for that beneficiary (and the other options, such as transferring the money to a 529 for a different beneficiary remain available).

The President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, which included SECURE Act 2.0, on December 29, 2022.

SECURE Act 2.0 has over 90 provisions, some major and some minor; some mandatory and some optional; some retroactively effective and some that won’t be effective for years to come. One difference between the SECURE Act 2.0 and previous retirement plan laws is that many of 2.0’s provisions are optional…that is, plan sponsors are not required to adopt the provisions, but can if they decide that the change will help their plans and participants. This series discusses the provisions that are likely to be the most impactful, either as options or as required changes.

This article discusses one of the optional provisions that is available beginning next year, 2024. While most of my posts are about retirement plans and related issues, this is more of a financial planning matter, but it does include a retirement aspect, that is, a Roth IRA.

Continue reading The SECURE Act 2.0: The Most Impactful Provisions #10 — Moving 529 Assets to a Roth IRA

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Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #17

Regulation Best Interest: Education vs. Recommendation (Rollovers Part 3)

The SEC has issued its final Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI), Form CRS Regulation, RIA Interpretation and Solely Incidental Interpretation. I am discussing the SEC’s guidance in a series of articles entitled “Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors.”


In my last post, Best Interest for Advisors #16, I pointed out that, if a broker-dealer’s advisor recommended that a participant rollover his or her benefits in a workplace retirement plan to an IRA, it would be subject to the best interest standard of care (when Reg BI applies on June 30, 2020). (Best Interest for Advisors #15 discussed the process and factors to be considered to make a best interest rollover recommendation.)

My last post then went on to discuss rollover education and information . . . as opposed to a rollover recommendation. If properly done, the education and information approach can be used by broker-dealers if they are concerned about the difficulty of gathering the information for a rollover recommendation and the process for evaluating that information.

Continue reading Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #17

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Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #16

Regulation Best Interest: Education vs. Recommendation (Rollovers Part 2)

The SEC has issued its final Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI), Form CRS Regulation, RIA Interpretation and Solely Incidental Interpretation. I am discussing the SEC’s guidance in a series of articles entitled “Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors.”


In my last post, Best Interest for Advisors #15, I discussed the “best interest” standard for broker-dealers and their advisors and how it applies to rollover recommendations. (Keep in mind that Reg BI doesn’t apply until June 30, 2020.)

Until then the suitability standard applies and it only covers recommendations that involve securities transactions, for example, recommendations to rollover from a 401(k) plan, which requires that a participant liquidate the securities in his 401(k) account. When Reg BI applies, all rollover recommendations from all plans (e.g., including pension plans—where the participant doesn’t liquidate investments in order to rollover and non-ERISA plans, such as government plans).

Continue reading Best Interest Standard of Care for Advisors #16

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